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This thesis tackles the problem of realism in science by examining the analyses and insights
that pluralism and perspectivism might o0fer. Scienti-.c perspectivism was introduced by 
Giere (2006) as a way to use insights from the semantic analysis of theories to strike a 
middle ground between realism and anti-realism about science, which I discus in chapter 
1. The project here atempts a similar balance in the context of disagreement in speci-.c 
scienti-.c-historical contexts. It does so by suggesting we think of some forms of 
disagreement as taxonomic, or identity, disagreements. Scientists use perspectival 
taxonomies and when problems with a given taxonomy arise, rival “perspectives” emerge 
(hence perspectivism is a form of pluralism). Such problems can be resolved by appeal to 
trans-perspectival standards of asesment. This approach has the advantage of being 
sensitive to the historical context in which past theories were used, a virtue that anti-realist 
views typicaly have. At the same time, perspectivism does not fal into an anti-realist 
atitude toward science because it is compatible with stronger realist commitments to the 
interpretation of scienti-.c theories. 
To make this argument, I -.rst discus how data and data-to-phenomena 
inferences depend upon perspectival taxonomy (in chapter 2) and hence cannot always be 
used unambiguously to resolve disagreements. I next articulate the perspectival view, 
defend it, and situate it within the literature on scienti-.c pluralism in chapter 3. Chapter 4 
provides a perspectival interpretation of a paradigmatic case of historical disagreement: the
Chemical Revolution and the debate between Lavoisier and Priestley on oxygen and 
phlogiston. In chapter 5 I distinguish and defend my own view against two in?@uential 
alternatives (relativism and pragmatism) that also aspire to provide insightful analyses of 




There are two extreme atitudes we might take toward scienti-.c products, such as theory, 
scienti-.c explanations, or scienti-.c models. Of particular interest here is the suces of 
those products, where succes encompases things like good predictions, the ability to 
develop technology, accurate explanations, and whatever other positive results we take 
science to provide. The -.rst atitude, realism, suggests the succes of science is best 
understood in terms of truth or approximate truth, suitably de-.ned. An implication of 
this atitude is that the truth or approximate truth of a theory, say, is independent of 
human cognition, i.e. whether a theory is true is independent of whether there is someone 
who can know whether it is true. The other atitude, anti-realism, suggests truth, 
approximate truth, and independence of human cognition are unsuitable concepts for 
understanding the succes of science. Typicaly, these two atitudes form a dichotomy, but
there are also a number of atempts to bridge the gap between them. One such atempt, 
which this thesis wil elaborate, is perspectivism, so caled because its proponents take 
human vision as a metaphor. Crudely, it is posible for us, humans, to perceive the world 
around us because of two preconditions; one is a world that exists independently of our 
perceptual organs and the other is those perceptual organs. Other views, perspectivists 
might argue, run into trouble by thinking that to understand scienti-.c succes, only the 
world is necesary (realists) or only perceptual organs are necesary (anti-realists). By 
alowing both, perspectivists hope to move beyond the realism/anti-realism dichotomy. 
This thesis argues for a perspectival interpretation of science.
To make this argument, I -.rst discus how data cannot be used as certain realists 
intend to ground their views because there is a human cognitive element to them (in 
chapter 2) and hence cannot always be used unambiguously to resolve disagreements. I 
next articulate the perspectival view, defend it, and situate it within the philosophical 
literature in chapter 3. Chapter 4 provides a perspectival interpretation of a paradigmatic 
case of historical disagreement: the Chemical Revolution and the debate between 
Lavoisier and Priestley on oxygen and phlogiston. In chapter 5 I distinguish and defend 
my own view against two in?@uential anti-realist alternatives (relativism and pragmatism) 
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This thesis is an atempt to use perspectivism as a lens for furthering our understanding of
realism in science, particularly in the face of disagreements and great conceptual change. In
chapter 1, I situate and motivate perspectivism, showing how proponents of this view have
atempted, and sometimes failed, to mediate between realism and anti-realism. Failure is 
ofLen asociated with an inability to account for the empirical side of science. The next step
in my analysis is to addres scienti-.c evidence. Within science, one typicaly expects 
empirical evidence, especialy in the form of data, to resolve disagreements, test theory, or 
justify theoretical change. However, chapter 2 argues that data and evidence are distinct. I 
make this distinction by arguing data are representational, but not mind-independent 
evidence because they depend upon the conceptual taxonomy.
Chapter 3 provides clari-.cation on what the conceptual taxonomy is. I situate my 
view in the literature on epistemic pluralism. Many existing accounts approach pluralism 
from a pragmatic position. I suggest there are some limits on this line of thought and 
argue we should understand pluralism primarily as conceptual and therefore taxonomic. I 
draw on resources from the philosophy of language, particularly Witgenstein, in making 
this claim. Two features of this account are that it takes language to be a kind of practical 
ability and sharing a conceptual taxonomy is a precondition for belonging to the same 
practice. 
In chapter 4 I ilustrate the perspectival view using the Chemical Revolution. In 
chapter 5 I contrast perspectivism with two other views—relativism and scienti-.c 
pragmatism—that also purport to advance our thinking about disagreement and change. 
Pragmatism and relativism both struggle with accounting for the objectivity, or at least 
inter-subjectivity, of science. They also suppose it is posible to make sweeping claims 
about the variety of epistemic positions, while denying that there is such a position to 
make such claims. Perspectivism avoids both of these isues. It suggests disagreements arise
between those with shared background. The evaluation of scienti-.c products is 





Realism, Anti-Realism, and the Promise of Perspectives
There is no outside; outside you cannot breathe—
Where does this idea come from?
It is like a pair of glases on our nose 
through which we see whatever we look at. 
It never occurs to us to take them o0f. 
—Witgenstein Philosophical Investigations
1.0 Introduction
This introductory chapter provides context and motivation for a new view of scienti-.c 
disagreement and conceptual change that draws on perspectivism. Giere has recently re-
articulated perspectivism as a model-based approach to analysing science that shares some 
commitments with both realists and non-realists. Each of these camps is susceptible to two
opposing isues that any account of science should strive to avoid. On the one hand, an 
account of science should be sensitive to the historical and social context in which 
scientists work. On the other, a satisfactory account should acknowledge that science is an 
empirical inquiry and as such, scientists are responsive to, and answerable to, empirical 
constraints, whatever those might be. Realists tend to struggle with the -.rst isue and non-
realists, particularly constructivists, with providing a satisfactory explanation for science’s 
empirical succeses. I believe perspectivism as Giere articulates it also shares these 
di0-.culties with constructivists, though I hope to advance the perspectival view by 
clarifying its scope and applying it speci-.caly to cases of disagreement and conceptual 
change.
In this chapter, I describe the realists’ commitments (section 1.1) and why anti-realists 
might depart from them (section 1.2). I argue that some forms of realism wrongly ignore 
the scienti-.c context. One way of avoiding this problem is to build an account of science 
using a conceptual taxonomy (section 1.3). This is di0-.cult to do without faling into 
strong constructivism and ant-realism. Perspectivism o0fers another approach, but I 
suggest this view easily encounters problems similar to those faced by constructivists 
(section 1.4). But these problems are not endemic. I discus where perspectivism has been 
succesful (section 1.4.5) and how this thesis wil further develop the view (section 1.5).
1
1.1 Realism and its Tenets
As Hacking notes (1983, chap. 1), di0ferent realists at di0ferent times have used the term 
“real” to elicit di0ferent contrasts and resist di0ferent “anti-realist” positions. 
Consequently, realism is not easily captured by a broad brush. There are, however, three 
commitments realists ofLen have: a metaphysical, a semantic, and an epistemic 
commitment (Psilos 1999, xix). Not every realist accepts al three and some forms of 
realism do not explicitly endorse any. 
1.The metaphysical commitment is to the existence of a mind-independent world. 
That commitment could take several forms such as mind-independent existence of
entities (Hacking 1983), structure (Ladyman 1998), or natural kinds (Boyd 1991), or
combinations of these. This is the most central commitment that realists have and 
it is meant to satisfy a simple intuition about the nature of the world. 
2.The realist semantic commitment is to the literal interpretation of theories, i.e. the 
terms used in a scienti-.c theory have referents. This is also a commitment to 
bivalence. One of the main purposes of this commitment is to put observable and 
unobservable features of the world on par, at least to the extent that we should 
take at face-value the descriptions of any scienti-.c theory under consideration, 
regardles of whether the entities it postulates are observable or not.
3.Epistemicaly, realists are commited to the truth or approximate truth of scienti-.c
theories and contemporary theories have greater approximate truth than past 
theories. Kuhn-los and incommensurability, phenomena that contest progres in 
science, are particular foils for this commitment. 
Taken together, these commitments would form a position that takes a realistic 
interpretation of each main feature of science (metaphysics, semantics, and knowledge). It 
is, therefore, a very commiting form of realism. To be anti-realist, one need only reject 
some combination of these premises. There are therefore a number of di0ferent ways of 
rejecting realism. For example, constructive empiricists mainly reject epistemic realism
(Van Fraasen 1980, chap. 1), so are mostly opposed to 3, but they also think we should 
literaly interpret theories, making them semantic realists. Some social constructivists 
would accept 2 and even 3 while mainly taking isue with 1.1 
1 Bloor for example accepts a form of corespondence (David Bloor 1999, 89), but denies 
that the corespondence is mind-independent.
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Endorsing al three tenets is a very strong commitment to realism, but there are 
also les strict forms of realism. As van Fraasen articulates it, realism is minimaly 
commited to the folowing:
Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literaly true story of what the world is like; and acceptance 
of a scienti-.c theory involves the belief that it is true (1980, 8).
This suggests that, minimaly, one could be a realist about science (and accept tenet 3) 
while remaining non-commital on the other two points. A ful blown and strong anti-
realism, this suggests, would need to reject only 3, as van Fraasen does.
Hacking articulates a realism that is even les commital than epistemic realism. He
is a self-described entity realist (Hacking 1983, chap. 1), i.e. he takes a realistic interpretation
of entities like electrons while avoiding commitment to a realistic reading of scienti-.c 
theory. In defending entity realism, he suggests we take our ability to use an entity for 
investigating other phenomena as a criterion for its existence. This may sound like 
straightforward ontological realism, but there a key di0ference. He proposes the criterion 
gives us the basis for not doubting existence: famously, “if you can spray them, then they 
are real” (Ibid. 22). So, if we can use, say, an electron to investigate some other 
phenomenon, we have no basis for doubting that electron’s existence. The key point here 
is that realism is not a positive claim about the existence of entities generaly, it is 
asociated with specifying under what conditions it is suitable to doubt an entity’s 
existence. Such a realism is a realism by default (we take a realistic interpretation 
automaticaly once there is no basis for doubt). More generaly we might say that 
Hacking’s view suggests that raising the realist question is only posible in certain contexts.
Cartwright o0fers an even starker view of the esential limitations of realist 
questions: “When you can spray them, they exist” (1994, 325). So while Hacking suggests 
there are contexts where doubting existence is no longer posible, Cartwright emphasizes 
that the claims we take to be true are only true in very constrained and speci-.c contexts. 
She is particularly interested in the truth of scienti-.c laws, but the point applies generaly 
to scienti-.c claims we take to be true. Realism, this suggests, is not a general problem 
about the sciences, but a problem that sometimes arises localy within the sciences.
The atitude Hacking and Cartwright take toward realism is the form of realism 
that is most congenial for the account of perspectivism I wil defend in later chapters. The 
realist question, I wil suggest, arises in speci-.c cases in conjunction with an identity 
problem, a di0ferent kind of problems that ofLen needs to be addresed with logical 
priority over existence. 
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However, why should we not just adopt al three of the stronger realist 
commitments? One important reason is the insensitivity these commitments tend to show
toward the epistemic context, a problem Hacking and especialy Cartwright highlight. 
There are many other reasons as wel, but this insensitivity is particularly relevant for 
understanding why a constrained version of realism is preferable to a strong, ful blown 
commitment to al three realist tenets. 
1.2 The Departure from Realism
Relativism and constructivism are two long and rich traditions that reject realism and part 
of their rejection stems from the insensitivity realism shows towards the epistemic context 
when evaluating the products of science. Speci-.caly, realism tends to focus on theory and 
whether it is true in the abstract. In doing so, it ignores the epistemic context. I discus 
what the problem is, how the realists neglect the context, and argue the problem is serious.
 The insensitivity to context can emerge from an analysis of theory in the abstract 
and such an analysis is ofLen a starting point for a rejection of realism. Bloor (2016), who is 
a part of that long tradition that rejects realism,2 has articulated one form this rejection can
take. He claims mistaken analyses of science get into trouble by treating a body of 
propositions as having truth-status independently of any and al historical and social 
contexts. This is a rejection of the posibility of evaluating beliefs or claims independently 
of contexts in which they feature and this is antithetical to the realist approach to science, 
an approach that examines the truth of theoretical claims independently of any historical 
or social contexts.3
Sociology is not the only -.eld to raise these concerns about the role of context in 
evaluating theory. Cartwright, as mentioned above, rejects a widespread a-contextual 
analysis of laws that she cals fundamentalism (1994). Fundamentalism is the view that 
laws of nature apply not just to those cases where scientists know how to apply them (such
as in experiments), but universaly, even to cases where scientists cannot curently apply 
them. The fundamentalist is therefore commited to an unconstrained and context-
insensitive interpretation of laws and where laws are true. The fundamentalist is broadly 
2 Bloor straddles several traditions ranging from sociology to relativism and 
constructivism. Some of these other positions I wil discus later in this chapter. I consider 
Bloor’s brand of non-realism here in particular because of the broad range of positions for 
which he has relevance and because his characterization of absolutism is congenial to views
I wil defend later.
3 This characterization of context-insensitivity does not only apply to realists, some non-
realists are guilty of insensitivity to context as wel. Just to name two, Hempel (1948) and 
Carnap (Carnap in Feigl and Scriven 1957) were both engaged in projects that were highly 
insensitive to the historical context. 
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similar to Bloor’s foil: both are commited to the truth of scienti-.c claims and the 
evaluation of truth does not require appeal to context. 
Why think context important at al? Isn’t it natural to think a theory is true or not 
regardles of what scientists believe or what methods they have available? Realists, such as 
Psilos (1999, xxi), are sometimes explicit about this. He argues truth is not epistemic, just 
regulative. Regulative truth provides constraints on scienti-.c theorizing, but o0fers no 
epistemic constraints; i.e. a claim is true regardles of whether we could ever recognize it as 
true. Therefore a theory is true, or not, independently of the epistemic positions that we 
could occupy. 
Part of the problem with this picture is that we could never be in a position to 
judge the truth of theory (because truth is not epistemic); we could only be in a position to
infer the truth of a theory based on its predictive or explanatory succeses. There is 
therefore a gap between succes and truth and a gap between what is epistemicaly 
available to us and what the world is like. We now have a clash in intuitions: on the one 
hand it seems whether a theory is true should be independent of the human position we 
occupy, but it also seems like the world is available to us to know and make judgements 
about. 
This tension leads anti-realists to an alternative to the regulative conception of 
truth: the epistemicaly constrained conception. This second view says that for a claim to 
be true, it must be posible to be in a position to judge that it is true (at least in principle). 
This is a context sensitive position. It is context sensitive because for a claim to have a 
truth-value, there must be a context from which we could judge its truth. So when 
evaluating a claim, it is necesary to consider the context which we would need to occupy 
to judge its truth. Cartwright, for example, might say that a law applies in those positions 
where we could judge the suitability of its application, i.e. a theory is true in those contexts
where we can apply it. 
General strategies for showing more sensitivity to the human epistemic position 
can include arguing for mind-dependence in science. Such mind dependence might be 
metaphysical (Knor-Cetina 1983; Cetina 1993; Latour and Woolgar 2013). This is the 
strongest anti-realist position. Scientists, by this view, “construct” facts. This has the 
advantage of closing the gap between truth and what we can know. Truth, what the world
is like, is accesible and context sensitive because it is the product of our cognition. 
However, this strategy has the unfortunate consequence of entailing that what the world 
is like is determined, in a strong sense, by human cognition. This is quite radical and does 
not sit wel with science as an empirical inquiry.
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If the extremes of realism and constructivism are unsatisfactory, presumably some 
middle position could satisfy us by being both context sensitive and accepting the 
empirical nature of science. One strategy involves appealing to a form of mind dependence
in conceptual taxonomy. This is a promising option, and ultimately this thesis’s approach,
because it promises to preserve the intuition that what the world is like does not depend 
upon human cognition. However, many of the existing strategies for developing 
conceptual taxonomies are too relativistic, or so I wil argue in the next section. Goodman 
and Hacking are the foils I wil use in making this argument. 
1.3 Being in the Middle 
Some atempts at avoiding realism involve locating mind dependence at the level of 
taxonomy. The advantage to this strategy is that we avoid making claims about 
metaphysics without -.rst clarifying what the epistemic grounds are, in this case the 
taxonomy. It also shows sensitivity to the epistemic context because taxonomies change 
and are intimately connected to the historical period and the inquiries in which they 
feature. Despite these advantages, some of existing taxonomic accounts are too 
constructivist and consequently fail to properly account for the empirical character of 
science. I wil show this below using accounts from Goodman and Hacking. I use these 
authors because they provide two radicaly di0ferent taxonomic options, but despite their 
di0ferences, they face similar problems. I wil ultimately be folowing a broadly similar 
strategy in appealing to taxonomy, but I wil combine it with perspectivism and avoid 
their problems. 
1.3.3 Philosophical Grounds for Construction: Goodman
Goodman’s view is motivated by considering the grouping of kinds an activity. This active
proces applies acros the board: to everyday life, to the subjects studied by science, 
religion, and art. The construction begins with categorization and because Goodman 
claims we cannot separate form and content very neatly, his view is strongly 
constructivist4. Metaphysics depends upon the categories and if the categories are 
constructed—which they are for Goodman—then the ontology is constructed as wel. I 
wil show this in more detail.
Goodman wil claim that there is more than one right way to group objects, that 
is, more than one right way of sorting experience into categories. He discuses this in the 
4 See especialy chapters 1, 4, and 5 in McCormick 1996.
6
context of worlds, where a world is a system of clasi-.cation and two worlds re?@ect two 
di0ferent systems of clasi-.cation. 
Much but by no means al world making consists of taking apart and puting together, ofLen 
conjointly: on the one hand, of dividing wholes into parts and partitioning kinds into subspecies, 
analyzing complexes into component features, drawing distinctions; on the other hand, of 
composing wholes and kinds out of parts and members and subclases, combining features into 
complexes, and making connections.5 
Goodman in this pasage makes repeated reference to clasi-.cation. It is on the basis of 
these clasi-.cations that worlds are made and distinguished from one another. We 
construct clasi-.cations by groupings, which is what he means when he writes of 
constructing wholes and kinds out of parts. And we also take those wholes and kinds and 
make -.ner distinctions. 
There is very litle discusion of what constraints, if any, there are on our 
clasi-.cations. If there are no constraints on clasi-.cation and if ontology depends upon 
clasi-.cation, then it looks like Goodman’s view is a very strong form of construction. Not
only are taxonomies and clasi-.cations constructed, objects, facts, everything is 
constructed. 
What does it mean for the world to be constructed? Two worlds are the same 
worlds when they have the same objects and whether the objects are the same is 
determined by whether they are clasi-.ed in the same way. If worlds con?@ict in their 
ontology, then they are di0ferent. Therefore, it is not the case that people in di0ferent 
worlds can fail to interact with one another, but despite their ability to interact, they can 
live in separate worlds, just in the sense that the categories each uses di0fer. If the categories
di0fer, so do the objects. These categories, therefore, are realy what drive the Goodman 
notion of multiple worlds. 
The language Goodman uses is quite dramatic—terms such as “star making” 
feature prominently in his work—and it applies acros the board, including to human 
projects we traditionaly think of as empirical, namely science. However, because 
Goodman o0fers no constraints on this construction, it is not only unclear what kind of 
role the world plays in science, it is not clear that anything in the world could play such a 
role. Consequently, it is unclear how science would di0fer from other forms of human 
inquiry because a key feature of science, that it is empiricaly informed or constrained, is 
mising. 
5 Goodman in McCormick 1996, p. 65.
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1.3.4 A Milder Form o+ Constructivism
Even though constructivism seems antithetical to treating science as empirical, there are 
milder forms that are not so obviously incompatible. Hacking provides a paradigmatic 
example of a mild constructivist position that is also, he claims, realist. The position is 
mild because it is not commited to strong contingency. In discusing certain social kinds, 
like gender, child abuse, and mental ilnes6, Hacking accepts contingency and 
constructivism within certain domains. Here constructivism means that the individual 
people are not constructed, but the act of puting them into categories—such as the 
category of schizophrenia—is contingent and dependent on the activity of clasifying. 
Hacking’s atitude toward construction here may face di0-.culties not so di0ferent 
from Goodman’s. Hacking does claim that science is contingent in its form, but not its 
content. To make this claim, he argues that the course of science is shaped by the 
questions posed by scientists.7 Puestions constitute a kind of framework or form in 
science and that the answers constitute the content. Puestions are contingent, answers to 
them are not. Therefore, scientists could have chosen to not study nuclear fusion, in 
which case no one would know anything about nuclear fusion; there would be no science 
of nuclear physics. But any scientists choosing to study nuclear fusion would inevitably 
learn the same things about it, acquire the same knowledge, regardles of any other social 
phenomena. The consequence of this view, we might say, is that the things scientists know
are contingent because they might have chosen to learn other things, but given the choices 
they did make, they inevitably learned what they did. Given that content is stable, the 
world is, in some sense, stable. We might phrase this in the folowing way:
Weak Contingency: Which content that scientists consider is determined by the 
scienti-.c inquiry, but the nature of that content is independent of any inquiry.
There are two isues I wil discus with being commited to weak contingency of this kind.
The -.rst is, can we be commited to the contingency of the form of science without the 
content as wel? If the content is in some sense determined by the question and the 
question is contingent, does that not entail that the content is contingent as wel? This 
stronger form of contingency can be expresed as folows:
6 See Hacking 1999, p. 165
7 Hacking 1999, p. 165.
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Strong Contingency: A scienti-.c inquiry determines not only what content is 
under consideration, but what content there is. 
The problem this question raises is what does asking a question do? Does it construct 
content, content that would not be there had the question not been posed? This is a 
strong reading. I take it that Hacking wants to o0fer a weaker view, which might be this: 
there is content and scientists are interested in some content, but not al content—and so 
their questions re?@ect their interest in that they study only a subset of the posible content.
This weaker reading does not claim that a question creates content. 
I’m not sure, however, that this weaker version is stable. It may colapse into 
stronger versions. Historical cases in particular are di0-.cult to interpret as Hacking would 
like to. Consider the historical substance phlogiston, a substance we now do not believe 
exists. And yet when scientists in the past asked questions about phlogiston, inevitably 
their answers would involve phlogiston. The fact that the answer to our question involves 
phlogiston is determined by introducing phlogiston into the question. 
And this suggests that we cannot avoid ascribing contingency to content: if we 
had not asked about phlogiston—which seems posible—then we would get no answer 
about it. If we are commited to the contingency of the question, we are also commited to
the contingency of content. Hacking, this suggests, cannot maintain contingency about 
form without having the same view about content, which is precisely the point that 
Goodman was at pains to defend. 
1.3.5 The Construction Approach: Chaleng. and Scope
There are two general problems I would like to suggest with the way these taxonomic 
accounts characterize science. The -.rst is over generalization and the second is the 
paradigmatic type of activity they have chosen for their analysis. Both problems are closely 
related because they preclude the posibility for science to be a0fected by the world.
The -.rst problem is over generalization. The idea of a construction suggests taking
materials and puting them together to make something new that is more than the sum of 
the original parts. Machinery, equipment, entire laboratories, and thermometers are 
intuitive cases of constructed and thus arti-.cial objects. If we had not made them, they 
would not exist. If we ceased to exist, they would cary on as they are until nature did its 
work. For any of these kinds of object, it is quite clear what is meant when we say they are 
constructed. Even if we do not understand the proces or the parts involved, some expert 
does and we can understand how, in a general way, the object is constructed.
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Now the constructivist, of a certain kind, wants to extend this idea of construction
beyond the normal set of objects and apply it to things that are not straightforwardly 
constructed. Such objects as stars, rocks, electrons, etc. These other kinds of objects are not
things that we put together using various parts and at -.rst blush it is not obvious what the 
constructivist might mean when claiming they are constructed. The problem seems to be 
one of over generalization: taking the term construction and applying it too broadly. It is 
too broad an application because natural objects fail to meet the criteria for construction.
The constructivist might say that of course we do not make natural objects in just 
the same way we make arti-.cial objects, but we have constructed them in a di0ferent sense. 
We, for example, have built laboratories and very arti-.cial environments in which to 
conduct experiments and the objects we investigate in them are, by extension, also 
constructed. Alternatively, our perceptual faculties build the objects we perceive, so even 
stars and objects not within the con-.nes of laboratories are constructed. We each take 
di0ferent features of the environment and in some way put them together to construct 
objects.
Firstly, the problem with laboratory constructions is that it does not generalize. Of
course we can only make certain experiments and observations in constructed 
environments and of course these are di0ferent from natural environments. This does 
mean that there is an open question about how far we can extend what we learn in a 
laboratory into the rest of the world, but this concesion does not imply the broad scope 
of construction that the constructivist wants. Puting a gold-.sh in a tank involves creating 
an arti-.cial environment, but the gold-.sh is not constructed just because the tank is 
constructed.8 
There is a second, more subtle trouble with the constructivist line of thought. It is 
that the criteria for a construction are stil not met, or are at least not met in the way the 
constructivist imagines, even if we were to accept that science is inherently an activity. 
Let’s examine Goodman’s stereo case to ilustrate this, but the point applies more 
generaly. 
I sit in a clutered waiting room, unaware of any stereo system. Gradualy I make out two speakers 
built into the bookcase, a receiver and turn table in a corner cabinet, and a remote-control switch 
on the mantel. I -.nd a system that was already there. But see what this -.nding involves: 
distinguishing the several components from the suroundings, categorizing them by function, and 
uniting them into a single whole. A good deal of making, with complex conceptual equipment, has
8 I imagine this criticism applies in particular to forms of construction that focus on 
laboratory work, such as those defended by Knor Cetina (2013; 2009, 1993; 1983), Latour 
and Woolgar (Latour and Woolgar 2013).
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gone into -.nding what is already there. Another visitor, fresh from a lifetime in the deepest jungle, 
wil not -.nd, because he has not the means of making, any stereo system in that room.9
One way to describe the scenario is this: the tribal member does not recognize stereos as 
devices for listening to sound, but I do. We might then wonder what is the di0ference 
between us? The di0ference is that I have learned how to identify, how to observe, and use 
stereos. The use of “identify” suggests action, but what sort of action is involved here? Is 
it, as Goodman suggests, a constructive sort of action? The kind of action asociated with 
building. I think Goodman wants to suggest here that the mere act of identifying is 
constructive. But we might wonder why identi-.cation should be asociated with 
constructive action?
A more natural emphasis in this case is to place more weight on how pasive I am, 
or the way in which I am pasive, when observing the stereo. Once I have learned what it 
is, there is no further learning or thing I must do in order to observe it, to pick it out, or 
use it to listen to recorded sounds. This way of characterizing the scenario is, I think, 
innocuous. The fact that I need to know what stereos are to use them as stereos should not
undermine my con-.dence in the existence of stereos, in how to use them, or in the fact 
that not everyone knows what stereos are. But it also does not prevent the tribal member 
from taking it apart, picking it up, using it as a seat, and failing to interact with it as a 
stereo. We are going to use and interact with this object in very di0ferent ways, but this 
does not commit us to a strong dependence relation between stereo and my activity. 
However, the constructivist may come back and claim identi-.cation is an activity, 
observation is an activity, and any activity has, inherently, an element that is not pasive. I 
must, when observing a stereo, look at it, notice certain features, etc. These are activities. 
We can, therefore, characterize science as constructed, or based on constructions, because 
the act of identifying something is active and best construed as construction.
The right response here to distinguish between activities that construct and those 
that do not. Identi-.cation is a form of activity that does not result in the construction of 
something. So we might say that the constructivists are right to emphasize the activity in 
science, but incorectly take construction as the paradigmatic activity. If we wanted to take
the constructivist insight seriously, it would be to acknowledge that there is an active 
element inherent in certain human activities that seem pasive at -.rst blush. But the 
trouble with using this language is that it equivocates between activity and construction. 
There are al sorts of activities and not al of them involve building. The mistake is to 
conclude that something is constructed on the basis that an activity was involved in 
9 Goodman in McCormick 1996, p. 155.
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identifying that object. But, contra the constructivist, we can say science involves activity 
without commiting to a construction of facts, objects, etc. 
In atempting to do justice to the human element inherent in science, 
these thinkers have appealed to taxonomy, but characterized taxonomy in such a way that 
it is unclear how the world could place any constraints on our clasi-.catory practices. This 
lack of empirical constraint wil also prove a problem for some perspectival accounts. 
1.4 Perspectives: History and Trajectory
What we have so far seen is taxonomy-based accounts atempting to show sensitivity to 
both empiricism and context in evaluating science. However, they are too strongly 
constructivist. Perspectivism is another such strategy that seeks middle ground. The 
existing literature shows the view has chalenges and promise. One chalenge is to limit the 
scope of perspectivism such that one is not making overly general claims about knowledge.
This is a chalenge with the metaphor. The second chalenge is how to account for data, 
the supposed empirical evidence on which scientists rely. Giere and Teler struggle to 
provide accounts that avoid these two problems, as we shal see in 1.4.3. The promise, on 
which Mitchel delivers, is to acknowledge the connections and relevance our di0ferent 
methods and forms of knowledge have for one another, i.e. science is not fuly uni-.ed, but
it is also not fuly disuni-.ed either. Science can be, on occasion subject to integration, 
despite the great disunity we ofLen see. I examine how the general idea of a perspective is a 
di0-.cult metaphor to apply generaly to knowledge, then examine more speci-.caly how 
perspectivism has fared when applied to science. 
1.4.1 Perspective / Metaphor
Perspectivism takes as a knowledge metaphor the case of perception, which is not a new 
approach to epistemic problems. Just as the approach is old, so is the tension in the 
thinking that underlies it, a tension we can -.nd in the history of perspectivism. Conant
(2005, 2006) has done some of this historical research in the context of Nietzsche’s work. 
The later took vision seriously as a metaphor for a philosophical view of knowledge, a 
metaphor that Giere has also adopted, albeit more super-.cialy, as we wil see below. 
Conant raises what I see as a chalenge to thinking that perception provides guidance in 
thinking about non-perceptual epistemic problems: to determine where and to what 
extent the metaphor of a perspective provides an ilumination of (human) knowledge. 
This chalenge is deep and pernicious because the metaphor itself can, and ofLen does, lead 
to a confused view of our (humanity’s) epistemic situation, which it has in Giere’s case. 
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However, I think it can be overcome, as it has in the context of Mitchel’s integrative 
pluralism. The key is using the metaphor in speci-.c contexts to resolve particular 
problems. The application and suitability of perspective-as-metaphor is, consequently, 
highly constrained to speci-.c kinds of cases and does not provide an account of knowledge
generaly. 
Perspectivism can easily provide a misleading picture of human knowledge. It is 
misleading because it entices us to suppose that it is posible to distinguish those 
contributions to human knowledge that come from the world and those which come 
from our faculties, perceptual or cognitive. That is, it suggests it is posible to stand apart 
from our epistemic context and make independent claims about it, even though we of 
course cannot set aside our faculties when we make those claims.
This picture is suggested by the appeal to a perspective. To say the world appears 
to be such-and-such from th0 perspective, is to make two claims. One is that the world 
would appear di0ferently, if only we occupied a di1erent perspective, or if we could only 
look at the world from another point. That is, there is the claim of plurality and thus of an
alternative. The second claim is that there is something about being in one position rather 
than another—something about each perspective—that in some way a0fects what it is the 
world is like. 
There is a logical problem to the second claim. How could our faculties, cognitive 
or perceptual, alow us to evaluate our faculties independently? This seems imposible 
because any evaluation we o0fer draws on our faculties, so how could we know what kind 
of evaluation we would give had we di0ferent faculties, faculties we cannot poses? It is 
not clear that our faculties could in principle give us the capacity to evaluate the world or 
ourselves independently of these faculties. This is the God’s-eye-view problem. 
The -.rst claim, that of a genuine alternative, trades on the second. In thinking that
a particular position o0fers a tainted view, one can make the smal philosophical step 
toward thinking that there are other positions that are tainted di0ferently and so by 
occupying di0ferent perspectives, we may come to infer more general claims about our 
cognition, which also supposes a strong distinction can always be maintained between 
what the world and our minds contribute to knowledge.
Thus far the discusion of perspectives is quite general and metaphorical. There 
are more precise formulations available. Conant (2005) discuses three and implies that al 
three are dubious. I wil discus what these formulations are and o0fer some reasons for 
thinking that, even if these philosophical positions are not stable positions, the metaphor 
of perspective is nevertheles helpful, but in speci-.c cases. The three formulations of 
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perspectivism as Conant describes them are, in decreasing realist commitment, (1) primary 
quality realism, (2) hidden world realism, and (3) pseudo-Kantianism.
(1) is the mild claim that some of the things we perceive are properties of objects 
(the primary qualities), while others are at least partly the product of our capacities as 
perceivers (the secondary qualities). This interpretation of perspectivism stays close to the 
original metaphor by taking the objects of perception, especialy vision, as the subject of 
the perspective. This is a very restricted view because only some properties are the product 
of our perceptual system, many properties are not. 
Slightly more distant from the original metaphor is (2), which claims that some 
perspectives, roughly equated with ways of knowing, are privileged because they are more 
accurate, true, or corespond more closely with reality. There is a sense in which this 
version of perspectivism is not fuly stable because inferior perspectives should give way to 
those that are beter. If perspectives can actualy be ranked, then scientists (or knowers 
more generaly) would tend to abandon the inferior perspectives in favour of those which 
are superior. 
Least realist is (3), which Conant cals pseudo-Kantian because al human 
knowledge is in some way tainted or the product of our faculties, which precludes any 
de-.nite knowledge of truth or mind-independent states of a0fairs. Crucialy, this view 
asumes it is posible to posit mind-independent states of a0fairs while at the same time 
denying the posibility of cognizing those states. Giere’s view fals squarely within this 
version of perspectivism because al knowledge is restricted to models and there is no way 
to evaluate or compare models, as we wil see below. 
The least commiting versions of perspectivism (1) seem quite innocent, but there 
is a di0-.culty with presing the metaphor of a perspective too far. With this presing there 
emerges a tension between making a claim about knowledge generaly, while at the same 
time denying that there is a privileged position from which one could make general claims 
about our epistemic position. Who could say whether knowledge is restricted or not about
a mind-independent world? To make this claim, one would need to compare what we 
know with what the world is like and such a comparison is in principle ruled out when a 
strong perspectivist claims that knowledge fals short of teling us what the world is realy 
like.
However, when used in a more restrictive sense, the perspectivist view may be 
insightful. Sometimes this insight has proved helpful in modeling. For example, it shows 
how acquiring knowledge requires appealing to very di0ferent methods. Similarly, there is 
scope for thinking that perspectivism may, when suitably restricted and articulated, 
provide insightful analysis of other areas of science that show some kind of plurality. In 
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particular, it may help shed light on how we should think about disagreement and 
dramatic conceptual change. These topics, like modeling, also involve a kind of plurality, 
especialy taxonomic plurality. Crucialy, taxonomic plurality in these cases involve 
restricted cases where there are alternatives, i.e. where there are two or more taxonomic 
options, one has a choice of which to pursue, and it may not be obvious which taxonomic 
choice is best. Before exploring how I wil approach this problem in 1.4.5, let’s see how 
others have applied perspectives to science.
1.4.2 Modeling and Perspectiv.
Modeling, especialy recent literature on perspectival modeling, promises to pave a 
middle road between realism and antirealism. Although there is this promise, some of the 
way’s authors have developed the view fail to folow the middle road by encountering the 
di0-.culties asociated with the perspectival metaphor, which I discused in the preceding 
section, and with constructivism. I -.rst examine why models are of philosophical interest 
and then how perspectival modeling tries, and ofLen, but not always, fails to be the middle
road.
Models are constructions: scientists build them. Once built, a model can be used 
for a variety of purposes, some of which may not be anticipated by those who built it
(Morison and Morgan 1999). Philosophers since the Semantic Turn have also supposed 
that models provide a mediating role between theories and more empirical elements of 
science (Suppes 1966). Science, by this view, does not aim to provide explanations for what
we can observe, so caled saving the phenomena—a thesis empiricists sometimes defend. 
Rather, science is concerned with building theories that are sets of representations, in the 
form of models. What is and is not observable drops out as a central feature of science, at 
least according to the semantic philosopher of science.
 
1.4.3 Perspectival Risks
This section has two tasks; -.rst, to defend the idea that some modeling accounts, 
especialy Giere’s, presuppose the normative and conceptual aspects of data. In so doing, 
these accounts face similar isues to those facing constructivism. I wil defend two points: 
1) that Giere’s framework gives no resources for talking about what data or other model 
inputs are; 2) modeling practices can be subject to some of the same criticisms that 
constructivists face. Because of these two points, Giere’s account has an odd tension: on 
the one hand it is a form of unfounded empiricism, but on the other a form of strong 
constructivism. Teler’s version of perspectivism has similar di0-.culties. The second task is 
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to suggest that model perspectivism is innocuous, if we do not subscribe to model 
relativism. Mitchel’s interpretation of perspectival modeling provides this kind of escape 
route (Mitchel in Masimi and McCoy 2019). Let’s -.rst examine Giere’s account and the 
problems facing it.
Giere builds his perspectival account of science with observation as his starting 
point. Observation, he argues, is perspectival. Human vision provides an ilustrative 
example (2006, chap. 2). He then extends the metaphor of vision to scienti-.c instruments 
and theories (2006, chap. 3). The asumption here is that science is built up from 
information given to us by observation and instruments. And like vision, scienti-.c models
are sensitive to di0ferent stimuli and provide di0ferent “perspectives” on what the world is 
like. It is not posible to “see” the world or o0fer theories of it except through some 
particular and partial perspective. This is the 3rd and pseudo-Kantian version of 
perspectivism that Conant lays out. 
Observation and instruments, so this story goes, are partial. They are only sensitive
to a limited range of environmental stimulus. In the case of vision, our light receptors are 
only sensitive to a speci-.c range of radiation. Because these receptors are partial, vision 
which depends upon these receptors is also partial. The same applies to scienti-.c 
instruments. Di0ferent instruments are sensitive to di0ferent kinds of input from the world
and are consequently partial in di0ferent ways. This partiality alows models to be 
representational, but at the same time very di0ferent. Two models can both represent the 
same target phenomenon, but maintain very di0ferent commitments. 
Giere distinguishes two stages of scienti-.c activity, a pasive reception and an 
active model building stage. We can re-articulate these stages in realist terms. There is a 
mind-independent and worldly contribution that our receptors and instruments are 
sensitive to: this contribution comes from data. There is a mind-dependent element that 
takes the form of model construction. Model building is mind dependent because models 
are built for particular purposes using a partial selection of posible worldly inputs. Giere 
extends this to knowledge generaly. Statements are true only in the context of particular 
perspectival representations (Giere 2006, 57–58) and truth does not generalize to the 
world, i.e. we cannot generalize a claim beyond the particular model in which it appears. 
This is the sense in which knowledge is perspectival. This is because the only acces we 
have to the “world” is mediated by selective and constructed models and only in the 
context of a particular model can a claim be true or not. 
This discusion shows that Giere’s view asumes an unfounded empiricism, i.e. 
that he takes atempts to ground his account in mind-independent worldly contributions 
to knowledge, but in so doing takes for granted many other forms of knowledge that are 
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necesary for his examples. Supposedly there is a worldly contribution to scienti-.c 
modeling, but claims should only be understood in the context of models. How, then, are
we supposed to know anything about the data that form the basis of any given model? 
Giere’s own examples ilustrate this problem. He discuses at length the functioning of 
Computer Asisted Tomography (CAT) (Giere 2006, 50–51), a type of X-ray scan that 
models the structure of the brain. During a CAT scan, an emiter positioned near a 
patient’s head produces X-rays that pas through the brain before striking an X-ray 
detector. The intensity of the X-rays that strike the detector yield information about the 
structure of the brain tisue that the rays pased through. A computer then takes the 
information and builds a structural image of the brain. It is important for Giere’s point 
that the image tels us something about the brain’s structure because he then goes on to 
discus another type of imaging method that captures brain function rather than brain 
structure.
This example, as Giere describes it, does not actualy ilustrate the perspectival 
view he is defending. It fails to do so because he omits critical information about the 
knowledge necesary for making CAT scans work. Scientists do not just build a machine 
that selectively represents part of the human brain, they build such a machine using an 
extensive body of knowledge, skil, and understanding of nuclear physics, mechanics, 
neurobiology, and many other -.elds. Knowledge is not restricted to what the model tels 
us. We have to know a lot about the world and about what data it is posible to colect; 
and we must know al this before we can even dream of building anything that captures 
the structure of the brain. 
Now perhaps Giere could respond that the knowledge upon which CAT scans 
depend takes the form of other models. This would preserve the hierarchy of models 
approach. This response cannot be caried very far, however. Scientist need to know lot 
about X-rays in order to use them to create images of the brain. That is, they need to know
something about the world and this knowledge is independent of any particular model 
and it is necesary to have this knowledge before data colection. One does not blindly 
colect data and only acquire knowledge afLer one has a model of the data. 
This discusion suggests that models, and anything we learn from a model, is 
situated within a broader context of scienti-.c knowledge, some of which is not 
constrained to particular models; understanding the function of a model is imposible 
without atending to this broader context. Because Giere takes this knowledge for granted 
and lumps it into a cursory contribution from the world, his view asumes an unfounded 
empiricism. It is unfounded because there is no justi-.cation for thinking that the world 
makes a contribution in the way he asumes, i.e. that there is an unmediated contribution 
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in the form of data. LefL unanswered are questions like: what are data? How do scientists 
choose which data to colect? How is a data model built from data? I wil addres some of 
these topics more fuly in chapter 2.
Unfounded empiricism is not the only problem facing the hierarchy-of-models 
view and Giere’s view in particular. There is also an element of strong constructivism in 
model thinking. This construction emerges from Giere’s views on representation in 
particular, but could emerge in principle from any account that takes an agent-based view 
of representation without constraints.10 Other views, such as isomorphism, may not face 
this problem, though they stil face considerable di0-.culty on other fronts. Let’s look at 
Giere’s account for simplicity. His agent-based account of representation consists in the 
folowing:
Agents (1) intend; (2) to use model, M; (3) to represent a part of the world,
W; (4) for some purpose, P (2010, 274).
We can see that representation is a highly constructive proces, and not only in the trivial 
sense that models must be built to exist and to be used. Human intentions play a 
constitutive role in a number of places, not only in model construction and use, but also 
in model evaluation. A model “works” or is in some way a good model if it satis-.es our 
purposes. Parker (2010) also emphasizes this point about model evaluation. 
This agent-based approach to modeling is not, on its own, a particular problem. 
Indeed this approach avoids several problems that other views towards representation 
have, views such as isomorphism or partial morphism because it stipulates why a particular
model represents a particular target: because a scientist uses it as such to further some 
purpose. But it becomes a problem when the philosophical approach to science takes 
models to be constitutive of scienti-.c practice and knowledge. Under those conditions, it 
is di0-.cult to see how scienti-.c knowledge could be anything other than constructed. 
Consider once again the CAT scan and let’s consider it using Giere’s framework. 
By the agent-based representation view, we should positively evaluate the models it yields 
not based on the accuracy or truth of its representations, but on the basis of how wel it 
furthers the agents ends, which in this case might be diagnosing certain brain diseases or 
brain damage. Now we might further wonder how it is posible for the CAT scan to yield 
such useful models. The explanation for this succes can appeal to the model inputs, in 
10 These criticisms could in principle apply to inferential accounts—such as that which 
Suarez defends (2004; 2010)—or any account that is strongly intentional. Whether these 
criticisms are a problem wil depend upon whether the account then relativizes knowledge 
to models. The folowing discusion on Giere’s view ilustrates this. 
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this case the information from the X-rays striking the detector. But Giere thinks the 
inferences we can draw from succes stop there. We cannot, for instance, infer what the 
true structure of the brain is because al we have at our disposal is the structure of the 
model. Giere is explicit about this:
To say a model is “true oS” a particular real system in the world is to say no more than it “-.ts” that 
system or “applies to” that system (2006, 65).
As wel as rejecting claims about truth, Giere’s account also precludes comparing models 
directly with anything in the world. Models are compared with data models or other 
models (2006, 89). There is no direct comparison with data. But more generaly, a model is
only answerable to other models: there is no further empirical constraint. Does this seem 
corect? 
It does not seem corect. The analysis is de-.cient in two ways, both concerned 
with mind independence. First, there is no posibility of making claims about the world, 
only claims relative to a model (a perspective). This is puzzling because one very minimal 
requirement of science is that it tel us about the world. Second, models can only be 
compared with one another, not directly with data. Consequently, we cannot make any 
inferences about what contribution the world is making to our models, or it is at least 
unclear how it would be posible to know anything about how the world is a0fecting our 
models if any evaluation we can give is internal to a model. And I take Giere to be 
commited to this relativistic idealism, as exempli-.ed when he writes this: 
That scienti-.c observational or theoretical claims should in general be relativized to a perspective is,
if anything, easier to accept (Giere 2006, 82).
 
Without an ability to make claims about the worldly inputs, the hierarchy of model view, 
and Giere’s perspectivism in particular, becomes a misleading description of science and 
exceedingly di0-.cult to accept. Scientists, by only comparing models to other models, 
would not be engaged in an empirical enterprise; science would be reduced to a practice 
litle di0ferent from that of comparing train engines. Although interesting, comparing 
human constructions is not the project of science.
Once again it is important to emphasize that modeling practices are situated in a 
broader scienti-.c context and modeling cannot be solely constitutive of that context. If 
we take models to be solely constitutive of that context, there is very litle work that 
empirical support provides and what we are lefL with is a highly constructivist view of 
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science. It is worth comparing more directly strong constructivist commitments with 
Giere’s perspectivism, which wil show the striking similarities. I take the main 
commitment for the constructivist to be the folowing:
Constructivist commitment: There are di0ferent ways to conceptualize the world and there 
is no best conceptualization. What the world is like (ontology) depends upon how it is 
conceptualized. Because conceptualization is a contingent action, ontology is constructed.
Is Giere also commited to this view? Each model o0fers a di0ferent perspective on the 
world. Among other things, a perspective supplies a taxonomy. In order to be a form of 
construction, this taxonomy would have to be mind dependent and it would have to 
determine ontology. Does Giere’s perspectivism do this? I think it does. Consider the 
folowing:
The kinds are de-.ned relative to the theory. Determining the empirical counterparts of theoretical 
kinds is another mater altogether. […] What we count as being empirical members of the 
coresponding set of real systems depends on how good a match we require and in what respects. 
These judgments cannot help but be interest relative (Giere 2006, 87).
Giere claims quite clearly that kinds—qua the potential basis of a taxonomy—are relative 
to theory, which is for Giere just an abstract form of model. Because models and 
perspectives are equivalent, kinds depend upon perspectives. Taxonomy therefore 
depends upon perspective. Because models are built to ful-.l speci-.c purposes, it looks like 
taxonomy is also mind dependent and constructed, just as it is for the strong 
constructivist.
Does, however, this construction of taxonomy also mean ontology is constructed, 
which it must be if Giere’s perspectivism is indeed a form of strong constructivism? Giere 
is not explicit. He does reject what he cals an objectivist metaphysics (2006, 81), i.e. a 
mind-independent structure that is the world. This certainly leaves room for a 
constructivist view. Whether it fuly deserves this label may depend upon whether data or 
data models can provide a kind of worldly anchor that would preclude ful mind-
dependent ontology. I suggested above that data provide a very weak or non-existent 
anchor for Giere, so the connection between model perspectivism and strong 
constructivism is probably a powerful connection.
1.4.4 Perspectivism and Realism
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Giere’s view fails to -.nd a middle path and, though it is a stronger atempt, Teler’s 
characterization of perspectivism is also not in the middle. Teler atempts to bring 
perspectivism more directly in line with realism by rejecting some realist tenets and 
explicitly accepting others. His work suggests there could be stronger links between 
realism and perspectivism than Giere makes out. If such links do exist, however, Teler has 
not established them. Let’s see which commitments he endorses, why, and how his view 
does not make strong advances over Giere’s. 
Teler rejects traditional scienti-.c realism because it fails to accurately explain 
reference and existence, commitments 2 and 3 listed at the beginning of this chapter. He 
argues that reference cannot work the way the realist intends because to -.x the reference of
a term, one needs some kind of reference -.xing tool to connect a term with its extension
(Teler in Masimi and McCoy 2019, 51–52). However, Teler argues that the world is too 
complex for scienti-.c terms to realy work in this way. How does complexity interfere 
with reference? By supplying too many potential entities for the extension. For example, a 
simple realist semantic analysis of “atom” gives us tools for -.xing the extension and, so the 
realist hopes, these tools give us a unique referent. So “atom” refers to al and only atoms. 
However, if we then use those tools, we do not get a unique referent, but too many 
referents, or so Teler contends.
If realist reference fails because the world is too complex, what kind of knowledge,
if any, do we have, and what are we to make of the truth of scienti-.c claims? Teler 
rea0-.rms the perception metaphor (Ibid, 57); we have inexact and partial knowledge 
a0forded us by our imperfect representations. This is how we are to understand knowledge
with an emphasis on context. For scienti-.c claims to be true, Teler cannot appeal to the 
traditional realist views because he has rejected traditional realism about reference. That is,
if scienti-.c terms do not refer, then what makes them true is presumably not their 
referents. Instead, Teler argues that we think of truth as approximate and contextual. 
Claims are true or false within particular idealised and abstracted contexts given to us by a 
model or perspective. They are approximately true, i.e. true enough, depending on our 
purposes. 
There are two wories I have with Teler’s defence of perspectivism. First wory: 
how are we to know that our knowledge is inexact? To make such a claim, one would need
to compare our state of knowledge with some les inexact variety. But such a comparison 
is imposible because, as a truism, the only knowledge we can have is human knowledge, 
i.e. what Teler cals inexact. An understanding or grasp of a more exact knowledge is 
beyond our ken and so a comparison between what we know and what the more exact 
knower knows is imposible. 
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Second wory: there is a truth gap. Teler wants to say that truth is context-
sensitive and models or perspectives provide that context. But how then are we to 
generalise or extend what is true in a model to the world? This is a peculiar wory because 
Teler may (and Giere de-.nitely wil) want to reject idea that truth can be evaluated 
independently of a perspective. But their rhetoric does not support his rejection. They 
have set up a distinction between models (imperfect representations that we construct) 
and the world. They then proceed to contextualise claims to the models. If that is corect, 
then our knowledge is only knowledge of our imperfect, constructed representations. 
Where does the world factor into our knowledge? In what sense is human knowledge 
about the world, perfect, imperfect, inexact, or otherwise?
1.4.5 Perspectiv. and Integrative Pluralism
The general problem with Giere’s and Teler’s defence of perspectivism is a deep one, as I 
suggested in the brief discusion of Nietzsche and adopting the perception metaphor for 
knowledge generaly. However, the problem does not suggest perspectivism cannot 
provide a useful tool for addresing epistemic and metaphysical problems in the 
philosophy of science. In particular, there is hope that perspectives can o0fer a way of 
thinking about disunity in science that is not relativistic and that does not prevent the 
fruitful exchange and relevance di0ferent elements of science enjoy. Mitchel has provided 
an exploration of perspectivism in the context of epistemic and integrative pluralism that 
avoids the pitfals other brands of perspectivism face. 
Mitchel defends a version of model perspectivism that is methodological
(Mitchel in Masimi and McCoy 2019, 178). Like Giere, Mitchel takes perspectives to be 
intimately connect to models and what makes a model perspectival is its partiality: 
through abstraction and selection, a model only represents a target imperfectly and 
incompletely. However, this view is much les divisive, and it is much more sensitive to the
empirical context in which scientists work. Mitchel is primarily resisting a clasical view 
about ontological reduction in the sciences. 
Her view is les divisive because there is the posibility of integrating the results 
from di0ferent models. Her (2003, 2002, 2009), and other works, explore the varying ways 
that biological inquiries use multiple models and approaches to investigate the same 
phenomena, such as social insect behaviour or depresion. Crucialy, the results of these 
di0ferent inquires can be integrated because di0ferent approaches select and abstract 
di0ferently. 
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This account is more sensitive to the empirical context than Giere’s because the 
evaluation of a model is not solely based on human interests. Rather, scientists are faced 
with a number of modeling options that vary in their levels of abstraction. Which model 
they use depends upon their interests and upon the inquiry, but the accuracy of any given 
model depends upon the world (2009, 15).
There are consequently two senses in which scientists evaluate models. As 
Mitchel writes: “empirical con-.rmation warants corectnes, while pragmatic concerns 
decide adequacy” (Mitchel in Masimi and McCoy 2019, 188). To be useful in developing 
our knowledge and understanding, models and perspectives need to be representations 
that scientists can integrate as wel as use to inform and constrain one another. But to 
provide this function, models must be accurate and accuracy is not decided by 
pragmatics.1 Knowledge, by this view, is not relativistic and fraught with idealism because 
perspectives are not the constraint on knowledge. Perspectives rather concern the methods
whereby scientists develop and further our understanding of the world. 
This view has two advantages. It approaches the perspectival element of science 
through the methods scientists use, which is perfectly sensible because the view concerns 
representations especialy models, which are a part of scienti-.c methods. Because of this 
emphasis on methods—i.e. on how scientists investigate phenomena—and not on what 
knowledge consists in, Mitchel’s view is not antirealist in the way Giere’s is. Second, 
Mitchel’s view alows for models to be integrated. Claims are not, consequently, 
relativized to a model. Multiple models can be informative in di0ferent ways about 
di0ferent features of the same target phenomenon. There is extensive case study evidence 
for thinking models can be integrated in this way (see Mitchel 2002). 
This discusion shows that a perspectivism restricted to particular parts of inquiry,
such as Mitchel’s discusion of modeling practices, can be insightful. But at the same 
time, when perspectives are used more generaly to provide an account of knowledge, 
perspectivist views face chalenges similar to those that constructivist views face. I showed 
this in the context of Giere’s hierarchy of models account, but even divorced from 
modeling, perspectivism as a general view about knowledge faces di0-.culties, some of 
which we can see from a look at part of its history. 
This discusion of perspectivism suggests two things. First, data have been 
neglected and must be addresed more directly. Without an account of data and with 
knowledge relativized to models, we have a strong anti-realist account of science. As those 
accounts stand, they do not provide a stronger middle ground compared with the 
1 Mitchel notes that not al models can be integrated, but there is the posibility of doing 
so in some contexts (2009, 17–18). 
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constructivist views discused earlier. Second, despite these di0-.culties perspectivism can 
provide a fruitful way of thinking about unity and disunity in science.
1.5 The Promise of Perspectives
The rest of this thesis wil develop, clarify, and defend a perspectival view of science. There
are four parts to this task. First, I wil develop a stronger and perspectival account of data 
that avoids unfounded empiricism. In doing so, I suggest data depend in a strong sense on 
the epistemic context. Second, I clarify what this context consists in and how it is a form of
scienti-.c pluralism. Third, I wil ilustrate this view through an analysis of a case from the 
history of chemistry. Fourth, I defend the view against two related positions with very 
di0ferent commitments. Linking these tasks together, and the basis of my appeal to 
perspectives, is taxonomy. In 1.5.1 I discus why taxonomy, despite isues with 
construction, is a fruitful starting point. I then show how I wil develop the four parts of 
my defence of perspectivism in the sciences (section 1.5.2). 
1.5.1 Conceptual Taxonomy
Starting with taxonomy is not a new strategy for understanding realism. Dupré’s 
promiscuous realism is primarily a taxonomic account and the same could be said of 
Chakravarty’s sociability of kinds. There are, however, important di0ferences both with 
the content and with the problems that need to be addresed. Dupré is primarily 
concerned with reduction, ontology, and natural kinds; his view is tailored accordingly. 
His pluralism is also primarily based upon the varying human interests asociated with our
inquiries. I, on the other hand, am interested in constraining the realist question of 
existence and I am not basing perspectival pluralism upon human interests so directly. I 
also mean taxonomy in a more general and abstract way than Dupré, who mostly discuses
natural kinds in biology. 
In what way does taxonomy help us addres realist questions? Like Teler, I wil 
accept and reject some of the realist tenets listed at the beginning of this section 1.1. Tenet 
2, semantics, is likely to be in con?@ict, depending on how we interpret it. If we folow van 
Fraasen and insist just in the literal interpretation of theories, then this is -.ne. If we go 
further and think 2 should be about bivalence and corespondence theories of truth, this 
wil likely con?@ict with the view I wil defend. The con?@ict is likely to arise because of the 
in?@exibility a strong reading of 2 ascribes to scienti-.c terms. The mastery of taxonomies in 
the sciences is not easily understood in terms of corespondence and the meaning of terms 
change in ways that -.t unnaturaly this strong reading. 
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Tenet 3, the epistemic commitment to truth or partial truth of scienti-.c theories, 
should not be problem. It could be if we read a strong metaphysics into truth, but this is 
not necesary. We can just read 3 as the claim that what the world is like is not determined 
by our cognition, i.e. the world is resistant to our interests, desires, construction, and 
clasi-.catory practices. 
Tenet 1 is not straightforward. The general atitude I defend is that 1 does not arise
in the way realists intend, with the result that both realists and antirealists who endorse or 
contest this commitment are wrong to do so in many cases. In esence, I wil suggest a 
wory about existence, which is the concern of 1, is a misplaced wory because it can be 
understood instead as a problem about identity, not existence. I am in agreement with 
realists to the extent that this commitment cannot be straightforwardly rejected, but also 
in agreement with antirealists to the extent that it also cannot be straightforwardly 
endorsed. An examination of conceptual taxonomy alows for this more nuanced atitude 
toward 1. My view is esentialy in line with Hacking and especialy Cartwright as I 
described their realist commitments in section 1.1.
This nuanced atitude toward realism raises the question: does this perspectivist 
view count as realist? Typicaly, to be realist, one would need to be commited to al three 
realist commitments. The perspectivist view I wil defend does not do this—though it 
does share some of the realist’s commitments—and so whether it can be legitimately 
considered a form of realism is open to question. There are a number of di0ferent ways 
perspectivism can be cached out, some of which I discus later in this chapter. The realist 
vein in these views is as broken and varied as the views themselves.
However, I contend the perspectivist view, as I wil defend it, can be thought of as 
realist to the extent it is commited to 3 and to the extent it does not o0fer an outright 
rejection of 1, but it is antirealist to the extent that it rejects 2 and does not accept 1. I 
presume that this straddling of realist and antirealist commitments is su0-.cient for caling 
perspectivism a middle ground. However, I’m not sure much hangs on whether 
perspectivism can legitimately be caled a form of scienti-.c realism, provided the view is 
defensible and gives insight into philosophical problems asociated with scienti-.c 
disagreement. I believe it satis-.es both these requirements; perspectivism is compatible 
with an optimistic view of scienti-.c progres and with a serious commitment to the 
products of science.
1.5.2 The Thes0 Structure 
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My view wil emerge over the next three chapters. I wil show in chapter 2 how 
empirical evidence, data, are actualy unable to provide the kind of unequivocal empirical 
arbitration we might expect when we face taxonomic problems, i.e. conceptual problems. 
We -.nd this di0-.culty with evidence because data actualy depend upon the conceptual 
taxonomy in which they feature. I argue data sit mid-way between traditional 
representational accounts which are strongly empiricist (such as Bogen and Woodward’s
(1988) account), and more mind-dependent relational accounts, most recently defended by
Leoneli (2016). Data are representational, I wil argue, but stil depend upon the epistemic
context because they are the product of selective colection and in choosing what to 
colect, scientists conform to a conceptual taxonomy. 
Chapter 3 explores in what way the perspectivist account I defend is pluralist and 
what it means to use a conceptual taxonomy. It does so by showing the connection 
between scienti-.c practice and taxonomy. One common approach to epistemic pluralism 
is to be pluralist about practice and to distinguish practices by epistemic aims. Drawing on
a Witgensteinian approach to practices, I argue that epistemic engagement, rather than 
epistemic aims, should be the basis for distinguishing practices. The question then arises 
what preconditions are necesary for epistemic engagement? The answer, I wil argue, is a 
conceptual taxonomy. I clarify what such a taxonomy consists in. This is a crucial 
clari-.cation because there is a danger of faling into conceptual relativity, as Giere does.
There are two reasons my account is not best characterized as conceptual relativity.
First and most importantly, I do not mean taxonomy in a rigid sense. A taxonomy is rigid 
if it consists in a -.nite set of terms with de-.nitions. I think this is Kuhn’s view of lexicons, 
for example (1990). The di0-.culty with this kind of taxonomy is that it suggests a 
taxonomy has autonomy and isolation from other taxonomies. One can just switch from 
one taxonomy to another by merely replacing one -.nite list with another. This is a very 
di0ferent kind of taxonomy from the one I am interested in. A conceptual taxonomy is 
beter characterized as ?@uid with un-.xed edges that only become sharp and distinct in 
cases where there is conceptual disagreement or abrupt change. The consequence of this is 
that one cannot just replace an entire taxonomy with another because it is not a -.nite set 
that can be replaced with another -.nite set. 
The second reason this kind of taxonomy does not fal into conceptual relativity 
concerns epistemic standards. These standards provide norms for evaluating taxonomic 
choices and are not fuly internal to the conceptual context in which scientists work. 
Standards as I de-.ne them folow a middle path between rigid determiners of rational 
choice (Boghosian 2007) and scepticism of standards (Kusch 2004).
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In chapter 4 I ilustrate the perspectival view by examining a clasic case of 
conceptual disagreement and theoretical change: The Chemical Revolution. A 
perspectival analysis is in tension with traditional views. A traditional view of the 
Chemical Revolution treats it as a period of, unsurprisingly, revolution, speci-.caly 
theoretical revolution: oxygen theory replaced phlogiston theory. One of the main isues 
at stake, so the traditional account goes, is the existence of a theoretical substance, 
phlogiston. This view struggles to make sense of continuity and also struggles to make 
sense of the appeal phlogiston theory may have had. The perspectival analysis has traction 
with both of these problems. I argue what realy was at stake was a taxonomic problem: 
how to clasify several di0ferent reactions and substances. This analysis -.ts quite naturaly 
with several historical experiments and shows greater continuity, while at the same time 
accommodating and specifying the intuition that there was indeed dramatic change 
during this period. The dramatic change was conceptual, and therefore taxonomic, 
change. This analysis strikes a balance between thinking of science as uni-.ed and thinking 
of science as disuni-.ed, hence delivering on the promise of perspectivism I suggested was 
posible in my discusion of Mitchel’s views. 
Chapter 5 brings out explicitly the di0ferences between the perspectival view I 
defend and two other views that a) philosophers have used to try and understand the 
Chemical Revolution and that b) strive to addres some of the same problems 
perspectivism does. The two views are a form of scienti-.c pragmatism and relativism. The 
main problem with the other accounts is that they are too divisive: they place too much 
emphasis on disunity by alocating disagreeing scientists to di0ferent epistemic contexts 
and in so doing, they fail to account for the fact those who disagree have a lot of shared 
epistemic background. The chalenge with conceptual change and disagreement is o0fering
a characterization that brings those who disagree close enough together epistemicaly so 
that they can disagree, but not so close that there is no basis for disagreeing. Perspectivism 
strikes this balance beter. 
1.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has laid some of the groundwork for a perspectival view of scienti-.c 
disagreement. It has done so by showing how traditional strong realist views run into 
trouble with accounting for the context in which scientists work and in which theories are 
developed and used. Constructivist views of science, in resisting these isues with realism, 
have run into a di0ferent kind of problem: accounting for the empirical nature of scienti-.c 
enterprises, a constraint realist views tend to accommodate. Taxonomic pluralism has 
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been one strategy for resisting the lack of context realism provides while also avoiding 
metaphysical antirealism. Some such views struggle to separate themselves from 
constructivists.
This is part of the promise of perspectivism: to provide an account of science that 
is sensitive to those constraints and in so doing to o0fer a middle ground. However, some 
of the existing characterizations of perspectivism take the view to apply too broadly, in the 
proces running into some of the same problems constructivism faces. I suggested a more 
constrained version, restricted to disagreements and conceptual change, might o0fer more 
promise. I laid out the view I wil defend, which also makes appeal to taxonomy, but by 
also using perspectivism, it strikes a balance between realism and antirealism and between 
emphasizing unity and emphasizing disunity in the sciences. In so doing, perspectivism 





This chapter defends a novel perspectival account of data that overcomes isues facing two
existing views. It aims to specify what data are and how it is posible for them to be 
evidentialy useful, isues Giere’s perspectivism does not addres. Those existing views of 
data, the relational and representational views, also do not fuly capture what data are and 
how they function in science. The representational view is insensitive to the scienti-.c 
context in which data are used. The relational account does not fuly account for the 
empirical nature of data and how it is posible for data to be evidentialy useful. The 
account I defend here surmounts these problems by accommodating a representational 
element to data. At the same time, data depend upon the epistemic context because they 
are the product of situated and informed judgements. These judgements emerge from 
within conceptual taxonomies. By explicating the connection between data and human 
judgement, this chapter sets the scene for a more detailed examination of the epistemic 
context, of judgement, and of taxonomy in chapter 3. 
2.0 Introduction
What are data? It is important that my account start with this question because data are 
closely asociated with empirical evidence. Understanding in what way science is an 
empirical inquiry—and the limits of that empiricism—therefore requires starting with an 
examination of data and of evidence. 
There are two main answers to the question of what data are. One in?@uential 
answer, -.rst defended by Bogen and Woodward (Bogen and Woodward 1988), is that data
are representational. They represent in virtue of being records produced by reliable 
experiments. Data provide empirical evidence and, as such, are mind-independent and free
from theoretical asumptions. They are also stable, meaning their identity does not change
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even if other features of an epistemic context change, including theoretical and conceptual 
change.
Another answer, more recently defended, is that data are relational (Leoneli 2016).
Data are de-.ned principaly by their use as evidence. Consequently data identity depends 
upon the particular inquiry in which they feature and their identity changes as the inquiry 
changes. Di0ferent inquiries put di0ferent demands upon data and, to meet these demands,
data change identity. Because these demands are many and varied, data identity changes 
ofLen and data are very unstable.
Given these two seemingly incompatible options, how should we de-.ne data? Do 
data have a changing identity and, if so, what precipitates identity change? In trying to 
clarify the role of data in science, this chapter wil strike a middle option between the 
representational and relational accounts. I wil cal this third view a perspectival account. I 
defend two claims: (1) that data identity is much more stable than the relational account 
alows because data are representational; and (2) data identity is not completely stable 
because data are relative to the epistemic context, in a way I wil clarify. This dependence 
can be helpfuly understood by appeal to perspectivism. This account wil help develop 
what it means for data to be representational and consequently how data are both 
empirical constraints, but also with an identity that depends upon the epistemic context. 
With these results in place, we wil avoid the kind of problematic empiricism to which 
perspectival accounts like Giere’s are susceptible. 
My strategy for defending the perspectival account has two main parts. In section 
2.1 I discus the relational account of data and why it provides a foil to explicating a view 
with stronger representational commitments in section 2.2. To develop these 
commitments, I argue in 2.2.1 that, despite this representational element, data stil do 
depend on the epistemic context. Section 2.2.2 clari-.es this dependence by introducing the
notion of a perspective and section 2.2.3 ilustrates the view with an example. Section 2.3 
concludes this chapter.
2.1 Representational and Relational Accounts of Data
The representational view of data (Latour 1999; Rheinberger 201; Bogen and Woodward 
1988; Bogen and Woodword 2003) is the view that knowledge claims are grounded on a 
largely theory-free and empirical contribution from data. Scientists record data and, once 
recorded, the data serve as unchanging evidence against which theories and models can be 
compared, or upon which theories and models are built. Data serve as the empirical 
arbitrator by being evidence that supports more theoretical claims, though the data 
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themselves are theory-free.12 In using data in this way, scientists can justify claims about 
phenomena, phenomena such as the melting point of lead, neutrinos, black holes, 
aggresive behaviour, or evolutionary traits (Bogen and Woodward 1988). 
Leoneli (2009, 2016, 2015) rejects the representational view and defends a 
relational account. This account claims data are material artefacts whose identity is 
determined by their evidential use. AfLer describing how this view is motivated, I wil 
argue that accounts that do not treat data as at least partly representational—such as 
relational accounts—face two isues: the problem of circularity and the problem of data 
stability. 
Leoneli has documented how data travel and how they are used evidentialy. She 
argues that these two considerations require substantive identity changes in data (Leoneli,
2012, 2009, 2013, 2016a, 2016b). Here is an excerpt from Leoneli’s work where she 
discuses this change in identity, couched in terms of stability:
What I do not share [with the representational view of data] is the emphasis on stability. When 
traveling from their original context of production to a database, and from there to a new context 
of inquiry, biological data are anything but stable objects. (Leoneli 2016, p. 5). 
Data must be transported to be used: they are not used right at the time and location of 
colection. To make data suitable for movement and use, they must be formated, 
clasi-.ed, organized with meta-data, and -.led for later use. Scientists make these material 
changes so the data can be put to new and di0ferent evidential uses. Leoneli also writes:
Within this framework, it is meaningles to ask what objects count as data in the abstract, because 
data are de-.ned in terms of their function within speci-.c proceses of inquiry (Ibid. p. 7).
This pasage suggests that data are de-.ned by their use, or the “role they are made to play”
(Leoneli 2016, 78). Leoneli’s account is relational because it rejects the consideration of a 
datum independently of the context in which it is used. Consequently, what are data to 
one scientist in one context of inquiry may be di0ferent data to a scientist in a di0ferent 
context. This is the particular feature of relational accounts, namely that data are “de-.ned 
in terms of their function within speci-.c proceses of inquiry” that I want to criticaly 
engage with in the rest of this chapter and somehow mitigate by arguing that the 
representational view might in fact have some important insights, even though we do not 
want to reject the importance of examining data within the epistemic contexts in which 
12 See, for a wel-articulated view of this position, Bogen and Woodward (2003).
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they are used. Let us then consider in more detail what data are according to Leoneli’s 
account: 
[…] any object can be considered as a datum as long as (1) it is treated as potential evidence for one 
or more claims about phenomena, and (2) it is posible to circulate it among individuals” (2015, 2). 
A set of records are data when those objects function as evidence and when the set can be 
transported. Data are de-.ned by their functioning as potential evidence and in virtue of 
their physical form. Because data are de-.ned by these two criteria, a set of data does not 
merely acquire or lose properties or characteristics when its use or form changes, the set of 
data actualy ceases to be data or becomes di0ferent data. The identity o+ the data set h/ 
changed. Data, this view seems to suggest, are unstable because what data are depend on 
purposes of speci-.c agents that want to make evidential claims about some phenomena. 
As soon as di0ferent epistemic communities have di0ferent purposes in mind, what used to 
be a data set might no longer count as such. 
My purpose in what folows is to addres the problem of data instability by 
suggesting that relational accounts leave room for a further discusion concerning what 
data are in addition to their evidential role; that other role is representational. There are 
two isues to addres concerning the relational account: 
(I) Is use-as-evidence su0-.cient in identifying data? and 
(II) Is the materiality of the data important in establishing identity?
I here suggest (I) is problematic for two reasons. First, data are not the only source of 
potential evidence in science. A model or simulation, for example, might provide evidence 
that a huricane wil strike a particular place at a particular time, but both these forms of 
scienti-.c evidence are distinct from data. This suggests data are not the only evidence. 
How then should they be distinguished from other forms of scienti-.c evidence (say 
simulated evidence)? Or, di0ferently put, can simulated evidence count as evidence under 
the relational account? And if so, is not there a risk that a net with mesh too large is used 
to capture what count as data? 
Second, it is unclear how data can be used as potential evidence. To use data as 
evidence seems straightforward, but “potential evidence” is presumably not a use because 
any such use would just be a straightforward case of using data as evidence. This suggests 
potential use is more like an atitude that scientists have toward a set. If it is this atitude 
that de-.nes data, then we have what I am going to cal the problem of circularity: scientists
expect data to be evidence; and those data are data because scientists treat them as 
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potential evidence. But why think they can be used / evidence at al? The answer to this 
question requires thinking of data as more than just evidence or potential evidence. And 
because of the circularity, a relational account must just take it as given that data are 
potential evidence. 
These two isues show that data should not be de-.ned solely in terms of evidence: 
something further must be said about what data are if we are to understand how they can 
be used. My point here is not that data cannot be evidence, but that in order to addres 
why data can function evidentialy, there is a logicaly prior question about what they are. 
But perhaps this is too hasty. Leoneli may have anticipated some of these 
objections and may have more of a story to tel about what de-.nes data. For she compares 
data to biological individuals, which also have some kind of identity through continuous 
change over time, like a succesion of states (2016, 82). This comparison preserves the 
intuition that something about data does persist acros time and space, even though what 
persists continuously changes. If this is right, then data can be connected to their 
colection and to previous uses, giving scientists motivation for treating them as potential 
evidence, while at the same time preserving a relational account.
This analogy only works loosely and it only works if we consider the materiality of
data important for their identity. I wil brie?@y discus why it should not satisfy us. First, 
biological individuals may be too unlike data. We might think, for instance, that 
reproduction, evolutionary relationships, birth, and death are important determinants of 
biological individuality. These considerations are not, however, relevant for data. Second, 
biological individuals, to the extent they change, do so materialy; this is what the analogy 
hangs on. I am sceptical that materiality is important for data identity. 
One reason for thinking the material change in data can be overplayed stems from 
the high level of stability data ofLen have. This is the problem o+ instability: data must have 
some stability to function as evidence. This is exempli-.ed in cases where changes in data 
form are symmetric: for example, cases where we can take digital information and write it 
down on a data sheet, then enter that information on a computer, thus geting the same 
material object that we started with. Transformation that alows for a return to the 
original form in this way does not seem very substantive since data can ofLen be moved 
and transformed without los o+ information. If the information were lost, then change 
back to the original would not be posible. 
The requirement that data be stable is also exempli-.ed when data are moved and 
transformed, especialy when scientists critique or respond to one another. Consider as an 
example the historical and philosophical work that Alan Franklin (1981) conducted on the
electron’s charge, building on Milikan’s oil drop experiment. In the early 20th century, 
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Robert Milikan was interested in precisely measuring the charge on an electron and 
famously measured the faling rate of electricaly charged oil drops to do so. Based on how 
fast the drops fel, he was able to calculate the size of an electron charge. He did not, 
however, publish al his data, only a selection. Franklin (Ibid.) revisited Milikan’s 
notebooks to see, among other things, how Milikan’s conclusion might di0fer if al data 
were included in the calculations. This is where my point about transformation arises. 
Milikan recorded his data in a notebook using a pencil. His notebooks were later 
photographed and the photographs were stored as micro-.lm in the Milikan Colection at 
the California Institute of Technology. Franklin obtained digital copies of these 
micro-.lms (or at least some versions of his published paper used digitized versions of the 
micro-.lms). It seems to me that the data underwent extensive transformations before 
Franklin could verify Milikan’s results. They began as pencil parks in a notebook and 
ended as bytes on a hard drive several decades later. Despite these extensive 
transformations, it would be odd to say that Franklin was not working with Milikan’s 
data; the entire purpose of Franklin’s work was to re-examine the data to determine 
whether some data points that Milikan omited a0fected the results. This suggests that, 
despite some great material and contextual changes, Milikan’s data did not change.
Leoneli’s account of data has an insight here by noting the signi-.cance of the form data 
must take to use them in certain ways. However, it would seem that the identity of the 
data (in terms of their informational content) persists through this material change. 
Speci-.caly, the persisting information, in the Milikan case, is the record of the folowing:
The notebooks contain observations on 175 drops along with voltage and chronoscope corections 
and measurements of the density of clock oil (Franklin 1981, 187).
The notebooks contained information about the charge (voltage) on each drop as wel as 
time corections and the density of the oil. They are the records of the measurements and 
observations that Milikan made and consisted, in this case, of a table of numbers with 
labeled columns. This information seems to me the same regardles of whether it is in a 
notebook, Franklin’s hard drive, or transcribed from my own computer to my notebook. I
take it a relational account is commited to the idea that the data on the hard drive are 
di0ferent from the data in the notebook and this is puzzling. 
These material changes may seem too trivial to wory the relational account, but they are 
actualy quite substantial. Once micro-.lmed, Milikan’s notebooks were archived with 
other material from his life and curated. There is even a published guide to asist the 
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researcher in navigating the micro-.lm archive (Goodstein, Gunns, and Underleak 1977). 
Extracting data from these notebooks was no easy task.
A relational view of data might want to give due consideration to elements of data 
practices, such as those ilustrated by this electron charge example. Indeed, any account 
should do this and the view I defend in section 3 seeks to accommodate this consideration. 
But an account must also be able to explain how di0ferent scientists acros time with 
di0ferent interests and using di0ferent tools could nonetheles study the same 
phenomenon and I do not believe relational accounts have an explanation for this as yet. 
Franklin and Milikan were both interested in the same oil drops and the same charges on 
those oil drops. Their research interests were slightly di0ferent: Milikan wanted to 
calculate the charge of an electron and Franklin wanted to determine whether Milikan 
made no important omisions. Both of these di0ferent research interests required the same 
data set. It is di0-.cult to make sense of how they could have their respective research 
interests and pursue them, unles they were working with the same data. This case suggests
that the data, the records that began in a notebook, provided a link between two 
scienti-.caly-minded researchers and a set of oil drops. This conclusion gets us out of the 
problem of stability: data are stable enough to support a variety of research interests and 
this stability stems from the fact that they are records, not just evidence. 
Relational accounts do have resources to discus the relationship between data and
the world. One posible strategy may be to use meta-data. Leoneli discuses (2016, 189–
90) the importance of curatorial work in packaging data. Such work involves recording 
what kind of experiment and recording techniques were used in producing the data. Such 
meta-data are important for communicating how data were colected, what instruments 
were used, who made the record, and under what conditions, etc. So perhaps meta-data 
can explain why scientists should expect data to serve as evidence. 
Without denying the importance of meta-data, one might stil wory about how meta-
data make a set of data that set and di0ferent from another set. If I read Leoneli corectly, 
meta-data are primarily important for evidential, but not identity, reasons. By aloting 
data-colection and experiment to meta-data, this relational account suggests data identity 
is not primarily a0fected by how data are produced. Asigning meta-data this secondary 
role is reasonable; afLer al, meta-data must be recorded in addition to recording data, but I 
contend that a set of data would have a life of its own even if one neglected to record the 
meta-data (though they may be evidentialy not useful).
I have argued that the ontology and use of a data set leave open questions about 
data identity. I noted that data must have some sort of existence and identity prior to their 
use of evidence and, therefore, use-as-evidence might not be enough to determine identity.
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This leaves room, I believe, for a treatment of what data are qua data, independent of 
evidence. The folowing section suggests some additional resources from representational 
accounts could provide a stronger account of data.
2.2 Data Records
The starting point for this chapter’s account of data is this: data should be de-.ned in 
terms of records. The records in question can be of events, objects, behaviours, proceses, 
any number of things that have been detected. Scientists, we might say, use data to record, 
share, and cary speci-.c details about a part of the world. By being used in this way, data 
provide a means for scientists to work with a great deal of empirical content that would be 
imposible to aggregate otherwise. In this section, I wil suggest that the function of data 
to record empirical information is of primary importance because, without this, they lack 
even the potential to function as evidence. 
Data-as-records is ilustrated by an example from Bogen and Woodward. I can 
colect data on the melting point of lead by melting a lead sample and observing my 
thermometer reading when the lead melts (Bogen and Woodward 1988). This is an 
observation. If I do this repeatedly, I have a set of observations of at what temperature lead
samples melt. If I write down the temperature asociated with each observation, then my 
writen records are a set of data—my data are a record of the results of my experiment. It is
necesary that each observation be an observation of the same type of event or type of 
object. Sometimes the records can be writen down, but at other times they may consist in,
to use Straser’s example (2012), colections of, say, plants, which we might think of as 
records of a species. What form data records take is variable, but an esential element, and 
a de-.ning criterion for a data set, is what they are records of. We can think of the content 
of the records as empirical information.
There are a number of accounts of empirical information that could be 
compatible with this view of data, perhaps with litle modi-.cation. What I have in mind 
in particular is information as the representation of an entity, as de-.ned by van Fraasen
(2008, 179–80) and therefore as bearing empirical content. This representation connects 
the data to the worldly entity; in the case of data it is a recorded measurement or 
observation result. This is al I mean by data carying information. I do not mean 
information as signal and noise, as in Shannon’s sense (1948).13 It cannot be merely signal 
13 The Information Shannon discuses is relevant to data, as Woodward notes (2010), but it
is too basic and fundamental a type of information to be evidentialy useful and so it 
cannot be data. It is posible that a more complete account could take this basic form of 
information and supplement it to create data, but this project is beyond the scope of this 
chapter.
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and noise because this combination provides no speci-.cation of what is recorded: signal 
and noise are too primitive a form of information, too bare, to be evidentialy useful 
without a richer understanding of what a recorded observation is an observation of. 
Representation in this case is not friendly to a strongly naturalized account of 
representation, such as isomorphism (French 2003, 2014), because data depend upon a 
choice of what to record, what observations data represent cannot be speci-.ed except by 
appeal to scienti-.c practice. I wil discus this dependence that data have later in this 
section. But the kind of representation needed here is in principle compatible with, say, an
inferentialist account (Suarez 2010; Suárez 2004) or even an agent-based account (Giere 
2010). Whether these accounts are compatible may depend upon how content is 
characterized, which is beyond the scope of this chapter. But what this chapter wil help 
clarify is the way in which data, as records that are representational, must stil involve 
judgement. Before explicating this in more detail, I show how this view avoids the 
problems facing representational accounts and the criticisms that Leoneli levels at 
traditional representational views of data.
 Recal that relational accounts faced circularity and stability problems. Treating 
data as records avoids both. The -.rst problem is avoided because this de-.nition is non-
circular. It is clear why a scientist would colect data: because they are records of worldly 
events against which theories or models can be tested and which stores information. And 
if this is what data are, then it is no longer mysterious why scientists would -.nd them 
worth colecting. The isue of stability is avoided because data remain stable to the extent 
that records are stable. However, this treatment may bring to mind the representational 
view that Leoneli criticises (2016, 73–74). The representational view is commited to two 
things: (1) that data are mind-independent representations when reliably produced by the 
scienti-.c method and (2) that the exclusive role of data is to test theory. Leoneli argues 
that data cannot be de-.ned in this way. I am not atempting to defend a representational 
view with these two commitments. Like Leoneli, I also reject data as mind-independent 
representations of the world that are stable. This may seem odd and counter to the entire 
point of developing a representational account. However, there is sound reasoning behind
this claim.
Thinking data are tied to an epistemic context wil hopefuly seem les odd when 
we examine what is involved in using data as records. I contend that this use invariably 
requires human judgement. And if there is judgement involved, there is reason for 
thinking that data depend upon the epistemic context in which they feature. This appeal 
to judgement is necesary because it is otherwise imposible to establish which 
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observations qualify for a data set; in other words, we must specify how to choose what to 
record and how to group the records. 
This speci-.cation is not trivial to addres. Any given experiment can present to a 
researcher any number of things to record and only through judgement is it posible to 
extract data from an experiment.14 For instance, it is usualy not the case that scientists 
would record whether they wore a watch, the size of the lab bench, what was for lunch, or 
the colour of their lab coats. It is imposible to record everything and scientists must make 
deliberate, informed choices about what is and is not important information. Those 
choices are informed by knowledge and understanding of, for example, theory, 
experimental techniques, or instruments. To return to a previous ilustration, when 
melting lead, one might record the temperature because atomic theory predicts at what 
temperature lead melts. It is therefore an interesting study to compare what theory 
predicts with the world, which is done best, in this case, by comparing the actual 
temperature at which lead melts with what theory predicted. To do this, I need to know 
how to identify lead, how to melt it, how to measure its temperature as it melts, and how 
to read and record the reading on a thermometer. 
In being able to judge what to record, scientists must be able to determine when 
two events are the same. If this were not the case, it would be unclear which data would 
belong in which set. There are criteria for justifying the treatment of two events as the 
same. Criteria, in this sense, are related to justi-.cation. To return to the lead example, I can
justify using two measurements when my samples are of similarly pure lead that I heat 
using the same burner and measure using an accurate thermometer. Justi-.cation is 
important because scientists must establish that their data sets of records of the same 
thing. This is particularly salient a problem in the case of unusual readings. Unusual 
readings suggest something has gone wrong. Say I have an outlier, a number that is much 
farther from the average temperature reading than my other recordings. If someone 
chalenges me on this number, I need to be able to justify its inclusion and I do so by 
appealing to criteria that establish the outlier is the same type of event as the other 
recordings. I need to be able to say things like “I used the same thermometer and the same 
lead sample under the same conditions.” Without this kind of justi-.cation, there is reason 
to doubt that my outlier can be included in my data set. And with this doubt comes 
uncertainty about what the data are records of because to make a record, one must know 
what it is one is recording. 
14 In this sense an experiment produced any number of signals and noise. This is why 
Shannon’s information is insu0-.cient: scientists must choose and judge what to record, 
without this speci-.cation, there is simply no way to determine which signal and noise is 
relevant. 
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I have suggested the identity of data depends at least partly on their empirical 
information: the product of what data-colectors judge to record or what data-users judge 
their data are records. By de-.ning data in terms of records, I am more closely connecting 
the concept of data to the that of measurement. My view in particular is related to the idea
of measurement as information gathering and might be compatible with Tal’s (2014) or 
Parker’s (2015) account. 
Considering data colection as measurement or information gathering makes more
explicit the role of judgement in colection. What we measure or what information we 
gather is a selective choice; we do not record and measure al posible parameters or 
information, just a subset. Furthermore and more importantly for my discusion, in 
judging what to record, those who colect data distinguish the phenomenon of interest 
from others that are irelevant for their purposes. Milikan had to be able to distinguish 
faling, charged oil drops from al other phenomena surounding his experiment, 
including oil drops that were not charged. I am considering this selective recording a 
judgement because Milikan could have chosen to record other things (though that 
information would have been useles for his study) and because he required extensive 
knowledge about electrons, oil drops, and his instruments in order to make the kinds of 
records he did. 
As mentioned earlier, the account defended here shares with Woodward (2010, 
792) the emphasis on the connection between data and information. However, there are 
two reasons for thinking there are signi-.cation di0ferences between these two accounts.
The -.rst is that I emphasize the dependence of the data upon the judgements 
scientists make when selecting what to record. This is a very di0ferent claim from the one I 
take Woodward to defend, which is that data depend upon experiment outcomes, but not
judgements. A more congenial position on data comes from philosophy of experiment. 
Hacking’s (Hacking in Pickering 1992, chap. 2) description of experimental practice as 
human-dependent activity, but with some realist commitment, provides a particularly 
important backdrop to this project, though his writings on data may be notably di0ferent.15
The second reason my discusion is disimilar from Woodward’s and more similar 
to Leoneli’s is that I asign a more explicit role to the epistemic context. To the extent that
judgements form part of this context, data—as products of those judgements—are also 
part of that context. Woodward asigns litle role to the epistemic context. He suggests in 
his (2010, 796–98) that data do not depend upon theory. And further discusion he o0fers 
15 More strongly constructivist views about experimental work, such as those that 
Pickering (1992) or Latour and Woolgar (2013) defend are les closely aligned with the 
perspectival account I wish to defend. However, their work on practice, activity, and 
experiment provide important foundations for this work. 
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of the epistemic context is restricted to either what motivates scientists or to what helps 
scientists make data-to-phenomena inferences. There is no discusion of the role that the 
epistemic context plays in shaping and determining the data themselves, apart from 
motivating scientists to colect them. 
It is posible that Woodward’s view is more congenial than the preceding 
paragraphs suggest. But these two points of divergence between the account I defend and 
Woodward’s are signi-.cant because the former has a much milder empiricist 
commitment: data, as the empirical contribution to science, depend much more on the 
scientists and the context in which they work than Woodward suggests. 
2.2.1 Data and the Epistemic Context
So far I have argued that relational accounts leave room for more discusion of data-as-
records (section 2). I then argued that data should be de-.ned in terms of records (section 
3a). I now would like to suggest that because data are part of an epistemic context, they are
unstable in the sense that as the epistemic context changes, the data can change as wel. 
There are two motivations for endorsing this view of data as unstable. One is that 
what scientists select and record can change based on changes in epistemic context—and 
so the data change—and the other is that a set of records can turn out to be records of two 
di0ferent things: in both cases the data change because the content of the data, the 
empirical information they cary, does not re?@ect the kinds of judgements that scientists 
would like to make. I discus each motivation in turn. 
Two records can only be a part of the same set if they both are records of the same 
type of observation. Think of data sets as sets of individual records of the same general 
type of observation. If data were not records of the same kind of observation or 
measurement, the data could not be used as records or evidence. I cannot, for instance, use
data to reason about the melting point of lead if one datum is a record of melting lead and 
another of melting iron. To reason about the melting point of lead, I require a set of data 
with an internal coherence and this is formed when al members of the set are records of 
the same type of observation or measurement. Even an individual scientist ofLen works 
with a great variety of data sets, each a colection of data that are the products of di0ferent 
measurement outcomes.
The reason data are not fuly stable is that the information they cary is subject to 
change in the face of certain epistemic changes. In particular, if scientists come to make 
new distinctions about what they are recording, then the information data cary is not 
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straightforwardly preserved. What scientists took their data to re?@ect at one point in time 
di0fers, in such cases, from what it does at a later time.
Historical chemistry provides an ilustration of this point. Over the course of 
several experiments, Henry Cavendish (1766) thought he had isolated and weighed 
phlogiston, a substance once posited to form acids, metals, and combustion. His data were
numerical records of the weight of the phlogiston. It was reasonable of him to make this 
asertion because phlogiston was a widely accepted substance and because many chemists, 
including Cavendish, distinguished the products of a reaction on the basis of what could 
be isolated and the gas he caled phlogiston was one such substance. Chemists today use 
other criteria such as weight as the basis for distinguishing the products of a reaction. The 
changes in data that I have been discusing occur because of the change in clasi-.cation. 
We no longer say Cavendish had records of the weight of phlogiston, but that he had 
colected data on the weight of hydrogen gas. The reason the data here are not stable is 
that the information we take them to cary changes. The data do not stand as records of 
the measured weight of phlogiston, but as records of the measured weight of hydrogen 
gas. When chemists accepted phlogiston chemistry, these data were records of phlogiston 
weight. But today in our epistemic context, the data are records of hydrogen gas. The 
claim that data identity changes may seem deeply unintuitive, but the rest of the chapter 
wil show that this need not be so.
As the -.rst step toward motivating the instability of data identity, consider what 
the alternative is here. It may be more intuitive to think the identity of the data identity 
does not change here. The marks on paper or something else about what Cavendish 
colected in the 18th century must in some way be the same as it is today. However, the 
numbers only become data in conjunction with the information they cary, so although 
the marks do not change, the identity of the data do. We need to know what our data are 
records of in order to determine what kind of data we have. Once we atend to the fact 
that data cary information, it is les intuitive that data cannot change. And the change is 
only partial. The marks on paper, the description of the experiment, and the published 
papers are unchanged. But our epistemic context, and thus the identity of our data, has 
changed.
The second reason for thinking data are not fuly stable is related. We might 
discover that records we took to be of the same thing were actualy records of two distinct 
things. So not only is the event or phenomenon the data were records of di0ferent, but also
the data are not records of one type of thing. We can say that data sets of this sort are very 
heterogeneous. This is a case of only partial stability because the description of what data 
are records of changes in response to things we have learned. The new data cannot be used 
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for the same generalizations, they do not support the same claims, and we do not take 
them to be records of the same events we did before. This last consideration is a direct 
consequence of de-.ning data in terms of what they are records of. There are, in other 
words, strong inferentialist reasons for thinking the data are not the same.16
These two features of instability di0fer because, regarding the -.rst, the data are al 
subject to the same generalizations, but the generalizations change, whereas—for the 
second feature—generalizations do not hold acros the data set, though they may hold for 
a subset.17 What is common to each of these types of change is that the change destabilizes 
what we take the data to be records of—and hence the data are not stable since data are 
identi-.ed in terms of empirical information. We can see this change because the empirical 
information caried by data is determined by the judgments that scientists make about 
what they are selecting to record. More speci-.caly, the change here is not token change. 
For example, a particular number inscribed in Milikan’s or Cavendish’s notebook is 
always going to be that number, regardles of where it is and how it is recorded. However, 
what that number stands for is not necesarily stable in the face of al types of scienti-.c 
change. 
Data instability of the kind discused above is in tension with Bogen and 
Woodward’s commitment to establishing reliable data experimentaly. As discused above,
their account suggests data are largely independent of theory and that data can therefore 
serve to arbitrate between di0ferent theoretical claims. In other words, they rely on a 
reliabilist epistemolo9 to grant data autonomy from theory. However, what those data are
and how they can be used are not independent of scienti-.c practice, including theory, 
because data depend upon judgements that scientists make and these judgements are not 
made in isolation of theory. This is independent of how reliable we take the data-
producing method to be. In coming to beter understand what we observe, we may, and 
have, come to recognize important distinctions that undermine what we took to be the 
subject of our investigations and the way we caried out those investigations. 
The instability here is not incompatible with a relationist account such as 
Leoneli’s. This is because the kinds of changes in records I have been discusing are 
compatible with other kinds of changes discused by Leoneli, such as material changes 
and changes in how the data are used (see Section 2 above). My purpose in this chapter is 
16 It may be instructive at this point to compare this inferentialist motive with Suarez’s
(2004) inferentialist account of representation. Brie?@y, he stipulates, minimaly, that 
representations have a force that points to a target and representations must alow for 
inferences about the target. The force is established at least partly by convention.
17 This is distinct from Goodman’s Grue problem (1955) because Goodman was concerned 
with criteria for “lawlikenes” and prediction—and hence induction (p. 310)—whereas I 
am concerned with changes in identity. The two questions are not completely unrelated.
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not to reject the importance of material and use changes, but to highlight another form of 
change that I believe is su0-.ciently interesting to addres directly and that changes in the 
data in ways that are more fundamental than those addresed by other accounts. 
There are, however, important di0ferences between this account and relational 
accounts when it comes to stability. I take relational accounts to de-.ne the instability of 
data in terms of evidential use and materiality: as the use of data changes, their physicality 
changes and the data themselves change. In contrast, I am de-.ning instability in terms of 
the what data are records of, irespective of the particular evidential use to which the data 
wil be put. So there is a sense in which for both accounts the epistemic context determines
data identity, but for relational accounts it is use and material and for mine it is the subject
of the record.
2.2.2 Perspectival Data
We might say that data, because of their dependence upon the epistemic context, are 
perspectival. Perspectivism, as Giere (2006) articulates it, is about representations, 
especialy models. But the term perspectivism is just as apt for data because data are 
representational and because perspectivism also emphasizes the contextual nature of 
scienti-.c practice, which is a feature that data have. Another reason to invoke 
perspectivism concerns how scientists make judgements. Recent work by Masimi (2012) 
suggests that we conceive of perspectivism as the epistemic context in which scientists 
work. Scienti-.c work is always situated within a network of beliefs that should be reliably 
justi-.ed and coherent. She writes “Justi-.ed-belief-atribution is always perspectival and 
contextual: it has to do with the way each belief -.ts into the agent’s epistemic perspective”
(2012, 48). 
Data are part of the epistemic context because scientists make judgments based 
upon their beliefs. And because colecting data is asociated with a judgment, data 
colection should be cast as a perspectival activity that partly forms a perspective. If this is 
right, then these judgments are not merely informed by the epistemic contexts in which 
scientists work: they in fact partly constitute this epistemic context. 
Another reason to invoke perspectivism here is to distinguish between context-
dependence and theory-ladennes.18 Theory-ladennes suggests a high level of dependence 
on a particular form of knowledge, speci-.caly theoretical knowledge. Data, although they
depend upon the epistemic context, do not depend upon theory so heavily. If they did, 
data could neither arbitrate between theoretical claims nor support or refute such claims. 
18 For some discusion of the isue of theory-ladennes, see for example (Kordig 1971; 
Brewer and Lambert 2001; Schindler 201)
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The practice of colecting data sets, analyzing them, and using them evidentialy would 
then be very mysterious or even pointles. So data must have some level of independence 
from theory, which is part of what Bogen and Woodward (1988) took such pains to show. 
Hacking (Hacking 1983, 185) also argues, but in the context of observation more generaly, 
that there must be enough independence from theory to provide empirical constraints. 
The kind of epistemic context upon which data do depend—and of which data 
are a part—is more fundamental than theory. This context includes a range of knowledge, 
such as knowledge of instruments, experimental technique, and especialy knowledge 
clasi-.cation. That is, how to clasify what is observed. Scientists make judgments about 
clasi-.cation in asociation with data-colection and use. Such a judgment might be “this is
a meteorological object,” or “this is a lead sample.” These judgments are perspectival, I 
suggest, because they are intimately connected to the understanding scientists have and 
this understanding is distinct from theory. One can, for instance, judge an object in the sky
to be a comet and they might make this judgment independently of modern astronomical 
theory. And yet if the epistemic context changes su0-.ciently, scientists would make, or 
might make, di0ferent judgments. Instead of judging comets as meteorological, we now 
judge them to be astronomical. Let’s examine a brief example to ilustrate the perspective-
dependence of data.
2.2.3 New Stars and Old Data
Here is an example that ilustrates the perspectival view I am defending. In the 2nd century 
A.D. observers in China recorded a “new star.” This record has since sparked several 
contemporary studies that atempt to make sense of what this “new star” might be in 
contemporary terms. Clark and Stephenson (1977) made an atempt to use this early 
observation. Thorset (1992) and Green and Stephenson (2003) published further 
discusion of the isue. There are two chalenges that these studies faced: one easy, one 
very chalenging. The -.rst is that these ancient observers did not write English and the 
second is that “new star” might mean several things. Establishing what it was they saw 
requires addresing these two problems with two tasks. The -.rst is a straightforward 
translation of their language into English; this was the easy task. If you know the relevant 
languages, translation is straightforward. But translation alone does not establish what it 
was they saw in contemporary terms and this second task was the harder. To do this, 
Thorset (1992) suggested that the “new star” might be the supernova MSH15-52, which 
was in contrast to a set of supernovae suggestions from Clark and Stephenson (1977). 
Thorset went about arbitrating between these posibilities using a number of methods. 
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For one thing, a contemporary pulsar may have originated from supernova MSH15-52. 
Pulsars are smal stars that can be detected using their radio emisions. Sometimes they are 
produced by supernovae. Thorset estimated how old that pulsar is (which gives an 
indication of when the supernova occured). This timing estimate seemed to match the 
Chinese observation. Thorset also investigated three further considerations: where 
supernova MSH15-52 was likely to be in the night sky; how bright it was; and whether 
these estimates matched historical observation, or at least did not obviously con?@ict with 
the historical record. The result of these estimates and comparisons was that Clark and 
Stephenson’s suggested supernovae did not -.t wel with the record, but MSH15-15 did.
The whole purpose of these studies was to put more speci-.c constraints on 
contemporary theories. If modern astronomers could determine precisely when the 
supernova occured, contemporary astronomers could use that information to test 
predictions more precisely.
This example ilustrates a perspectival shifL and it ilustrates a change in data. The 
modern astronomers did not simply take the historical record and “interpret” the 
observation in contemporary terms. If it was a mater of interpretation, then the record 
itself should provide su0-.cient information for a translation. An interpreter (translating 
French into English) needs only hear the French phrase to translate it into English: no 
other research or information is required. This astronomy example is not so simple. The 
ancient Chinese did not discriminate between comets, supernovae, and some other 
astronomical phenomena. From their perspective, bright objects in the sky were al “stars,”
which was a completely reasonable judgement given the epistemic context. However, 
contemporary scientists make much -.ner distinctions between bright objects in the sky 
and “star” is too vague a term to constrain contemporary theories. So rather than just 
interpret the record in a new way, modern astronomers had to use the historical 
description of the event in conjunction with contemporary data and knowledge of 
astronomy to determine what event the Chinese astronomers observed. This proces is 
very much like identi-.cation, which requires an understanding of how to determine the 
identity of an object, which is precisely what Thorset knew and what he did. 
Let us return to the two earlier points about why data change is not interpretation
change. First, the data in this example presuppose content. Thorset and other 
contemporary astronomers were not just using raw numbers both in working with ancient
texts and in working with the data they extracted: they worked with records of something 
that was observed. Initialy those records were of a “new star” and afLer contemporary 
research and re-identi-.cation, they were records of a supernova. In order to place 
constraints on contemporary theory, Thorset’s interpretation of the data -.rst required 
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that the data be records of very speci-.c things, such as a supernova. Otherwise the data 
would have been useles.
Second, this example ilustrates how once re-identi-.ed, the new data cannot be 
used in a straightforward way in the old perspective. Ancient Chinese astronomers did not
recognize supernovae and would be unable to use an observation about a supernova 
without -.rst learning about modern astronomy and the taxonomic distinctions it 
recognizes, which would be highly anachronistic. 
It is important to note that there is a sense in which there is something that persists
between the ancient Chinese records and the contemporary data. Otherwise, what would 
be the connection between the contemporary research and that event thousands of years 
ago? Surely there is one. The thing that persists is some coarser grained description of the 
event, such as “smal bright light that appears at such-and-such time and location.” This 
toy example is not particularly helpful for the ancient or contemporary astronomer, 
however, since the former are interested in stars and the later in supernova: “smal bright 
light” is not equivalent to “new star” nor to “supernova,” even seting translating texts 
aside. It does ilustrate, however, one way we could track the origins of Thorset’s data in 
this particular example and why a historical event is of interest to the contemporary 
scientist. 
This description of re-identi-.cation may resemble Leoneli’s “re-
contextualization” (Leoneli 2016, 189). Despite the similarity, they di0fer in important 
ways. Leoneli notes that data are ofLen packed and described in such a way as to alow 
them to be transported and later used (caled de-contextualization). When scientists 
retrieve de-contextualised data, they then must “re-contextualise” them by situating the 
data, which involves clasifying, describing, and forming them materialy so as to provide 
evidential value for the particular inquiry. 
This is substantialy di0ferent from my view in two ways. First, I believe data, to be
used as evidence, must bear partialy stable information, regardles of the particular 
inquiry context in which they were or have been used, provided the perspective 0 the same.
The account defended here di0fers in a second way from a relational account: re-
identi-.cation occurs only when we change how we clasify what we have recorded, but 
not every time data is put to a new use; consequently, data do not change ofLen. Some 
circumstances that precipitate re-identi-.cation may include substantive theoretical change
—such as a shifL toward a heliocentric universe—or some other change in our 
understanding of the world or our instruments. A paradigm shifL is an example of the 
kind of change required for re-identi-.cation, though milder shifLs in understanding may 
also be su0-.cient, provided they result in new taxonomic distinctions. Perspectives alow 
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us to talk about these kinds of data changes without invoking the kind of radical upheaval 
asociated with paradigm shifLs. 
We might think that I have, in considering data perspectival, just made them fuly 
relative, mind-dependent entities. Didn’t perspectivism promise to be a more constrained 
view than this, one that didn’t preclude empirical constraints in the sciences? In response, 
perspectives only arise in cases where we want to compare, or examine the di0ferences 
between, di0ferent perspectives. That is, perspectives only arise in the context of data when
examining history, disagreement, or other cases where there is a kind of disunity of 
judgement.
2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, I sought to addres what data are and what relationship they have to the 
epistemic context in which scientists work. The account has the advantage of 
accommodating the empirical contribution data make, while also giving due consideration
to the role of human knowledge and understanding in determining data identity. Because 
of these two constraints, data do not -.t neatly with antirealist analyses of science, but nor 
do they have a place in the picture painted by realists with a strong empirical commitment.
My account of data is, consequently, a kind of middle ground. To strike this balance, I 
argued that, contra relational accounts, data are generaly highly stable acros di0ferent 
inquiries and acros material forms. Data have this stability because they are at least partly 
representational. I then argued 1) that data are not stable in the face of certain kinds of 
scienti-.c change and 2) that we can think of data as perspectival in the sense that they are 
part of the epistemic context. This contextual dependence comes from the distinctions 
that scientists make about what they record. One upshot of thinking about data in this 
way is that it shows how even old data can be repurposed and improved to re?@ect the 
contemporary epistemic context and help scientists investigate contemporary research 
questions. This account also gives credence to the profound changes in science and the 
surmountable di0-.culties asociated with navigating the ancient sciences and our changing 
understanding of the world. 
I have so far only made cursory remarks about what an epistemic context is and 
what relevance the distinctions that scientists make have. The folowing chapter wil 






What does it mean to be pluralist about epistemic contexts? This chapter wil argue that 
we should understand the epistemic context primarily in terms of epistemic engagement, 
in contrast to a strong pragmatic approach, although both approaches are commited to 
asociating the epistemic context, and pluralism, with scienti-.c practice. Epistemic 
engagement is made posible by common commitment to a conceptual taxonomy. When 
there are rival taxonomies, or alternative taxonomies, we have pluralism, understood in 
this context as a form of perspectivism. I draw on a Witgensteinian tradition in the 
philosophy of language in developing this account of epistemic engagement. 
3.0 Introduction 
The preceding chapter argued that data are tied to the epistemic context and vary as the 
context does. There brie?@y arose the question of what the epistemic context is. And in 
answer I brie?@y mentioned that the distinctions scientists made were an important part of 
this context. The purpose of this chapter is to explore more fuly what an epistemic 
context consists in and how we should understand the distinctions that scientists make. 
In section 3.1, I discus the motivation for pluralism in science generaly. Pluralism 
has recently become a very popular way of avoiding reductive and simplistic views of 
science. But when one is a pluralist, what is the subject of the pluralism? Pluralist accounts 
can be roughly grouped into ontological and epistemic versions. The -.rst make claims 
about what the world is like, the second make claims about the structure of scienti-.c 
inquiry. I suggest in section 3.2 that we should consider ontological pluralism a secondary 
inquiry afLer epistemic pluralism, which is consistent with several ontological approaches: 
one should have an epistemic view before one develops an ontological view.
But what does it mean to be an epistemic pluralist? What is such an account 
pluralist about? I argue in section 3.3 that such a view involves commitment to a pluralism 
about scienti-.c practices. Understanding pluralism therefore requires de-.ning practices 
and characterizing how they can be distinguished. I show that several forms of epistemic 
pluralism al have a similar commitment to distinguishing practices by appeal to some 
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notion of an end. Using ends as the basis of pluralism in this way is a di0-.cult project for 
several reasons that I discus. We can -.nd an alternative way of de-.ning and characterizing
practices in the philosophy of language, which I discus in 3.4. This approach, which is 
broadly Witgensteinian and perspectival, uses epistemic engagement as the basis of 
distinguishing practices in the context of science. I show what this could look like in 3.5. 
This approach is more precise and avoids the pitfals of using ends. 
Pluralism, as a general term, suggests the acceptance, or at least tolerance, of a set 
of alternatives, be they alternative clasi-.cations, practices, ontologies, theories, etc. 
Whatever might compose a set that we are pluralist about, a pluralist view must have some
basis for distinguishing between members of that set. I am going to asume that a pluralist 
view, to be pluralist at al, must give us some criteria for distinguishing between members 
of the set. Without these criteria, we do not have a pluralist account. Part of the general 
argument of this chapter is that many pluralists get their criteria from pragmatism and 
that there is a beter alternative, which I provide. 
3.1 Pluralism and Practices: Historical Context
The tradition of philosophicaly examining science using pluralist lenses stretches into 
what are now historical texts. There are two threads in this tradition that are important for
this chapter’s argument. The -.rst thread is the shifL from analysing theory to analysing 
practices. The second thread is the shifL from expecting uni-.cation in science to expecting 
pluralism.
We can see both of these threads emerge from concerns with logical positivism, a 
tradition which paradigmaticaly analysed science in terms of its theory and expected 
uni-.cation in the sciences. Theory should be analysed propositionaly and the activities 
and interests of scientists, though interesting for sociology or history, are concerned with 
discovery, not with justi-.cation, i.e. the logical structure of theory (Reichenbach (1938). 
With this distinction between discovery and justi-.cation, philosophers could abstract and 
analyse independently of the activities asociated with scienti-.c practice. With this form of
abstraction came the expectation that sciences would converge on uni-.ed explanations
(Hempel and Oppenheim 1948).
Subsequently, philosophers shifLed focus from abstract propositions to the things 
scientists were actualy doing, i.e. the practice of science. Kuhn’s (1976) analysis of 
paradigms o0fered a holistic way of thinking about the tight connection between theory 
and the activities that scientists performed, although it o0fered much more than that too. 
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The semantic turn continued the emphasis on practice. Unlike Kuhn, this analysis 
emphasized theory, but instead of treating theory propositionaly, philosophers appealed 
to models. This shifL promised to abstract les from scienti-.c practice, i.e. what the 
scientists were actualy doing. Another important development away from positivism was 
the more explicit introduction of plurality in science. Suppes (1978) drew atention to 
what looked like a divergence, not a convergence, in scienti-.c practic., not just theories, 
which suggested the sciences would diversify, not cohere on a single uni-.ed explanation. 
The evidence for this claim comes from an examination of the things scientists say and do, 
i.e. from looking at practice. 
For Suppes, the complexity and diversity of scienti-.c practice o0fers justi-.cation 
for a pluralist atitude. It is consequently natural to treat an examination of practice at the 
same time as an examination of pluralism, since justi-.cation for the later can emerge from
an examination of the former.19 Nevertheles, it is not obvious what sort of pluralism best 
accounts for the disorder we see in scienti-.c practice. Philosophers have made a number of
suggestions since Suppes in 1978. 
The varieties of pluralism may be divided crudely into two camps: an epistemic 
and ontological camp. The ontological camp holds that the world is inherently pluralistic: 
there is a diversity of ontology that cannot be reduced. Cartwright defends a version of 
this view in The Dappled World (1999). Dupré has a related account in The Disorder o+ 
Things and Chakravarty more recently defends an ontological pluralism about properties
(201). 
The second type of pluralism, epistemic pluralism, does not necesarily make the 
ontological claim. Instead, this view holds that science is composed of di0ferent epistemic 
systems that cannot be reduced or eliminated. Longino (Longino in Kelert, Longino, and 
Waters 2006), Kusch (2017), Chang (2012), Wylie (2015), and Danks (2015) are some 
defenders of epistemic pluralism, in various forms. Pluralists of this breed are ofLen 
adverse to making ontological claims (Kelert, Longino, and Waters 2006 Introduction). 
Because perspectivism as discused in the last chapter is concerned with epistemic side of 
science, this second form of pluralism is the more relevant and therefore the subject of this 
chapter. I provide motivation for this choice and why ontological pluralism is of 
secondary importance below. 
19 See for example the introduction in (Kelert, Longino, and Waters 2006) for a discusion
of pluralism and various ways this might apply to the sciences.
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3.2 Ontological Pluralism 
Ontological pluralism takes various forms. Many are asociated with the Stanford school 
and include Dupré, Cartwright, and Suppes. Cartwright, Dupré, and more recently 
Chakravarty defend more ontological forms of pluralism. However, there are important 
di0ferences in the way these philosophers make ontological claims. For Cartwright and 
Dupré, the ontological claim is secondary to epistemic considerations. 
In the Dappled World, Cartwright approaches ontological pluralism afLer raising 
some epistemic considerations. She -.rst brings our atention to the various things we 
know in our everyday lives and the number of very precise things the natural sciences have 
taught us, which are al epistemic considerations. She points this out here:
Besides this odd asortment of inexact facts, we also have a great deal of very precise and exact 
knowledge, chie?@y supplied by the natural sciences. I am not thinking here of abstract laws, which 
as an empiricist I take to be of considerable remove from the world they are supposed to apply to, 
but rather of the precise behavior of speci-.c kinds of concrete systems [….] (1999, 24). 
She takes it as a fact that there are a number of things we know. She then asks what 
ontological conclusion this fact licenses. From this epistemic claim, she argues that the 
laws of nature are constrained in their application to very speci-.c and controled—usualy 
experimental—contexts, what she cals nomological machines (1999, chap. 3). The view 
that best supports this is metaphysical pluralism (1999, 31). Di0ferent parts of nature are 
governed by di0ferent laws that may or may not be related to one another, but whatever 
relation there is between these laws is not systematic.
Notice that in Cartwright’s view, the ontological claim about nature emerges from
the epistemic claims she makes about human knowledge. She does not appeal to content 
that is speculative, highly abstracted, or highly theoretical, but to wel established 
knowledge of every day facts and to wel established scienti-.c facts. The scienti-.c facts are 
connected to speci-.c or practical problems, like sending information through -.bre optics 
cables (1999, 30), and involve very litle abstraction. We can say generaly that her appeal to
knowledge is an appeal to knowledge of speci-.c facts and that posesion of this 
knowledge is demonstrable through the solving of speci-.c problems. So even though 
Cartwright is ultimately concerned with metaphysics, her analysis of science begins with 
epistemology. 
Something similar underlies Dupré’s promiscuous realism (Dupré 1981; Dupré 
1995, 1996). He writes
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It is, of course, imposible for any such philosophical thesis to contradict an 
empirical demonstration—a demonstration derived, that is to say, from the 
investigation of the actual practice of science—that science is at this time in a state 
of radical disunity. But the deeper question is whether science is disuni-.ed simply 
because it has not yet been uni-.ed, or rather because disunity is its inevitable and 
appropriate condition (Dupré 1996, 102)
A philosophical account must be informed by, and be consistent with, an examination of 
scienti-.c practice. A philosophical investigation of scienti-.c practice shows that science is 
very disuni-.ed and what this disunity consists in is the purview of philosophy. Two 
options that Dupré points to here are, -.rst, that the disunity may just be an artefact of the 
curent state of science, a state that may later give way to more unity. Or, second, the 
disunity may not be accidental, but a fact about scienti-.c inquiry. 
In other work (Dupré 1995, sec. 1), Dupré defends the second option. He does so 
by showing that di0ferent biological clasi-.cations satisfy very di0ferent theoretical needs 
and provide explanations for very di0ferent natural phenomena. These epistemic 
considerations suggest disunity is not just an artefact of scienti-.c practice, but an esential 
part of it. The disunity is esential because, according to Dupré (1995), our (humanity’s) 
varied interests give rise to a plurality of natural clasi-.cations. A consequence of this 
initial position is a metaphysical conclusion: nature has a variety of structures, giving us a 
number of di0ferent natural clasi-.cations. There are two important elements to Dupré’s 
thought: -.rst, his interest in ontology emerges from epistemology; second, that 
epistemology concerns primarily an investigation of scienti-.c practice.
Chakravarty (201), however, takes a di0ferent approach. Although he is also 
interested in ontological pluralism, there are several wories we might have with his 
approach. I discus his view and then show the wories, which generaly concern how 
realist his account can be. He, like Dupré, is interested in clasi-.cation and ontology. He 
takes it as given that science as a whole is commited to a kind of taxonomic pluralism. The
task he sets himself, given this commitment, is to provide a realist ontology. At minimum 
this realist view is commited to the sociability of properties.
[…]Taking properties to be the focus of realist commitment in the -.rst instance introduces 
precisely the sort of taxonomic ?@exibility the realist needs in order to satisfy the requirement [..] 
that there exists more than one structure of natural kinds (201, 169).
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The realist here is commited to the existence of properties and on the basis of these 
properties, scientists create di0ferent taxonomies. Any particular taxonomy is relative, 
pluralist, and mind dependent, but the properties are not. This gives the realist, one 
supposes, the ?@exibility to accommodate the diverse taxonomies in the sciences, but 
without faling into strong relativism, constructivism, constructive empiricism, or 
instrumentalism. There is, however, stil a nominalist threat, which Chakravarty avoids 
by the folowing clari-.cation (201, 170): properties are not randomly distributed, but 
grouped together, hence they are “sociable.” Sociable properties give us reason for forming
some taxonomies over others, i.e. taxonomies are not arbitrary. 
There are two puzzling features of this account. The -.rst puzzle concerns whether 
properties can be grouped in the way Chakravarty suggests. Let’s take his example of 
electrons to ilustrate this puzzle. 
[..] Some groupings of properties are more sociable than others. The mas, charge, and spin of an 
electron [..] are always found together where there are electrons [..] (201, 171)
Taxonomic pluralism is posible, Chakravarty contends, because the mind-
independent properties can be grouped in di0ferent ways. The choice of which properties 
form the basis of the taxonomy is conventional. However, this electron example does not 
sit very wel with this brand of pluralism. These three properties—mas, charge, and spin
—are always asociated with electrons. How then, can they give rise to taxonomic 
pluralism if they are always grouped together? And why are they always grouped together?
The plausible answer is that they are the properties of an object: an electron. This suggests 
that it is in fact the electrons that are important here; they are what bind these di0ferent 
properties together and make them interesting for scienti-.c investigation. Only by being 
the spin of an electron is the property of spin a property that scientists can study. This 
position that electrons occupy in physics is not one of convention, i.e. it’s not clear to me 
that scientists could have chosen other properties for their taxonomy because the kind of 
constraints the world places on building a taxonomy are stricter than the constraints of a 
convention. What implications does this have for Chakravarty’s taxonomic pluralism? 
The discusion implies that conventionalism creeps too far into taxonomy. So although 
Chakravarty is striving for a realist view of taxonomic pluralism, it is not realist enough. 
And it does not provide an ontology for the epistemology of science. 
The second puzzle about Chakravarty’s account is that it does litle to iluminate 
why science might give rise to taxonomic pluralism, a fact that it takes as given, but which 
the other authors discused here do not because they draw pluralist conclusions about 
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ontology based on epistemic analyses. But why and when is science pluralist? One answer 
he could give is this: scienti-.c practice has a number of taxonomies because scientists 
group things in di0ferent ways. Why? Because there are a number of properties that can be 
naturaly grouped in those ways. How do we know that? Because scientists make a 
number of taxonomies. This, however, is circular and I don’t take Chakravarty to have 
addresed why it would be that science is taxonomicaly pluralist. 
As an argument against the content of Chakravarty’s project, this argument of 
circularity is not fair. He is, afLer al, establishing a realist metaphysics that accounts for the 
pluralism we see in science. That is, he takes for granted a plurality of taxonomies. But as 
an argument against the approach, my criticism stil stands because it is unclear what status
pluralism in the sciences has. Is it necesary? Productive? Why is it there? What drives 
these di0ferent taxonomies? These questions seem like the kind philosophers should 
entertain and the kind that should be addresed before ontological claims. If this criticism 
does apply to Chakravarty, we should conclude that one should have a story to tel about 
scienti-.c practice before one has a story to tel about the underlying metaphysics. 
Cartwright and Dupré have this kind of story in place and Chakravarty should too. 
Consequently, the discusion wil now turn to scienti-.c practice and what pluralism may 
look like in that context. 
3.3 Epistemic Pluralism 
The epistemic atitude toward pluralism takes various forms.20 These atitudes generaly 
make few claims about ontology; the emphasis is epistemic. One common thread to 
pluralists is the desire to be empiricaly informed. Some pluralists include the authors of 
Scienti:c Pluralism (Kelert, Longino, and Waters 2006). Other examples of pluralism 
that are motivated and informed by detailed case studies include Mitchel (2002, 2003, 
1992), Giere (2006), Chang (2012), and Danks (2015, 2007, 2005). There are important 
di0ferences between these views, but also important similarities. Two important 
similarities are an atention to scienti-.c practice and the appeal to ends, epistemic or 
otherwise, when characterizing practices. Let’s examine what these ends are and the role 
they play.
3.3.1 Ends 
20 A note on terms: I wil use “pluralism” in this chapter to refer to views that reject 
uni-.cation, reduction, convergence, and elimination in science. I use “pragmatic 
pluralism” to refer to pluralist views that take aims or some other end as the basis of their 
analyses of science. Such analyses are pluralist in that they reject uni-.cation as the aim of 
science.
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The main similarity I focus on here is the role of ends, or aims, in pluralism. There are a 
number of roles that an end can play, but there is a general commitment that many 
authors have to using them to de-.ne practices. Because the structural disunity we see in 
science is, according to these views, a product of the diverse pursuits of diverse aims, the 
epistemic pluralism discused in this section is realy a pragmatic pluralism, so caled 
because it is not the representational or ontological features of science that are important, 
but the practical abilities required to further epistemic or other ends. I wil argue in this 
section that epistemic pluralists are consequently not just pluralist about practices, they are
primarily pluralists about aims, which gives rise to a pluralism about practices. Let’s 
examine some pasages where this view emerges. Chang is particularly explicit about the 
role of aims. He writes the folowing about how aims structure practices:
A system of practice is formed by a coherent set of epistemic activities performed 
with a view to achieve certain aims (Chang 2012, 293:15).
My main interest in this pasage is the appeal to aims, which give coherence to the 
activities that scientists perform. Chang uses aims to determine when scientists are or are 
not part of the same practice. I take the folowing to be a sympathetic reconstruction of 
how to use Chang’s account to determine whether scientists are part of the same practice:
Scientists are part of the same Practice when they share the same (i) aims, (i) use 
the same methods to pursue those aims, and (ii) evaluate their work using those 
shared aims.
 
Although Chang does not explicitly formulate a system of practice in this way, I think this 
is in keeping with the spirit of his thought. Crucial for this account is the notion that 
scientists occupy di0ferent epistemic practices, but how are we to determine whether they 
are members of the same practice? In this paraphrase of Chang’s view, it is an analysis of 
the aims that tels us when scientists are part of di0ferent practices. If two scientists have 
di0ferent aims, they are part of di0ferent practices because they wil require di0ferent 
methods and wil evaluate their work di0ferently (by appealing to di0ferent aims).
Other accounts of epistemic pluralism also appeal to some kind of end, even if the 
end goes by another name. Longino claims that di0ferent groups of scientists develop 
di0ferent questions and di0ferent methods to addres those questions (Longino in Kelert, 
Longino, and Waters 2006, 11). She argues a number of approaches can provide an 
account of the same phenomenon by each providing answers to questions best addresed 
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by that approach (Longino in Kelert, Longino, and Waters 2006, 127). An “approach” 
here is equivalent to an epistemic practice. Di0ferent questions require di0ferent methods 
because the question determines what causal space scientists wil be investigating. 
Puestions consequently function as ends in structuring scienti-.c activity.
Another pluralist who appeals to ends as criteria for distinguishing practices is 
Danks. He (2015) suggests practices are goal-dependent. Di0ferent practices have di0ferent 
goals and which theory that practice considers “best” depends upon those goals. Because 
there is no practice- or goal-independent method for determining the best theory, we 
should be epistemicaly pluralist.21 Like Chang and Longino, scientists have ends and these 
ends give us the means to distinguish practices. 
There are also model-based versions of pragmatic pluralism. Two I wil mention 
here are Giere’s perspectival realism (2006) and Mitchel’s integrative pluralism (Mitchel 
2003, chap. 6), both of which have strong pragmatic threads.22 Giere’s view is that models 
are partial representations that represent in the folowing way:
Agents (1) intend; (2) to use model, M; (3) to represent a part of the world,
W; (4) for some purpose, P (2010, 274).
Notice that the representation, and therefore suitability of a model, depends upon
purposes, i.e. on the ends the scientists (agents) are pursuing. This suggests that models are
asociated with practices the members of which have purposes and if the purposes change, 
then the choice of models wil change. Once again, an end plays a role in distinguishing 
practices.
Mitchel’s view is related. She also argues that di0ferent models provide 
“perspectives” on target phenomena. Models do this through idealizing, abstracting, and 
selecting di0ferent features of a phenomenon to represent. No model perfectly represents. 
The resemblance to Giere’s view is strong here, but there is an important di0ference that 
sets Mitchel’s views apart from many other pluralists. Di0ferent models can be integrated 
to provide beter predictions and explanations of phenomena; this is an unusual move for 
an epistemic pluralist. The pragmatic thread winds through this view when evaluating 
models. A model’s adequacy is determined by the aims of the scientists who use it. 
Consider the folowing:
21 He thinks he also implies an ontological pluralism.
22 See chapter 1 for a more detailed discusion of these views. Here my main purpose is to 
show their pragmatic commitments.
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What the investigator wants to do provides the source of criteria for judging representational 
model adequacy. Di0ferent models can each corectly describe the same complex system and yet not
be reducible to a single representation from a single perspective. Empirical con-.rmation warants 
corectnes, while pragmatic concerns decide adequacy (Mitchel in Masimi and McCoy 2019, 188).
This is one of the most explicit and clear accounts of the role of aims among pragmatic 
commitments. The aims, in this case, are “what the investigator wants to do.” And what 
the investigator wants to do determines what models are adequate, i.e. which are to be 
used and which are to be rejected, avoided, and disregarded. 
The discusion has shifLed here from accounts of pluralism about practice to 
pluralism about models. This shifL is licit because models are typicaly asociated with 
particular practices, so if there is a shifL in models, there is a shifL in practices. Mitchel 
draws atention to this connection between models and practice (Mitchel in Masimi and 
McCoy 2019, 185). 
So far we have examined several di0ferent accounts of science that take some 
notion of an end as criterion for distinguishing practices. The general approach to ends in 
science, a pragmatic approach, is natural and intuitive in several respects. It promises to 
give a clear way of identifying when scientists are part of the same or di0ferent epistemic 
contexts, practices, or research programs (if ends di0fer, so do the contexts in which 
scientists work). It also provides a tool for evaluating scienti-.c activity (an explanation, 
prediction, or theory is adequate or acceptable to the degree it achieves the relevant ends). 
It alows us to set aside metaphysical questions about truth (an explanation can be 
succesful without the need to specify whether it is true). And -.naly it gives us a 
framework for thinking about disunity and diversity in the sciences (and it may have other
advantages too). Despite these diverse merits, I am going to suggest the pragmatic 
approach does not provide as complete a picture of science as it may seem, though it is an 
insightful and powerful approach nonetheles. 
The picture is di0-.cult to complete because ends are not easy to elucidate with 
precision. We can preview this di0-.culty by comparing the contemporary pragmatic 
approach with Kuhn’s discusion of values or criteria for theory choice (1979). The 
similarity is that pluralists and Kuhn make appeal to criteria for deciding which theories, 
claims, or explanations to endorse. However, the more recent pluralist views depart from 
Kuhn’s discusion of values in at least one important way: the ends are internal to the 
practice and hence have a strong element of subjectivity. Kuhn, in contrast, treats values as
objective—in the sense of shared by al scientists, regardles of practice (Kuhn and Epstein 
1979). Objectivity in this case is litle di0ferent from inter-subjectivity, but the point holds 
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because there is very litle “inter” atached to the subjectivity of the pragmatic pluralist 
views discused here. Many forms of pluralism do not stres the objectivity of questions or
aims and I wil suggest this prompts several puzzles about the role of aims in science, 
which I raise in the folowing section.
However, it is important to recognize before proceeding that some authors take 
pains to point out the di0-.culties asociated with subjective aims and that some authors are
not explicit about the subjectivity of aims. Danks suggests it is important for a perspectival
pluralist to avoid inherently individualistic analyses (Danks in Masimi and McCoy 2019, 
136) and Longino’s and Mitchel’s views could be easily construed so as to avoid 
subjectivity. However, Danks does appeal to aims that seem subjective and individualistic 
and his analysis of pluralism seems to appeal exclusively to the cognition of individuals. 
The scienti-.c aims Chang discuses are also very speci-.c to individual scientists. Few 
others explicitly reject subjective aims, apart from Kuhn, which suggests that appealing to 
aims without faling into an individualistic analysis of science is a di0-.cult balance that 
needs more atention. 
I think there is a key piece mising from our curent thinking about pluralism with
such a strong pragmatic foundation. The mising piece is how aims are situated in the 
complex practices in which scientists work. Appealing to aims without this more complex 
picture gives us four problems that al concern whether aims or some other end can in fact 
perform the function pragmatic pluralists expect. My purpose in raising these isues is not 
to deny that subjective ends have a role in science, but to suggest that they must play a 
more minor role than we might expect. I discus each isue in turn before o0fering my own
view of pluralism that situates aims within scienti-.c practices.
3.3.3 Can Aims Partition Practic.? Four Reasons Why They Cannot
The -.rst isue is that any given scientist may have a number of aims, some of which are 
shared by other scientists, some not. Determining which aims are relevant for membership
of a practice is not straightforward. For instance, two scientists may share a broad vision 
for their work, but di0fer in how they expect to achieve that broad end because the narow 
ends may not be shared. Both the broad and narow goals can guide and inform a 
scientist’s work, but if scientists share only some of these, which should we choose when 
deciding if they are part of the same practice? Lavoisier, a chemist, and Einstein, a 
physicist, may both have had general aims of providing systematic, unifying, and 
mathematical accounts of the universe, but their narow ends certainly di0fered, as did 
their day-to-day practice. This suggests the narow goals may be more important. 
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However, Bohr and Einstein both shared many narow goals and di0fered strongly on 
broader aims asociated with how to evaluate a statistical theory and whether such a theory
is satisfactory (Hansen 1976). Are they then members of di0ferent practices? That may be 
too strong since they both worked with the same phenomena and the same mathematical 
apparatus. The leson we should draw from this comparison is that it is unclear how to 
choose which ends should guide us in identifying scienti-.c practices. We would need a 
principled strategy for choosing and we do not yet have one.
The second isue is that ends can be di0-.cult to discern. Although this problem 
can be overcome by careful analysis of a scientist’s work, there is a wory. Presumably 
scientists know who they are working with, i.e. who the members of their practice are. The
criteria we use to distinguish practices, therefore, should not be obscure. The wory is this:
if goals are di0-.cult to discern, it may be hard to also give an account of how scientists 
could know to which practices they belong. The method of partitioning practices, this 
suggests, should be one we can easily folow and “we” should include not just 
philosophers, but scientists as wel. It is not clear that consulting aims or ends is 
su0-.ciently easy or even necesary when determining practice membership, especialy if 
careful textual analysis is required to make this determination. 
The third isue is that it is not clear that scientists must have the same aims to be 
part of the same practice, nor that having separate aims precludes their membership in the 
same practice. This point should be particularly salient today when we have incredibly 
large scienti-.c projects conducted by hundreds of scientists. Do al of those scientists have 
the same ends? Probably not, though establishing this would be di0-.cult (see the second 
isue above). Take two hypothetical scientists working on genetic predispositions for 
cancer. One scientist may be driven by a desire to cure cancer, but the other might be 
driven solely by curiosity about genetic mechanisms. This is a prety profound di0ference 
in goals, one humanitarian and medical, the other mechanistic and completely removed 
from humanitarian interests. Despite these profoundly di0ferent ends, both scientists can 
work on the same project and work toward producing the same results. Whether these 
scientists achieve the same results is independent of their subjective aims. This ilustration 
suggests that the di0ference in aims plays litle or no part in the fact that they are part of 
the same system of practice. 
The fourth and -.nal isue is related to the other three. The general approach 
asociated with distinguishing practices based on the aims of individual scientists is 
isolating and exclusive in ways that may not accurately capture what science is like. If 
scientists with di0ferent aims are part of di0ferent practices, it would seem easy to develop 
an oppresive and exclusive form of science where those with di0ferent aims could be 
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excluded solely on the basis of posesing di0ferent interests. But isn’t science tolerant of 
di0ferent aims, approaches, and inquiries? This is a reasonable ideal to strive for even if it is
imperfectly folowed. And I contend that science is much more permisive of multiple 
aims and projects that can productively interact. I believe Mitchel’s integrative pluralism 
shares this contention and other pluralisms probably do too. In striving to characterize 
science such that we acknowledge its inclusive and tolerant side, we need to situate aims so 
that they do not play a divisive role. 
I have suggested that using aims or some other end to identify or de-.ne scienti-.c 
practices face four isues. The -.rst concerned how to choose aims, the second whether 
aims can provide the guidance required in discerning systems of practice, the third that 
di0ferent aims do not preclude membership of the same practice, and the fourth that aims 
so characterized are in tension with inclusive science. It is not worth, however, rejecting 
the relevance of ends entirely, if such a project is even feasible. The result would be an 
arti-.cial characterization of science: we would be claiming that science is not a goal-
oriented activity. Although it may not always be clear what those goals are or how many 
goals there are, scientists certainly go about their daily work with purpose. If there is 
purpose, surely there are aims as wel.
But despite the importance of aims, there remain several questions about them: 
which aims do or should scientists have, how widely are they shared, and where do they 
come from? Until they are addresed, these questions and the isues I raised suggest aims 
are not the kind of clear and stable features of a practice that can provide the primitive 
basis of pluralism. If we use aims as criteria for distinguishing practices, it is just too 
unclear when we have a plurality and when we do not. We need a beter understanding of 
the context in which aims feature and the basis of pluralism may lie elsewhere. 
How then should we think about epistemic pluralism? What is pluralism in the 
sciences pluralism about, if not principaly about aims? A thread in the philosophy of 
language that Witgenstein started has resources for de-.ning practices that avoids an 
appeal to aims. This thread gives us two things: -.rst, it provides other criteria that I argue 
beter establish how to tel practices apart. Second, it gives us a context for situating aims 
and understanding their role in a practice. I discus what this thread is and how it applies 
to scienti-.c pluralism. The foundation for this view of practices is the conceptual 
taxonomy scientists use. I discus what such a taxonomy amounts to and why we might 
think of it as perspectival. 
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3.4 Practices and Language-games
Our understanding of pluralism in the sciences could be informed by an examination of 
practices elsewhere. I wil be drawing in particular on a Witgensteinian tradition in the 
philosophy of language that, like some philosophies of science, focuses on activity and 
pluralism in the context of practices. This Witgensteinian approach suggests the way 
scientists respond toward one another’s work—their epistemic engagement—should be 
the basis on which we characterize scienti-.c practices. I -.rst show that Witgenstein’s 
discusion of language-games gives us a basis for thinking about practices in general 
(section 3.1), then I describe how a discusion of language-games can inform our thinking 
about practices in the case of science in particular (section 3.2).
4.1 Language-gam.
I take Witgenstein’s discusion of language-games as a starting point for an analysis of 
practices. The discusion of games emerges in his later work. I wil focus in particular on 
the Philosophical Investigations. There are two points I wil be supporting; one is that his 
analysis is at heart an analysis of activity and the other is that activities have a degree of 
completenes that provides partial autonomy from one another. One of the -.rst references
to language-games is the folowing:
Here the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of 
language is part of an activity, or of a life-form (Witgenstein 2008, sec. 23).
Witgenstein is explicit in claiming that speaking a language—using a language—is part of 
an activity. As such, we might expect any insightful analysis of a part of language to be 
equivalent to an analysis of activity. This is consistent with some pluralist analyses of 
science, for example Chang’s treatment of a practice as an activity. There is reason for 
thinking, therefore, that Witgenstein’s views of activity have some bearing on scienti-.c 
activity. 
There is a second reason, however, that Witgenstein has for using this term, 
something he cal the completenes of a language-game, which wil also prove important 
for an analysis of science. Completenes, I wil suggest, concerns the epistemic 
requirements that members of a practice must meet. I discus what this means in 
Witgenstein’s writings, then suggest it can supply criteria for distinguishing practices.
If you want to say that this [primitive language-game] shews them to be incomplete, ask yourself 
whether our language is complete;—whether it was so before the symbolism of chemistry and the 
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notation of the in-.nitesimal calculus were incorporated in it; for these are, so to speak, suburbs of 
our language (Witgenstein 2008, sec. 18).
In this pasage, Witgenstein is responding to an objection that language-games, in being 
isolated, are too incomplete, i.e. cannot be understood in isolation. And he responds to 
the objection by suggesting that completenes does not apply to language 
straightforwardly because it is continualy changing (at what point would a language 
become complete)? This is not meant to suggest that it is posible to know only a single 
language-game. Black (1979) suggests we cal such a view “autonomy” and argues it is 
implausible. I agree and doubt Witgenstein held such a view. Rather, Witgenstein’s 
point here concerns what someone must know and do to participate in a particular 
language-game. A language-game is “complete,” so to speak, in that the activity is self-
contained; we need not appeal to other activities to understand th0 activity, this language-
game. Other games may, however, have some relevance to a given game, but 
understanding the given game does not require appeal to another game and an 
explanation of how to play does not involve the description of another game, or knowing 
how to play another game. Understanding, in this case, includes knowing the point of the 
game, etc. 
Witgenstein’s point about the completenes of language-games is -.gurative. He 
introduces it to ilustrate certain features of language. Because the purpose is merely to 
ilustrate, there are relationships between di0ferent things we do with language that may 
not be clearly captured by only thinking of language as a language-game or a set of 
language-games. For example, one need not know how to play American footbal to play 
European footbal, but it is les clear that one can engage in the activity of praising without
some awarenes of the activity of criticising or condemning. This suggests di0ferent parts 
of language have a level of connectivity that games ofLen do not. 
This caveat and constraint on the autonomy of language-games is consistent with 
Witgenstein, who does, afLer al, indicate that he means language-game both to talk about 
language as a whole as wel as simpli-.ed elements of language-activity, i.e. the appeal to 
games is helpful, but not necesarily literaly true. The simpler cases make addresing 
certain questions easier; Witgenstein writes that investigating simpler, more primitive 
examples clear the “fog,” i.e. makes it easier to understand some features of meaning
(2008, sec. 5). Speci-.caly, the appeal to language-games may give Witgenstein a way to 
investigate the role of context in understanding rules and the project-ability of concepts
(Cavel 1962, 71). 
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 But rules are not the only feature of language or practices that language-games can 
elucidate. They also show that the functioning of a word in one context (language-game) 
can di0fer substantialy from its function in another. This is very closely related to the 
concerns scienti-.c pluralists have, namely, how should we evaluate scienti-.c activity? Both
Witgenstein and scienti-.c pluralists emphasize contextual evaluations. Consider the 
folowing: 
If you do not keep the multiplicity of language-games in view you wil perhaps be inclined to ask 
questions like: ‘what is a question?’ —Is it the statement that I do not know such-and-such, or the 
statement that I wish the other person would tel me….? Or is it the description of my mental state 
of uncertainty?—And is the cry ‘Help!’ such a description?
Think how many di0ferent kinds of thing are caled ‘description’: description of a body’s 
position by means of its co-ordinates; description of a facial expresion; description of a sensation 
of touch; of a mood (Witgenstein 2008, sec. 24).
In asking us to consider the number of language-games, Witgenstein asks us to 
consider 1) the sheer number of contexts in which a word can appear and 2) how very 
di0ferent the function of that word can be in those di0ferent contexts. The plurality of 
language-games in conjunction with the completenes of a given language-game suggests 
the folowing: we can understand an action (know how to do it and why) in a particular 
context, but that action does not necesarily have the same function in other contexts ( in 
other language-games). We need not appeal, in other words, to other language-games 
when trying to understand an action in th0 language-game. The paralels to scienti-.c 
pluralism are very striking. Both views about practice suggest we should evaluate an 
activity within a practice and that other practices may have litle bearing on this 
evaluation. So far I take this discusion of Witgenstein to indicate there are similarities 
between his views and scienti-.c pluralism. However, I think there are also resources in 
Witgenstein’s thought that can help clarify what it is we should be pluralist about more 
speci-.caly. 
To make this clari-.cation, I now return to the -.rst purpose I claimed Witgenstein
had in introducing language-games: to emphasize language as activity. We might ask why 
he places this emphasis and what participating in such an activity entails. I raise these 
questions because answering them wil help us get clear on how to determine whether two
people are playing the same language-game, which wil in turn clarify three things: when 
scientists are part of the same scienti-.c practice, what it means for there to be multiple 
practices, and what we should be pluralist about. 
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One reason for Witgenstein’s emphasis on activity lies in what a participant in a 
language-game must know and do. Some such knowledge includes knowing how to a0fect 
others, how to respond appropriately to the actions of others, and whether others are 
responding appropriately to us. We can see this in both Witgenstein and in expositions of
his work. In (2008, sec. 2 and 8), Witgenstein describes a primitive language-game 
consisting in builders using terms to give orders and folow them. Playing the game 
involves not just knowing, say, the de-.nitions of the terms, but also how to use these 
terms to a0fect the behaviour in others and also how to act and respond appropriately. 
Black (1979, 346) discuses this as wel. He writes that
In both [language-games] we have two persons using and co-operatively responding to one-word 
sentences.. 
There are two main lesons I want to draw from this discusion of language-games as 
activities. The -.rst is that, as activity, it involves social action, i.e. acting with others and 
hence responding. Two people, we might therefore say, are playing the same language-
game—and thus participating in the same activity—if they are using the same body of 
words and responding to one another in the same ways. This wil not be true of al 
language-games necesarily; Witgenstein uses examples of language-games that one plays 
by oneself (2008, sec. 23) and, for such games, responding to others is not applicable, 
though we might think it posible to respond to oneself. The general notion of 
appropriate response, therefore, applies. 
The second leson I want to draw is that the completenes of a given language-
game suggests mastery of other games is not necesary for playing a given game. A 
language-game does not require recourse to other games or the understanding of other 
speci-.c games. One can investigate a game and how to play it, in other words, without 
investigating the workings of other games and how to play them. I do not take this to be 
absolute; language-games need not be fuly autonomous as Black (1979) argues at length. 
And Witgenstein suggests (2008, sec. 5) it is merely useful to consider primitive languages 
(language-games), useful for bringing to light similarities and di0ferences within language
(2008, sec. 130). Completenes and the relationship between language-games is a much 
more complex topic than this cursory discusion suggests, but for the purposes of this 
chapter, it is su0-.cient to claim that language-games and hence practices can be at least 
partly independent from one another. 
These two features of language-games—activity and completenes—apply to the 
philosophical treatment of practices more generaly, i.e. not just language. We can treat 
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such practices as consisting in activities and we can also identify a plurality of activities that
bear some independence from one another. These two features of scienti-.c practice, 
action and independence, are analogous to the emphasis Witgenstein places on activity 
and completenes. 
What sort of activities are asociated with practices and how does this help us 
identify what we should be pluralist about? These questions can be addresed by a further 
examination of the philosophy of language literature. Another philosophical view that 
addreses practices that makes more explicit the connection between practices and activity 
is Dummet’s. He writes, of someone learning a language, that 
What he learns is a practice; he learns to respond, verbaly and non[verbaly, to uterances and to 
make uterances of his own (1993, 47). 
We can see here that an esential part of learning a practice, and hence being a member of 
that practice, consists in responding to what others in that practice are doing. Dummet 
was writing about language more generaly and I wil shortly be concerned with scienti-.c 
practice, but the point wil hold because it is a general point about what membership of a 
practice consists in. Perhaps one modi-.cation to Dummet’s statement is to replace 
“uterances” with something like “activity,” since scientists are concerned not solely with 
uterances, but also with experiment, evidence, analysis, and explanation, some of which 
may or may not take the form of an uterance. 
Having discused how Witgenstein and some of those he inspired thought about 
practices, let’s return to an earlier question I posed: how do we know when two people are
part of the same practice? If we think of practice as analogous to a language-game, which I 
suggested is justi-.ed, then we can answer this question by investigating whether scientists 
1) are performing the same actions and 2) responding to one another appropriately. 
Having explored the origins of this view in the philosophy of language, I now discus what
this view might look like in the scienti-.c context in more detail.
4.2 Scienti:c Practice / Epistemic Engagement
The last section explored how Witgensteinian philosophers of language characterize a 
practice. In this section, I defend a pluralist account of scienti-.c practice using this 
approach from the philosophy of language. The novelty of this view is that rather than 
taking ends as criteria for identifying practices, it takes the responsivenes that scientists 
exhibit toward one another’s actions, which I claimed was an important feature of 
membership of a practice in general. In what folows, I describe (1) how this view is 
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commited to an analysis of activity; (2) the relationship between activity and membership
of a practice; (3) the kinds of activity that determine membership of a practice; (4) how 
this kind of activity gives us criteria for identifying practices.
The starting point for this Witgensteinian approach to practices is activity. This 
means that, like Chang’s pragmatism, this account takes practices to be composed 
primarily of activities and that understanding what a practice is requires an account of the 
actions of which a practice is composed. The di0ference between practices, consequently, 
consists in a di0ference in activity. Di0ferent practices, di0ferent activities. 
If practices di0fer because of a di0ference in activity, then we need an account of 
scienti-.c activity; presumably it is not the case that any and al actions that scientists make 
are relevant. The activity in question is the activity a scientist must perform in order to be 
a member of a practice. Being part of a practice is not like being part of a club that requires
only membership dues. I could be a member of such a club and atend no club events, 
interact with no other club members. This is unlike a scienti-.c practice. A scienti-.c 
practice requires performing speci-.c activities. 
But what kind of activities are important for membership of a practice? The 
discusion of language practices suggests the relevant activities include responding to the 
various actions of other scientists in that practice, by which I mean, the scientist’s work 
must be in?@uenced by others in the practice and that work must then have an e0fect on 
other members. These e0fects include, but are not limited to, citing one another in 
scienti-.c publications, providing alternative interpretations of an experiment, chalenging 
someone’s methods, someone’s analysis, gathering new evidence for old claims, etc. I do 
not take this to be exhaustive: there are many ways to in?@uence and to be in?@uenced. But 
these forms of in?@uence concern the inquiries scientists undertake and, as such, are 
epistemic.
What makes these forms of in?@uence important is that they re?@ect two things 
scientists must know: -.rst, each scientist must recognize the signi-.cance and form of the 
activities the other members perform; second, each scientist must know what kinds of 
responses are appropriate to the activities they recognize. For example, if one scientist 
criticises another using data as evidence, then the criticised scientist must be able to 
recognize that it is a criticism and how it is that the data provide an evidential basis for that
criticism. That criticized scientist must then also know what kinds of responses to that 
criticism are available. Each and every member of a practice must know these two things. 
Having discused what scientists must know and do to be part of a practice, we 
now have the resources to give a foundation to epistemic pluralism. Practices are de-.ned 
in terms of the activities of which they are at least partly composed. Scientists must be able 
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to perform those activities in order to be members of a given practice. An examination of 
what activities scientists are performing tels us whether they are members of the same 
practice. The speci-.c activities we must examine are those asociated with responding to 
others.
4.3 Aims Situated
This view I defend shares with the other pluralist accounts an appreciation of aims, but 
with very di0ferent emphasis. The day-to-day activities scientists undertake may involve 
aims and fuly understanding what they do wil likely involve an appeal to these aims. But 
unlike the pluralist accounts discused earlier, this analysis starts with the way scientists 
interact and based on that interaction, we draw conclusions about what kinds of aims are 
in play. By addresing activity -.rst, we can determine when and to what extent goals are 
shared. 
One way to situate the aims scientists have is to examine scienti-.c activity. For 
instance, one important motive a scientist might have for responding to someone else is to 
criticise, support, indicate approval, or imitate an approach toward achieving an aim. In 
other words, common aims might motivate scientists to respond to one another. 
Common aims that do provide this kind of motivation wil be apparent in the actions 
scientists take toward one another and so an examination of activity should lead to an 
understanding of aims. 
Treating aims subsequently to activity addreses the problem I suggested other 
forms of pluralism face: the problem of specifying which are important and which 
incidental. Those which are important and those which are shared wil feature in the 
activities scientists perform. The incidental aims wil drop out. This approach to aims 
through activity is particularly useful in cases where aims may not be explicit, obvious, or 
clearly established; we do not need a clear and explicit articulation of aims to determine 
whether scientists are part of the same practice. We just need to look at what they are 
doing.
There is another serious upshot to thinking about aims in this way. It is not always
clear in what direction an inquiry should go, nor is there always consensus about that 
direction. Thinking about practices in terms of activity, rather than aims, gives scientists a 
context for informing and working with one another without recourse to spliting them 
into di0ferent practices. In other words, there are cases when scientists might have di0ferent
aims, but can stil provide insight or work that is relevant for one another. If practices were
de-.ned in terms of aims, then this relevance would be somewhat mysterious because the 
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scientists would be in di0ferent practices. But by de-.ning practices by activity, there is 
room for scientists with di0ferent aims within the same practice. The case of Einstein and 
Bohr discused earlier ilustrates this. These scientists had very di0ferent explanatory aims, 
but were nevertheles able to critique each other’s position and develop their own in 
response to criticism. Their work was enhanced by having di0ferent aims, but in such a 
way that they could stil have productive exchanges. An analysis of practice based on 
activity, I think, alows for a more inclusive and productive kind of science.
I have suggested that rather than using goals to distinguish practices, we use this 
relevance and responsivenes as the basis of distinguishing units of scienti-.c activity. I see 
two advantages in what I have proposed. The -.rst is that it emphasizes what participation 
in a practice consists in, namely the degree to which scientists can engage meaningfuly 
with one another, even in the face of disagreement. Secondly, my view gives us a way of 
approaching the role of goals and aims that situates them within a practice. 
4.4 Objections 
This suggestion that we focus on the responsivenes scientists show toward one another 
faces a number of objections. I wil try to addres three. The -.rst objection is that I have 
not said whether disagreements can or should be resolved. The pluralist and relativist 
views discused earlier have answers to these questions. Although I do not take the 
responsivenes approach to provide a recipe for resolving disagreement, I do take one 
advantage to be that it alows for rationaly resolvable disagreements. Other accounts do 
too, such as Kusch’s relativism, so it is not unique in that regard.23 What is perhaps 
di0ferent, however, is that the responsivenes approach suggests disagreeing scientists 
actualy do have a lot in common, such as common goals, interests, and membership of a 
practice. 
One might object—and this is the second objection I wil consider—that 
disagreeing scientists ofLen have litle in common, suggesting that interaction of the kind I 
described does not indicate membership of the same practice. Disagreements between 
scientists and religious -.gures may provide an example of deeper disagreements between 
people who share very litle. There are two responses to this. The -.rst is that I do not 
intend to have given a universal account of disagreement and I would certainly expect 
some kinds of disagreement to take forms other than those discused here. The second 
response I can o0fer has two aspects and relates to the responsivenes criterion. The -.rst 
aspect is that sometimes scientists and religious -.gures do have a lot in common and are 
23 I wil discus relativism and how it di0fers from my view in chapter 5
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responsive to one another. Kusch (2018, 45–49, 60–62) has an aptly chosen case study to 
ilustrate this. He points out that the disagreement between Galileo and Belarmine over 
geocentrism and heliocentrism was underpinned by a number of common commitments, 
even though Galileo is sometimes seen as the quintesential scientist and Belarmine the 
unscienti-.c theologian. The second aspect is that to be a part of the same practice as I 
suggested requires responsivenes to take a certain form and unquali-.ed disagreeing does 
not necesarily satisfy this criterion. The people in question must produce e0fects in one 
another’s work, a demand that not al disagreements can satisfy. Modern debates about, 
say creationism, might be an example of disagreement between people who are not a part 
of the same practice because the level of disagreement does not concern speci-.c parts of 
the practice, such as evidence and experiment. I would need to say much more to make 
these responses robust and they face their own objections, but they suggest that there is 
extensive room to account for disagreement, responsivenes, and membership of a 
practice. 
The -.nal objection is the folowing: sometimes scientists who do not engage with 
one another seem to have the same goals and to be part of the same practice, in some sense.
A salient example is the co-discovery of evolution by natural selection made by Darwin 
and by Walace. Darwin and Walace did not communicate until their theories were 
almost fuly developed, suggesting what is important here is the problem they were trying 
to solve, not how they engaged with one another. In response I would not want to reject 
the analysis that Darwin and Walace were driven by the same problems, but I would 
suggest out that our ability to make this claim and to lump them into the same practice 
hinges upon their communication and upon the reception their theories received. To 
repeat an earlier claim, we might begin the order of explanation with the responsivenes, 
even while accepting that the teleology of the practice is important. Now one might 
respond that the common goals are what makes the responsivenes posible and so I have 
the order of explanation backwards. To this I would again ask to which goals should we 
appeal? This question is more easily answered by -.rst looking at responsivenes. And it 
might be reasonable to accept that Darwin and Walace were not members of the same 
practice until they began communicating, or perhaps until their peers responded to their 
work as work that addresed the same problem. AfLer al, how do we know whether they 
were working on the same problem? A straightforward way would be to bring them into 
contact with one another and then see what kind of exchange ensues. Or to examine the 
activities of scientists who were in?@uenced by both of their works. The very fact that there 
are such scientists is signi-.cant. 
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3.5 Practices and Perspectives 
Having discused how we might think of practices, I would like to draw a connection to 
perspectivism and by doing so, show how the judgements discused in chapter 2 are 
connected to the epistemic context. We wil therefore also have a clearer picture of what 
that context consists in. We might wonder whether there is any advantage to introducing 
perspectives. However, we have just relied on the claim that scientists do engage with one 
another in a practice, and that they must do so to be a part of a practice, but without 
considering how or why this is posible. Also unaddresed is the relationship between 
practices: are al scienti-.c claims internal to practices? If so, then the view defended above 
may be indistinguishable from relativism. I wil argue that the notion of a perspective 
addreses both of these isues. First, perspectives o0fer an explanation of how responding is
posible and, second, appealing to perspectives alows for fruitful exchanges between 
practices in a way that does not sit wel with strong internalism. I discus more in chapter 5
how perspectivism and relativism di0fer. 
Recal that I argued that an esential feature of membership of a practice consists 
in knowing how to in?@uence other’s work and knowing how to respond to the work of 
others (in the practice). How is such behaviour posible? While this may look like a 
sociological question, it is actualy epistemic. A more speci-.c way to pose the question that
brings out the epistemology is the folowing:
What must scientists know when they are part of a practice? 
The interest here is not what a practice is, but what preconditions must be in place for 
membership and the answer is epistemic, not sociological. My suggested answer is that 
scientists must know how to make the right distinctions. The distinctions that scientists 
make give rise to a conceptual taxonomy. So knowingly belonging to a practice 
presupposes using the same taxonomy. Before discusing the taxonomy and why scientists 
must know it, it is important to say more about these distinctions.
What kinds of distinctions are scientists making? A ready response might be the 
distinctions that alow scientists to identify natural kinds. These kinds certainly have 
scienti-.c importance; for example by being the basis of inductive inferences (Goodman 
1955), a part of the causal structure of the world, and the basis of phenomena that scientists
aim to understand. Another reason for thinking taxonomies should primarily concern 
natural kinds comes from Masimi (2015, 2014). Her account takes a Kantian version of 
natural kinds as the basis for thinking about scienti-.c perspectives and how those 
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perspectives change over time. Kuhn, she argues, may have taken a similar approach. 
Indeed, we can see Kuhn making explicit claims about the importance of natural kinds in 
the context of scienti-.c change (1990). There are a number of important metaphysical 
questions about this general approach, questions I hope to set aside here because I believe 
we can posit the ontological status of kinds subsequently to establishing that scientists do 
categorise objects by kind. Scientists, to respond to each other, must recognize the same 
kinds, regardles of their naturalnes. 
To apply this thinking about kinds to an example, consider that the molecular 
biologist—to be a member of the practice of molecular biology—who must be able to 
identify which biological molecules are DNA and which are RNA (among many more). 
For this scientist, understanding the metaphysics of natural kinds is esential neither for 
their work nor for their membership of the practice. But he or she would need to know 
the structure of each molecule since that is the basis on which RNA and DNA are 
distinguished. 
I noted that natural kinds might o0fer a ready answer to the question: what must 
scientists be able to distinguish? We may have some reticence about ful commitment to 
this suggestion. Scientists, afLer al, must know al sorts of things, not just what natural 
kinds their coleagues study. Surely this is a requirement, but a very low bar indeed. It is 
more re?@ective of science and les ontologicaly controversial to keep the discusion more 
general. By more general, I mean at the level of a conceptual taxonomy, not just the 
conceptual taxonomy of natural kinds. 
The level of interest is more general than natural kinds because scientists must also
be able to distinguish features of the human part of science, features such as experiments, 
equipment, models, data, and statistical tests. These may not be natural kinds, but they are
some of the things practicing scientists must master. I have in mind the di0ference 
between, for the molecular biologist, a scanning electron microscope and an agarose gel. 
Or the di0ference between a test that gives a p-value of .06 and a test that gives .04. For 
scientists to be members of a practice, they must know not only something about the 
natural world, they must also know something about how to investigate it and how others
are investigating it. I take it that objects within these two domains form a taxonomy and 
that knowing such a taxonomy is necesary for responding appropriately to the work of 
others.
These two epistemic considerations—knowing how to distinguish parts of the 
world and parts of the investigation of it—are necesary for practice-membership. More 
speci-.caly, we can presume that scientists must know these things when they are 
in?@uencing, and responding to, one another. This is a legitimate presumption because the 
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form of participation within a practice involves reference to elements of a common 
conceptual taxonomy. What might this mean? And how is it perspectival?
The -.rst question, about why participation requires a taxonomy, may be 
answered brie?@y: participation in a practice—participation that consists in the appropriate
response to others—wil invoke at least some elements of the taxonomy in some way. 
Einstein and the Copenhagen group, for example, disagreed over the suitability of a 
statistical interpretation of quantum theory (Hansen 1976). Despite the di0ferent 
interpretations, the disagreement presupposed a common identi-.cation of electrons and 
light waves, among other things. I have asumed a synchronic analysis of perspectives or 
practices here, but the analysis applies diachronicaly as wel.
Why is it fruitful to think of this as perspectival? The reason is that di0ferent 
practices have di0ferent shared taxonomies. Familiarly and hopefuly intuitively, 
organismal biologists study organisms and use certain methods to do so while particle 
physicists study fundamental particles and use their own methods to do so. They are 
di0ferent practices and therefore commited to di0ferent perspectives. This becomes a 
particularly fruitful point when thinking about disagreements. In trying to understand 
why there is a disagreement, we are in part seeking what is and is not shared between those
who disagree. In other words, what does the disagreement consist in? Perspectivism of this
variety gives us a way of investigating what is and is not shared in disagreement. For 
instance, if scientists can respond appropriately to one another and recognize their 
responses for what they are, we have reason to think they are part of the same practice, in 
which case the disagreement is shalow and resolution is posible. If this kind of 
responsivenes is not present in a disagreement, then we have reason to think there are 
deep di0ferences and that resolution is beyond reach. 
There are several other upshots to thinking of science as perspectival. First, it 
provides a framework for justifying the thought that di0ferent scienti-.c disciplines are 
quite di0ferent and are not reducible to one another. It also tels us when we have di0ferent 
disciplines (or practices). Perspectives also make sense of the spectrum of di0ferences we 
can see between disciplines. By this I mean that some practices are more closely related 
than others. Perspectivism tels us why: because there is more or les overlap between 
di0ferent taxonomic systems.
There are important similarities and di0ferences between perspectivism as I have 
described it and other accounts of scienti-.c practice, which I have already discused above. 
But paradigms or lexicons o0fer a second point of comparison, and perspectivism as 
described in (Masimi 2015) a third.
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Perspectives could be similar to Kuhnian lexicons in that there is an emphasis on 
language, especialy conceptual taxonomy (Kuhn 1990). But lexicons take a very di0ferent 
atitude toward language than perspectivism. As Kuhn articulated it, lexicons are 
asociated with communities of scientists and a lexicon consists in—at minimum—a 
taxonomy of terms. So far this sounds similar to perspectivism. However, there are for 
Kuhn very speci-.c requirements for that taxonomy (Kuhn 1990, 3–4); three requirements 
for that taxonomy are particularly relevant here. First, terms must be non-overlapping in 
their referents, except hierarchical terms. Second, the meaning of terms di0fer to the extent 
that their referents di0fer. And third, learning another taxonomy is like learning a 
language, except that translation between taxonomies is imposible. It is imposible 
because, for translation to be posible, it is necesary that the terms to be translated have 
the same exact referents as the taxonomy into which they wil be translated. In other 
words, translation is imposible because there is no one-to-one mapping between terms of 
di0ferent lexicons, where terms are de-.ned by their referents. 
Like Kuhnian lexicons, perspectivism emphasizes taxonomy. Both also emphasize 
the importance of evaluating scienti-.c claims within their historical context. However, 
this similarity is super-.cial given the many di0ferences in how these views characterize that 
taxonomy. The -.rst and most important di0ference is the characterization of meaning. 
Kuhnian lexicons consider terms de-.ned by their extensions. It is consequently pasive 
since the knowledge of a term is exhausted, I presume, by the grasp of a -.xed extension. 
Perspectivism, in contrast, folows a more Witgensteinian approach to meaning-as-use. 
The meaning of a term is to be analysed in terms of a practical ability, as discused above. 
In other words, meaning is not exhausted by extension, but consists in part in what a term 
enables one to do. 
Another di0ference between these views is incommensurability. Kuhn emphasizes 
incompatibility and incommensurability: communication is broken or never formed 
between paradigms or lexicons. This is partly because scienti-.c terms are de-.ned 
completely internaly to the practice and any di0ference in de-.nition precludes 
communication (so the Kuhnian story goes). Perspectives as I have described them are not 
so rigid and isolated. There could in principle be more or les overlap between 
perspectives. 
Also importantly, there is room in the perspectival reading of science for extensive 
shared knowledge that transcends particular perspectives. That is, di0ferences between 
perspectives are di0ferences in degree, not kind. Some features of science are shared 
universaly, or perhaps should be if something is to be considered scienti-.c at al. Such 
features may include sensitivity to evidence, a preference for simplicity, a preference for 
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methods that give repeatable results. This is not exhaustive, but failure to endorse features 
like these gives us grounds for thinking the practice in question is not scienti-.c. 
It would be di0-.cult to recognize science as a practice without cros-perspectival 
standards such as these. There are two reasons for this di0-.culty: one posed by scientists 
who interact and one by the history of science. The -.rst di0-.culty is, as Masimi (2018, 351–
52) argues, that each perspective would merely license the truth of its own claims if 
standards did not transcend perspectives. Such an internalist view of standards is 
antithetical to scienti-.c practice because any scienti-.c claim could be just as true as any 
other (provided there is a perspective that accepts it as true). If this in turn were the case, 
we would struggle to understand why disagreements would take place and what would 
motivate change. Why would phlogiston chemists see oxygen chemistry as a rival theory 
and not just an irelevant view? Why would astronomers abandon Aristotelian 
explanations of heavenly motions? These kinds of cases would be unmotivated and 
mysterious if science were not beholden to standards that transcend perspectives. 
Scientists who explicitly disagree or in some other way endorse di0ferent theories see 
relevance and signi-.cance in the work of others and this is not easily explained by an 
analysis of science that treats standards as internal. 
But there is another problem too with thinking standards are internal to 
perspectives, a historical problem. How could the history of science, if standards were 
internal, have any relevance to the science of the present? Take as an example that 
contemporary chemistry recognizes oxygen as an element that binds with metals, 
something that Lavoisier also accepted in the 18th century. We can -.nd similar examples 
where modern claims were also accepted in the past. However, if past scientists were part 
of di0ferent perspectives with their own internal standards that di0fer from ours, in what 
sense are the claims the same? The idea I am pushing here is this: the cognitive signi-.cance 
of claims like “oxygen binds with metals” is broadly the same for Lavoisier as it is for us. 
But if his standards and our standards di0fer, then it is unclear how we could share this 
cognitive signi-.cance. Internal standards raise the problem of incommensurability and 
this is incompatible with the expectation we have that science builds upon its history and 
that there is much that we share with our scienti-.c ancestors. We should conclude, 
therefore, that there is not in fact such a deep divide between the perspective of modern 
chemistry and of past perspectives. 
These standards as I have discused them are, ironicaly, similar to Kuhn’s 
discusion of values (1979, chap. 13). Kuhn takes as criteria for theory-choice universal 
values that di0ferent scientists apply di0ferently when asesing scienti-.c claims. His values 
include things like simplicity, fruitfulnes, among many others. Standards are also similar 
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to what Masimi (2018, 354) cals standards of performance adequacy, which are standards 
that scienti-.c claims must meet in order to be accepted by other perspectives. The 
particular form the standards take depends upon the perspective. 
I would like to make a modi-.cation, or change in emphasis, to the existing 
discusion of standards because of a posible wory that Kusch has raised about appealing 
to these kinds of standards. Kusch suggests that such standards (or principles as he cals 
them) are too abstract to inform us about disagreements, which are the product of very 
speci-.c epistemic contexts (2018). Once we de-idealize the disagreement, it is not so clear 
that standards are so shared or play much of a role in resolving disagreements. This 
concern suggests we should think about standards a litle di0ferently, or at least to account 
for why things that are as abstract as a standard might stil cary relevance for particular 
cases. 
To avoid this problem, the clari-.cation we need is this: to be cros-perspectival, a 
standard must not only be shared acros perspectives, as Kuhn and Masimi have argued, 
but instantiations of that standard must also be recognizable by the relevant scientists as 
instantiations of the standard. How does this solve the problem Kusch raises? It does so by
specifying in what way standards have relevance for de-idealised cases of disagreement. 
Standards have relevance because scientists recognize that they do so. There is stil room 
for extensive disagreement over, for instance, the variety of forms standards can take, 
which standards to prioritize, and whether a single standard has been applied corectly.
This modi-.cation I o0fered is not the suggestion that al scientists know explicitly a
body of standards and that each scientist can immediately recognize instantiations of those
standards. What this does require, however, is that when a scientist presents evidence, an 
argument, or makes a claim, other scientists can in principle recognize the merits or 
de-.ciencies of that evidence, argument, etc. And a description or explanation of those 
merits would likely involve an appeal to standards such as simplicity or consistency with 
empirical evidence. Placing this requirement upon scientists, that they recognize the merits
in the work of others, seems to me a realistic and not overly-idealised requirement. It goes 
some way toward ameliorating Kusch’s concern that standards are too abstract and it 
suggests there is a kind of cognitive continuity present through disagreement and change.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has motivated a pluralist account of practices that is inspired by both 
Witgenstein and the literature on perspectivism. I argued that criteria for distinguishing 
practices would give insight into what practices are and what pluralism should consist in. I 
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argued against an existing atitude toward distinguishing practices that appeals to some 
notion of an end, a so-caled pragmatic approach. I argued epistemic engagement provides 
a beter criterion not only because it shows us where the limits of a practice lie, but also 
establishes what epistemic preconditions must be in place for practice membership. Part 
of those preconditions involve epistemic standards. Such standards are present through 
disagreements and change. By tying standards to epistemic engagement, I have provided a 
characterization of standards that is not too idealised, and therefore have addresed a 
criticism Kusch has leveled against them. To further make the case that perspectivism is 
not an overly-idealised position, the folowing chapter provides a perspectival 




Acids and Rust: A Case Study
Abstract
This chapter defends a perspectival account of scienti-.c disagreement and applies it to a 
case from the Chemical Revolution. The folowing interpretation of this period uses 
several features of my account developed in preceding chapters; data do not provide a 
absolute arbitration and a central feature of disagreements between chemists during this 
period concerned taxonomy. I argue that my interpretation has several advantages over 
several recent analyses of this period. The perspectival view is distinctive in that it avoids 
discontinuity, speci-.es the type of disagreement, alows for the rational resolution of 
disagreement, and is sensitive to the historical epistemic context.
4.0 Introduction
This chapter ilustrates the perspectival view of science discused in the preceding chapter 
in a case study. I wil contrast and defend my interpretation in more detail in the folowing
chapter (chapter 5). The case study is the Chemical Revolution and is of particular interest 
because it demonstrates a clasic case of pernicious scienti-.c disagreement.
I wil suggest that a central problem that chemists sought to addres during the 
Chemical Revolution was the identity of several substances and how best to determine 
those identities. I intend this analysis to be in the spirit of Siegfried and Dobbs (1968), who
suggest that the emphasis we place on the Chemical Revolution should be greatest on (1) 
changes in nomenclature, folowed by (2) changes in the use of weight and, -.naly, (3) the 
replacement of phlogiston by oxygen. I also would like to de-emphasize the extent to 
which the Revolution consisted in a head-to-head confrontation between rival theories 
(oxygen versus phlogiston) and to emphasize that using weight changes how chemists 
determine which substances are simple. This new use of weight was, however, a natural 
extension of already existing practices and so does not constitute a radical shifL. Such an 
analysis should be compatible with the point made by Klein (2015) that changes during the
Chemical Revolution were les drastic than sometimes emphasized and were embedded in 
a continuous historical tradition. I wil pursue this line of argument to ilustrate the point 
I made in Chapter 3 about how to think of scienti-.c practice in terms of scientists’ 
responsivenes to conceptual/taxonomic changes rather than in terms of aims.
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4.1 Historiography of the Chemical Revolution
Broadly, there are two approaches to thinking about the Chemical Revolution. The -.rst 
suggests it was revolutionary in that fundamental elements of chemical practice changed, 
elements such as methods, ontology, explanation. The other approach places les emphasis
on the change. I wil describe features of these two approaches. I wil then indicate how 
my view relates to this debate. 
4.1.1 The Revolution w/ Revolutionary
One broad interpretive approach to the Chemical Revolution characterizes this period as 
revolutionary. Kuhn advocated this view (1976), as have in more recent times Siegfried
(2002, 1968) and Chang (2012). Chang’s view has sparked recent debate over how to 
interpret this period and I focus on his view with an eye toward advancing the debate. 
Chang cals his reading of the Chemical Revolution normative pluralism (Chang 
2015, 2012). This reading claims that scientists work in di0ferent systems of practice, each of
which has its own set of methods, goals, and explanations. These systems are 
incommensurable and cannot be evaluated in terms of one another, which may bring to 
mind Kuhnian paradigms (Kuhn 1976). However, unlike a paradigm a system of practice 
can co-exist with another system. A system of practice also o0fers an analysis based on 
activities -.rst and propositions secondarily, if at al. Another key di0ference is that Chang 
makes a normative claim about the number of systems being practiced. We should, Chang 
argues, promote a variety of systems and resist the imperialist tendency to folow just a 
single system. 
Kusch (2015) rejects Chang’s reading while not abandoning the anti-realist stance. 
Chang (2015) has acknowledged some of the concerns, so I wil only mention two that 
remain contentious: the normativity and role of social factors (and I shal return to a more 
philosophical examination of these views in chapter 5).
One crux of the debate is the normative element: why should the revolution taken
the actual course that it did? Or, was it justi-.ed? Kusch argues that there were good 
reasons, social reasons, for adopting the oxygen system of chemistry. To do this, Kusch 
appeals to experimental work in Germany that won over chemists to the oxygen system. 
He uses Hu?\auer (page 77) to argue that social factors provided sound motivation for 
adopting oxygen chemistry.24 Chang has responded (Chang 2015) that he is making a 
24 Hu?\auer actualy claims he is asuming a social analysis and does not claim to be 
arguing for it. It seems unlikely that Kusch can actualy use Hu?\auer’s research as 
evidence for a social reading given this admision. 
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normative claim about the Chemical Revolution: scientists should have been pluralist and 
should not have been monist. The social motivation does not provide su0-.cient reason to 
abandon a system of practice. Despite this exchange, both Chang and Kusch think 
revolutionary change marked this period, i.e. there was extensive experimental and 
conceptual revision. They are both consequently commited to a pluralist reading of the 
Chemical Revolution. 
4.1.2 The Revolution w/ not very Revolutionary
Both Kusch and Chang consider the Chemical Revolution a period of drastic change. 
Klein (2015) criticizes this interpretation, arguing instead that this period in chemistry saw 
more gradual change. She is not alone. Holmes (1995), Multhauf (1962), and Chalmers
(2013, 2012) have argued in di0ferent ways for thinking change during the Chemical 
Revolution was more gradual. 
There are two arguments for this reading. One is that chemists throughout the 18th
century were commited to the same ontology of substances; Klein and Chalmers in 
particular defend this view. The other argument is that the methods chemists used during 
this period do not change in a way that resembles a revolution. We might atribute this 
view to Multhauf. If one accepts this broad view that there was no revolution, we must 
consider the changes we see during this period as relatively minor and part of a more 
continuous practice of chemistry.
Chang responded (2015) to Klein’s criticism by acknowledging that there was 
indeed no drastic ontological change—and hence he agrees there was no revolution in this 
regard—but he argues the changes in methods, standards of judgement, and semantics 
were quite drastic and if we de-.ned a revolution in these terms, this period was 
revolutionary.
From this debate on how to characterize the chemical revolution, there are several 
main points of contention I wish to distil out.
1)Was there a Revolution at al?
2)What was the disagreement about?
3)Was theoretical change during the Chemical Revolution wel motivated?
A perspectival analysis wil provide some answers to these questions. I wil begin by 
focusing on a few particular experiments and exchanges between three natural 
philosophers: Cavendish, Lavoisier, and Kirwan. 
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4.2 Eighteenth Century Chemistry: A Brief Study
The study of acids was intimately linked to questions about the behaviour and nature of 
airs. Chemists were particularly interested in how acids were related to di0ferent airs and to
metals both in terms of how these di0ferent substances reacted, but also in terms of how 
each was composed. It is partly in this context that the question of phlogiston arose and it 
was the study of acids that led Lavoisier to propose a new principle, the principle of 
acidity, which he caled oxygen. I wil discus the general problem of acids and then discus
a series of experiments conducted by Cavendish, Lavoisier, and Kirwan. Cavendish began 
this work in the 1760s and this predates the experimental work of Lavoisier and Kirwan 
that I wil discus by at least a decade. 
There are several advantages to focusing on this early acid work. The -.rst is that 
the experimental context became incredibly complex once phlogiston became more hotly 
debated later in the 1780s. Part of the complexity stems from interconnected isues of 
acidity, calcination, combustion, and the composition of water and metals. The early acid 
experiments were les muddled by this complexity. The second advantage is that this 
subject is relatively self-contained and shows clearly the di0ferences in experimental 
practice between several very in?@uential chemists who had very di0ferent beliefs and 
o0fered very di0ferent explanations. The -.nal advantage is that al chemists involved had 
extensive common commitments. Puestions about qualitative versus quantitative 
approaches and principlism versus compositionalism do not need to arise here because al 
were quantitative and al were compositionalist. This common ground narows and 
emphasizes what precisely the di0ferences were between these approaches to the study of 
acids. I wil now discus what the questions were asociated with acids, then analyse the 
di0ferent approaches that Cavendish, Lavoisier, and Kirwan took. So from the start I am 
providing an analysis that suggests the Chemical Revolution was not very revolutionary. 
My analysis wil suggest identity played a central role in change and disagreement. 
4.2.1 Acids
In the 18th century, the acids were contrasted with the alkalis or bases. A substance was an 
acid if it e0fervesced when combined with an alkali and when combined, these two 
substances formed a neutral salt (Siegfried 2002, chap. 4). The e0fervescence produced an 
air and the acids therefore, along with combustion, provided a way to study the 
connection between solids and airs or elastic ?@uids. Acids could disolve metals and this 
property in particular gave them a special role in experiment. Metals also underwent some 
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transformation, becoming a calx or rust. Cavendish did some early work in this area, but 
acids came to play a central role in experiments during the late 18th century. 
Crudely put, there were two general accounts of the relationship between acids 
and metals, one o0fered by phlogiston chemists, the other by antiphlogiston chemists. The
former claimed that metals are compounds formed by a calx and phlogiston. When the 
phlogiston is released, the calx remains. The antiphlogiston account (also caled oxygen or 
French chemistry) claimed that metals were elements and acids compound, formed of 
oxygen and hydrogen. When combined with metal, the acid decomposed and the oxygen 
binds with the metal to form a calx and the hydrogen is released as a gas, which was caled 
in?@ammable air for a time. The crux of the di0ference between these two accounts was 
what was simple and what was compound. This di0ference began to take shape with the 
early work of Henry Cavendish. 
4.2.2 Henry Cavendish
Henry Cavendish (1731-1810) was a wealthy aristocrat who took a serious interest in natural
philosophy. He seemed to have few interests apart from his scienti-.c work, which was 
thorough, precise, quantitative and published with care and caution. He worked on a 
number of topics in addition to chemistry, such as electricity and meteorology. 
Cavendish’s work in physics in particular is wel known and perhaps more famous than his
contributions to chemistry. He found a scienti-.c community in the Royal Society of 
London, though his experiments were informed by and responsive to scientists from 
farther a-.eld as wel, including scientists from Scotland, Germany, and France. Cavendish 
did his chemical work in his laboratory in Westminster, a laboratory that his father likely 
started. Some of Cavendish’s earliest work in chemistry was with arsenic. His work quickly
expanded to include pneumatic chemistry and the study of acids. 
Cavendish’s initial interest in acids stemmed from an interest in arsenic because, 
although considered a metal, arsenic did not behave as other metals did (Cavendish 1921, 
298). This was not the only motive, however, for his interest in acids. The folowing 
experiments I discus concern the production of a type of gas Cavendish caled “factitious 
air” and his interest in the properties of this air was strong. Factitious air was any gas that 
could be bound in a solid state. Joseph Black (1728-1799) worked on this subject and was 
an important inspiration for this project. 
4.2.3 Cavendish’s Early Study o+ Acids
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To study the behaviour of acids and of metals, Cavendish used laboratory equipment that 
alowed him to combine substances with great control and to measure the products of the 
experiment (1766, reprinted in 1921, 77). I wil describe his apparatus in some detail 
because it wil ilustrate the great similarities in experimental practice that he shared with 
Lavoisier. 
For the work I wil discus, Cavendish used a botle to hold the reacting 
substances. To the top of the botle he a0-.xed an S-shaped glas tube. This tube curved 
down through a large vesel ful of water and then up into another botle, this one 
inverted. This second botle he -.led with water and inverted so that the botle opening 
was submerged in the vesel of water. In esence, Cavendish connected two botles with a 
glas tube and ensured there would be no leakage by submersing key parts of the system 
underwater. As gases (or airs as he caled them) were produced in the -.rst botle, they 
would travel through the glas tube into the second botle, where they would displace 
water. Based on how much water was displaced, Cavendish could measure how much gas 
was produced. 
With this apparatus, Cavendish investigated the reactions of three metals with 
three acids. The metals were zinc, iron, and tin. The acids were vitriolic acid (sulphuric 
acid), spirit of salt (hydrochloric acid), and nitrous acid (nitric acid). He disolved the 
metals in the acids, one acid and one metal at a time, in the -.rst botle and captured the gas
produced in the second botle. Generaly, he found in?@ammable air (hydrogen gas) was 
the product. Or, when not in?@ammable air, some kind of acidic fumes (Cavendish 1921, 
78–79). Although he does not here discus how he identi-.es the gas as in?@ammable air, we
might infer from later pasages (1921, 80) that Cavendish did so by observing whether the 
gas ignites when lit with a ?@ame. Cavendish measured precisely by weight how much 
metal he used and how much gas was produced. 
We can see from this paper that Cavendish was highly quantitative, something he 
was wel known for (Mccormmach and Jungnickel 2016, 171). He starts his experiments 
with careful measurements and diligently weighs the results. This clearly shows he is 
familiar and has great facility with quantitative chemistry, a skil ofLen atributed to 
oxygen chemists, but les ofLen to phlogiston chemists. 
Cavendish o0fers the folowing interpretation (1921, 79) of his experiments on 
these acids and metals: 
It seems likely from hence, that, when either of the above-mentioned metalic substances are 
disolved in spirit of salt, or the diluted vitriolic acid, their phlogiston ?@ies o0f, without having its 
nature changed by the acid, and forms the in?@ammable air; but that, when they are disolved in the
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nitrous acid, or united by heat to the vitriolic acid, their phlogiston unites to part of the acid used 
for their solution, and ?@ies o0f with it in fumes, the phlogiston losing its in?@ammable property by 
the union. The volatile sulphureous fumes, produced by uniting these metalic substances by heat 
to the undiluted vitriolic acid, shew plainly, that in this case their phlogiston unites to the acid; for 
it is wel known, that the vitriolic sulphureous acid consists of the plain vitriolic acid united to 
phlogiston
Cavendish interprets this experiment as showing that two types of acid—spirit of salt and 
vitriolic acid, disolve both zinc and iron and when they do, an in?@ammable air is released 
and this air is phlogiston.25 Crucialy, the metal, and not the acid, supplies the phlogiston 
that is released. In its gaseous state, the phlogiston forms in?@ammable air, which can be 
ignited by ?@ame. This would be nicely consistent with the idea that phlogiston is involved 
in al forms of combustion. However, if the acid is nitroA acid, the phlogiston combines 
with some part of the acid once the metal is disolved and forms the acidic fumes that 
Cavendish isolated. As it joins the acids, the phlogiston loses its in?@ammable property and 
therefore cannot be ignited by ?@ame. At the end of this pasage, Cavendish appeals to 
what he takes to a wel-known fact: that vitriolic sulphurous acid is formed by the 
combining phlogiston with vitriolic acid. We can asume that he takes this for granted and
is not directly testing it as an experimental hypothesis. 
The clasi-.catory choices Cavendish made, i.e. the way he individuated substances,
was based upon what he was able to isolate, in this case in?@ammable air. Because the 
reaction of metals and acids seem to produce a product that can be isolated, it is natural to 
think that metals are complex substances that give o0f the in?@ammable air. Cavendish 
clasi-.ed metal as complex on the basis of what the experiment produced. His choice of 
what to measure led him to this conclusion. As we wil see shortly, this is a markedly 
di0ferent strategy for clasifying metals when compared with Lavoisier’s work.
It is tempting at this point to folow Blumenthal and Ladyman (2017) in ascribing 
to Cavendish two “mistakes.”26 One was neglecting to weigh everything he should and the 
other was to appeal to a hypothetical entity, phlogiston, in analysing his results. It is a 
temping analysis because, to the modern eye, it is natural to weigh everything and 
phlogiston is not hypothetical, it is non-existent. However, we should resist this 
temptation because it is subtly anachronistic. Although Cavendish did not weigh al he 
could have, there is scant evidence that his contemporaries identi-.ed this as a mistake, 
suggesting his actions -.t contemporary scienti-.c norms. It is also di0-.cult to see how 
25 This is not the only interpretation of the relationship between phlogiston and air during
the 1770s. Priestley (1775), for instance, does not asociate it with in?@ammable air. 
26 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing this to my atention. 
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appealing to phlogiston could be a mistake. Phlogiston was accepted as a legitimate 
explanation since Stahl (1730) and there was as yet no salient reason to avoid appealing to 
phlogiston. There is also a more general problem with an analysis that cals these 
“mistakes.” It suggests that scientists can conduct their work while making no 
asumptions, taking no background knowledge for granted, and leting no hypothesis go 
untested at any time. Such an ideal just does not sit wel with the practicalities of science. 
Every scientist must take at least some things for granted.
Nevertheles, Cavendish’s explanations for his results stand in marked contrast to 
Lavoisier’s work, which was in other ways strikingly similar, even though it began a decade
later.
 
3.1.2 Lavoisier’s Lime, Chalk, and Acid
Lavoisier’s early work on acids was motivated by an interest in how elastic ?@uids became 
-.xed and separated from inelastic substances or, in modern terms, the nature of gases 
binding and forming solids (Lavoisier 1776, 221).27 Cavendish, recal, caled these same 
substances factitious. The similarity between these interests should be striking: both were 
investigating the relation between gases and solids. To do this, Lavoisier conducted a series
of experiments that resemble very closely Cavendish’s work, with a subtle di0ference that 
led to very di0ferent conclusions. 
For the -.rst experiments, Lavoisier disolved iron power in nitrous acid to its 
saturation point (1776, 293). He carefuly weighed both the acid and the iron before 
mixing and diluting the solution with distiled water. He separated out two portions of 
this solution and added chalk to one, lime to the other (1776, 294–95). Upon adding the 
chalk or lime, iron rust precipitated out of the solution. Had he not added the chalk or 
lime to the iron solution, the iron would not have precipitated out and would have 
remained disolved. He uses lime and chalk as a kind of control; the results cannot be just a
peculiar feature of lime, for example, because the results are similar when using chalk.
The point in discusing such detail is to show that thus far Lavoisier’s work is very 
similar to Cavendish’s, apart from precipitating the rust. Lavoisier has disolved a metal in 
an acid, just as Cavendish did. He also weighs his starting ingredients and his results. 
However, Lavoisier is at this point more interested in the metal than the vapour and 
makes an important departure from Cavendish. Lavoisier washes the iron rust in distiled 
water and weighs it (1776, 295). He -.nds that the metal rust, the calx, is heavier than the 
27 Lavoisier had previously worked on other topics in chemistry (see Guerlac (1966) or 
Holmes (1988) for example), but the acid work is particularly relevant here because of its 
connection to Cavendish and because Lavoisier’s evolving views on oxygen emerge here.
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metal was before being disolved in the acid. This is true for both the lime and chalk 
solutions, though the chalk solution produced heavier iron rust than the lime solution. 
Cavendish does not isolate and weigh the calx he produced. Lavoisier concludes the 
folowing:
The results of these experiments are, 1st, that iron and mercury disolved in the nitrous acid, acquire
in general a remarkable increase of weight, whether they be precipitated by chalk or by lime. 2ndly, 
that this increase is greater in respect to iron than to mercury, 3rdly, that one reason for thinking 
that the elastic ?@uid contributes to this augmentation is, that it is constantly greater when an earth 
is employed saturated with elastic ?@uid, such as chalk, than when an earth is used which has been 
deprived of it, as lime (Lavoisier 1776, 295).
Calxes, such as iron rust, are formed from metal and an elastic ?@uid and are therefore 
compounds. Because the calx is heavier than the metal, it stands to reason that there is 
more substance to the calx than the metal when the quantity of metal is su0-.ciently 
controled. Because the amount of metal was controled in this experiment, the extra 
weight must have come from somewhere. Lavoisier atributes the gain in weight to the 
elastic ?@uid in part because chalk contains more of it than lime. Recal that the iron rust 
produced by using chalk was heavier than the rust produced by lime. Lavoisier 
demonstrated this di0ference between lime and chalk in a series of earlier experiments that 
I wil not discus in detail here (Lavoisier 1776, chap. 1).
At this point Lavoisier has concluded that metals are simple and calxes compound,
which is opposite to the conclusion that Cavendish reached. Lavoisier made no appeal to 
phlogiston, though he also as yet makes no reference to oxygen, except as the “elastic ?@uid”
that binds with metal to form rust.28 But the crucial di0ference is that Lavoisier clasi-.ed 
metals as simple substances whereas Cavendish clasi-.ed them as complex. This is the crux 
of the di0ference between these interpretations, though other important di0ferences exist. 
The problem is therefore a clasi-.cation and identity problem and it emerges from a 
heavily shared experimental and clasi-.catory practice. 
So far I have shown that clasi-.catory di0ferences emerged in chemistry over the 
problem of acids and metals, which -.ts neatly with the perspectival emphasis on 
taxonomy that I defended in section 1. I have not as yet shown any disagreement. I now 
turn to this topic to show that not only was there extensive shared background prior to 
28 Lavoisier choice of terms changes. Eventualy he uses the term “oxygen” (Lavoisier in 
Best 2015) but in earlier work we can -.nd him refering to an “elastic ?@uid” (1776) or “pure
air” (1777). 
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the disagreement, there was also a shared interest in resolution and in establishing how 
best to approach explanation in chemistry. 
4.2.6 Oxygen Confronts Phlogiston
Cavendish and Lavoisier, although engaged in very similar projects, were unaware of one 
another’s experiments and alternative conclusions about the nature of metals. This 
di0ference becomes apparent later and is particularly striking in the work of Richard 
Kirwan (1733-1812) who, like Cavendish, was a phlogiston chemist, but communicated 
regularly with oxygen chemists. 
By the time Kirwan (1787) addresed questions asociated with metals and acids, 
the di0ferences between Lavoisier and phlogiston chemists became far more complex and 
connected to a number of related problems. One striking criticism that Kirwan levels 
against Lavoisier concerned the basis for clasifying metals and calxes. By this time oxygen 
chemistry became much more explicit and Lavoisier no longer uses “elastic ?@uid” to 
discus a constituent of calxes, but uses “oxygen” instead. Acids, both phlogiston and 
oxygen chemists claimed, were compounds. The oxygen chemists claimed they were 
formed from oxygen combined with a base, whereas phlogiston chemists claimed that 
phlogiston was a component of acids.29 This is a departure from Cavendish’s earlier work, 
which did not consider phlogiston a component of the acids.
Kirwan’s main criticism comes from his 1787 Esay on Phlogiston. This text 
provided the most recent and powerful defence of phlogiston theory. Lavoisier’s wife, 
Marie-Anne, translated Kirwan’s text into French. Added to Kirwan’s pasages were 
responses from leading antiphlogiston chemists, including Lavoisier. The French version 
with those responses was translated back into English two years later by Wiliam 
Nicholson of London. A crux argument in the text concerned a0-.nity tables and how 
Lavoisier used them. It is worth discusing these tables in detail because they were an 
important part of chemical explanations, but only for a limited time. I discus their history
and why Kirwan thought they were a problem for Lavoisier. 
4.2.7 ADnity Tabl. and Their Use
A0-.nity tables were a widely used explanatory tool in 18th and early 19th century chemistry
(Holmes 1962).30 Klein has argued (1994) that a0-.nity tables formed the basis of the 
29 Kirwan o0fers a brief discusion of these two views of the composition of acids (Kirwan 
1789, 38–39).
30 As Holmes points out, the concept of a0-.nity had di0ferent uses. One was to explain the 
combining of di0ferent substances. Another use was to provide a systematic ordering of 
substances, as in the a0-.nity tables. 
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concept of composition during this period. The -.rst a0-.nity table was constructed by 
Geo0frey (1718). The table was made more systematic by Bergman in 1778.31 The use of 
these a0-.nity tables declined afLer concerted atacks by Bertholet that began shortly before
1800.32 Before its decline, the basic principle of the a0-.nity table was that substances are 
atracted to one another and combine because of their a0-.nities and di0ferent substances 
have di0ferent, but constant, a0-.nities. For example, if three substances are mixed, then the
two with the strongest a0-.nity for each other wil combine, to the exclusion of the third. 
These tables were initialy interesting for explaining the behaviour of acids, metals, and 
bases and for providing order to the wide range of substances that chemists studied. 
Lavoisier was interested in using a0-.nity tables, not to accurately predict reactions, 
but to provide order and explanation. In this case, a0-.nity tables could explain how 
oxygen, the elastic ?@uid of his early experiments, behaves. Oxygen, as the principle of 
acidity, has an a0-.nity for other substances and therefore it was quite natural to explain its 
behaviour with the already widely used a0-.nity tables. Substances combust, so this 
explanation goes, because of their a0-.nity to oxygen and they stop when the source of the 
oxygen is at equilibrium with the combusting substance (Holmes 1962). Between 
Bergman and Bertholet’s criticism of a0-.nity tables, a number of chemists—including 
Kirwan, Morveau, and Fourcroy—worked on -.ling in the tables with more detail and 
more substances and atempting to quantitatively measure a0-.nity (Kirwan 1789, 173). 
The problem was that Lavoisier’s tables had many exceptions that could be easily 
demonstrated through experiment. This suggested Lavoisier’s table was inadequate. 
Without a0-.nity tables, oxygen chemistry becomes much les compeling because it is 
unclear why a substance would combust and why it would stop combusting. The 
phlogiston chemists could neatly provide this explanation by appeal to phlogiston: a 
substance burns when phlogiston is released and stops when the phlogiston is depleted. 
But why should oxygen bind with iron when a0-.nity tables suggest it does not? And why 
should combustion stop at any point once it has started? Kirwan writes:
Besides, though iron and zinc are the only metals which by Mr. Lavoisier’s table have a greater 
a0-.nity to the oxigenous principle, than in?@ammable air has to that principle; yet in?@ammable air is
also set loose during the solution of other metals, which by that table have a weaker a0-.nity to the 
oxigenous principle than in?@ammable air has to it (1789, 176).
 
Kirwan points out that that oxygen chemistry is commited to the idea that when metals 
are disolved in a water and acid solution, in?@ammable air is produced. Their explanation 
31 This was translated into English a few years later (Bergman 1785).
32 For a discusion of the fate of a0-.nity tables, see (Holmes 1962).
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for this is that because water and acids are at least partly composed of in?@ammable air and 
oxygen.33 The metal binds with the oxygen to form a calx and the in?@ammable air is 
released as a vapour. However, there is a tension in the oxygen account, so Kirwan’s 
criticism goes, because Lavoisier’s a0-.nity table suggests that only iron and zinc have a 
strong enough a0-.nity for oxygen to separate it from the in?@ammable air, and yet when 
other metals are mixed in acid, in?@ammable air is released. 
Kirwan’s alternative explanation (Kirwan 1789, 45) is that when water and metal 
are combined, the water drives in?@ammable air out of the metal. Calxes are what remains 
afLer the in?@ammable air is driven o0f. The water explains the fact that calxes are heavier 
than metals. This explanation may be reasonable because water is heavier than 
in?@ammable air. This explanation does not encounter the contradictions in a0-.nity tables 
that Lavoisier’s explanation must face. We can see here that Kirwan’s explanation is more 
consistent with Cavendish’s early work in that both Cavendish and Kirwan argue metals 
are compound substances and that part of their composition includes in?@ammable air and
that in?@ammable air is phlogiston.
There are two things to note about Kirwan’s explanation of the composition of 
metals. First, the notion of which substance is simplest is somewhat obscured because 
both calxes and metals are not simple and isolated substances (metals are partly composed 
of phlogiston and calxes have great quantities of water in them). This suggests Kirwan was
not as interested in composition as he was in other topics like a0-.nity tables. Second, 
Kirwan did not take isue with Lavoisier’s weight data. He accepted that calxes were 
heavier than metals and that this was puzzling. But he did disagree over what type of 
inference this data permited. Any conclusion, Kirwan seemed to have thought, required a
consistency with a0-.nity tables. A0-.nity tables, in other words, constrained the type of 
inferences one could make from the data, a constraint that Lavoisier did not recognize. 
The main point of di0ference between these chemists that I would like to emphasize is this:
Lavoisier distinguished the elements from the compounds by weight and Kirwan did not. 
I wil return to this point below. 
Lavoisier responded to this wory about inconsistencies by claiming that the 
a0-.nity tables were not meant to account for experiment directly, but to explain why 
di0ferent substances combust.34 And not only are the tables not intended to predict, they 
cannot make predictions about most experiments directly because they have not been 
su0-.ciently perfected due to a practical limitation: a0-.nities vary with temperature and 
33 A related problem is the question of the composition of water. Oxygen chemists 
believed water was compound while many phlogiston chemists, including Kirwan, 
believed water was simple. 
34  Lavoisier in (Kirwan 1789, 45)
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temperature is not incorporated into a0-.nity tables. To fuly explain the results of 
experiment requires a speci-.cation of temperature, which would lead to a new a0-.nity 
table for each incremental change in temperature.35 Such a project is impracticable. So 
Lavoisier is not commited to a0-.nity tables that provide consistent, experimentaly 
veri-.ed predictions. 
This discusion so far has shown two things. First, al chemists I have so far 
discused were interested in the reactions of acids and metals and the gases produced. 
Second, there were important di0ferences in the conclusions each chemist reached despite 
this common interest. The di0ference was in how these chemists thought substances 
should be individuated: a problem of clasi-.cation. 
4.3 Evidential Reasoning
Having discused the details of this early work on acids, let’s return to the three questions 
we began with, which were (1) was there a revolution; (2) what was the disagreement 
about; and (3) was change wel-motivated. The easiest to answer is (2), which is that the 
debate was about clasi-.cation, speci-.caly the clasi-.cation of elements. 
The answer to (1) is more complex to addres, but the answer wil be no. A 
revolution suggests the extensive replacement of the conceptual or experimental practices 
with a new set of practices, but I have shown that there was extensive experimental and 
conceptual continuity between phlogiston and oxygen chemists. It is worth distinguishing
here two senses of “revolution,” one technical, one informal. A revolution in the technical 
sense concerns radical conceptual or experimental upheaval. This is the kind of revolution 
Kuhn (1976) was interested in. An informal use of “revolution” involves great change, but 
without specifying, or requiring, conceptual or experimental revision. Chemists during 
and since the 18th century refered to the great changes in chemistry as a “revolution,” but 
this is informal and posibly even rhetorical. One can consider this period revolutionary, 
i.e. a period of great change, without requiring systematic conceptual and experimental 
revision. I have argued that there was not revolution in the technical sense, but there likely 
was a revolution in the informal sense. 
Before discusing (3), I would like to argue that continuity during the Chemical 
Revolution cannot be explained away by di0ferences in the experimental interests of 
oxygen and phlogiston chemists. It is tempting to analyse the di0ferences between these 
chemists in terms of their interests and goals. Chang (2012) provides such an analysis. 
Although interests were undoubtedly important, as I wil show in this section, the ful 
35 Lavoisier also studied heat in other contexts and methods to quantitatively measure it. 
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story cannot stop with this explanation because of how goals changed and how those 
changes informed and were informed by other considerations such as experimental results 
and clasi-.cation.
Cavendish, as a chemist working in the pneumatic tradition, was very concerned 
to isolate the gases produced by experiment. Some of his experimental choices can 
therefore be traced to the tradition in which he worked. The situation was more complex, 
however, because Cavendish had several evolving goals. The clasi-.cation of “airs,” or 
gases, became troublesome for natural philosophers when it came to the factitious airs, 
which poses some kind of important connection to more solid substances. This problem
was probably a motivation for Cavendish, but it was not the only motivation. The 
unusual properties of arsenic were also a puzzle that motivated him. Cavendish’s goals for 
his work in chemistry, I am suggesting by appeal to these cases, varied. Any one goal was 
not necesarily the only goal at play and no one goal necesarily guided Cavendish through
his entire experimental practice. However, it is fair to say that his experimental pedigree 
(pneumatic chemistry) led him to ask certain questions and to use the relevant methods. 
Lavoisier also worked in the pneumatic tradition and so was also interested in isolating 
gases and determining their relationship to solid substances. But Lavoisier did choose to 
weigh aspects of his experiments that Cavendish did not, speci-.caly the calx. 
This emphasis on weight may be unsurprising given his interest in the balance, not
simply as an instrument of measurement, but as a principle of natural and economic 
regulation. Bensaude-Vincent (1992) suggests the balance symbolizes for Lavoisier a kind 
of natural order. The weight that was conserved through reactions was just one example of
a kind of natural regulation that provided a kind of balance and equality (Ibid., p. 227). 
Given this background, a wilingnes to consider weight paramount is unsurprising. 
However, this inclination to measure al that could be measured did not exhaust 
Lavoisier’s interests. Later, Lavoisier was also interested in distinguishing the compounds 
from the elements, those substances which could be decomposed from those which could 
not. This project eventualy culminated in a colaborative revision of the nomenclature of 
chemical substances on the basis of elements (1796, 1787). So we might say Lavoisier was 
interested in a unifying principle for identifying elements and providing a clasi-.cation on 
this basis, but was not as interested in problems like anomalous metals, even though he 
also took an interest in the connection between gases and solids. 
Kirwan (1782) also had experience measuring weight and was skiled at it. 
However, Kirwan also worked extensively on a0-.nity tables and took quite seriously the 
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explanatory power an a0-.nity table o0fered (Kirwan [1782]).36 Given this interest, it is 
unsurprising that Kirwan was particularly concerned with Lavoisier’s table and les 
concerned about the other features of oxygen chemistry. And this is the case even though 
Kirwan has a lot in common with Lavoisier. Both, for instance, -.nd the weight gain of 
calxes important.
Despite these di0ferences, the broadly shared experimental practice and taxonomy 
would have made it hard to avoid adopting oxygen chemistry in some form. I say “some 
form” because oxygen chemistry was not the only logical posibility, but in the second half
of the 18th century, long-term adherence to the available alternatives may have been 
di0-.cult. This brings us to question (3): was the disagreement wel-motivated.
4.3.1 The Appeal o+ Oxygen
Chang (2012, sec. 1.2) claims that there was litle reason during the Chemical Revolution to
suppose weight could be used reliably in chemistry and that, as a consequence, Lavoisier’s 
work was not as compeling as it may seem to the modern reader who is now accustomed 
to the conservation of mas. There is indeed a puzzle here: given that producing isolated 
products and weight were both wel-established features of chemical practice, why prefer 
one over the other? Data, a typical form of empirical evidence, certainly fail in this case to 
provide the kind of straightforward con-.rmation one might expect. This is because 
di0ferent chemists chose to weigh di0ferent substances. 
Despite these caveats, I wil suggest that there was good reason for an 18th century 
chemist to use weight as a criterion for individuating reactions and substances because it 
was quite natural, even though it was also new and even though there was no rational 
compulsion to adopting weight. There are three motivations for this claim, which come 
not only from this historical case, but also from research by Multhauf (2015, 84). 
First, weight is quantitative, precise, and repeatable; measurements can be retaken 
with the same result, substances need not be isolated to be weighed, and it is objective 
(di0ferent chemists weighing the same substance can get the same result). These are some 
reasons for thinking that weight o0fers a perfectly good kind of data to be used as evidence 
and that it could be a reliable method for determining what substances one had. Indeed, 
al chemists I discused weighed substances quite diligently. It was not weight ful stop 
that distinguished Cavendish, Lavoisier, and Kirwan. What di0fered was the persistent 
application of weight as a criterion for distinguishing the element from the compound 
that made Lavoisier’s work stand apart. 
36 A0-.nity tables were not his only project; he was principaly concerned with defending 
phlogiston against oxygen chemistry. 
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Second, weight was already a wel-established part of chemistry methods. We can 
see that Cavendish, in addition to Lavoisier, was skiled at measuring the weight of 
di0ferent substances. He was not alone. Kirwan and many of the other leading chemists 
used weight with high precision.37 It would have been, this suggests, quite natural for 
Lavoisier to use weight to track oxygen and determine the composition of di0ferent 
substances. It was a new part of the chemistry practice, but not very unlike what others 
were doing. Indeed, despite initial scepticism, many chemists, including Kirwan, came to 
accept Lavoisier’s work quickly.38 It would have been di0-.cult for chemists to maintain 
scepticism of weight data. Weight was, afLer al, already a trusted tool. 
Thirdly, not only was weight quantitative and wel established, it also -.t neatly 
with intuitive conceptions of simplicity and complexity. It is quite natural, even trivial, to 
think that simple things weigh les than more complex things, al else being equal. If you 
take any two things and put them together, be it coin, fruit, or horses, the sum weighs 
more than a single component. This point is quite general. The only exceptional thing 
that Lavoisier does with this intuitive idea is to consider it paramount and the basis of 
determining what is elemental. Weight takes priority, say, over a0-.nity tables. The 
consequence is that someone like Lavoisier is perfectly happy to tolerate exceptions to 
a0-.nity tables, something Kirwan was unwiling to do because he considered a0-.nity tables
much more important. Recal that Kirwan’s explanation of the weight gain of calxes 
entailed that the notion of simple substance played litle or no role, a consequence he 
accepted, but which Lavoisier would have found intolerable. It is interesting to note that 
Kirwan eventualy came to endorse oxygen chemistry.39
I have so far argued in this section that it was reasonable to folow Lavoisier’s use 
of weight and perhaps di0-.cult to endorse an alternative. But this was not conclusive: 
disent was not irational, just di0-.cult to maintain. There are two lingering questions. 
First, have I set aside important complexities and underemphasized important di0ferences 
in experimental practice? Second, why not be pluralist; couldn’t both oxygen and 
phlogiston chemistry cary on independently? 
Seting aside as many complexities as I did was justi-.ed because although it was a 
complex period, complexity is not what made this disagreement distinctive. Any scienti-.c 
disagreement has the potential to become complex. Within this complexity there were 
certainly important di0ferences and this paper did not explore al of them. However, my 
37 See (Multhauf 1962) for a discusion of how widely used the balance was during and 
preceding the Chemical Revolution. 
38 For a discusion of Kirwan’s work and his eventual conversion, along with Bertholet, to 
oxygen chemistry, see (Mauskop 2002).
39 For a discusion of Kirwan’s later views, see (Mauskop 2002).
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purpose was to show the neglected similarity between these chemists. Of course there were
di0ferences, but in light of the similarities, they were not as fundamental as some pluralist 
readings suggest.
For the second question, why not be pluralist, there are some reservations we may 
have. The -.rst reservation with pluralism is that both phlogiston and oxygen chemists 
recognized the same problems and were interested, generaly, in solving those problems. 
The composition of metals was not just of interest to Lavoisier, Kirwan thought it worth 
exploring and arguing about. The projects were too closely related for either to ignore the 
other’s work. Oxygen chemistry in?@uenced and stimulated phlogiston chemistry and vice 
versa. As a consequence, each chemist was able to respond to the other because of the 
signi-.cance each experiment had to the overal project of trying to clasify and understand 
a set of substances. If the debate is indeed structured as I am suggesting, then it is hard to 
imagine how, say, an oxygen chemist could feel satis-.ed ignoring a phlogiston chemist.
The second problem with pluralism is that, as I argued, there was extensive shared 
background to oxygen and phlogiston chemists. Al worked in the tradition of pneumatic 
chemistry, al used broadly similar methods that involved isolating substances, weighing 
them, and exploring their properties. They were also al exploring substances that were not
far removed from everyday life. Metals, water, and acids are not obscure substances and 
there was no disagreement about what were instances of these substances. The isue was 
how to clasify them, as I argued earlier. The clasi-.catory problems were not particularly 
obscure either, even though solving them was complex and di0-.cult. Given the complexity
of the task facing these chemists, it was certainly reasonable for there to be what we might 
cal a period of uncertainty. But this is not a permanent state. Eventualy, afLer more 
debate, experiments, analysis, and the revisiting of old work, the debate became resolved. 
4.4 The Historiography Revisited
I claimed there were two broad approaches to the Chemical Revolution. The -.rst 
approach takes the idea of revolution quite seriously and suggests there were drastic 
changes in the transition from phlogiston to oxygen chemistry. The other view is 
opposite: the changes were not drastic and there was a great deal of continuity between 
phlogiston and oxygen chemistry. Emerging from the tension between these accounts 
were three main questions that could be made more speci-.c. The questions were: 1) Was 
change wel motivated? 2) Were chemists part of the same or di0ferent practices? 3) What 
was the disagreement about?
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The perspectival analysis gives these answers: 1) the change was wel-motivated; 2) 
there is an important sense in which these chemists were part of the same practice; 3) the 
disagreement concerned taxonomic problems that emerged from experimental results. 
Let’s look at this answers in more detail and compare with the other analyses. 
My analysis is much more closely aligned with Klein in that I have suggested a 
great deal of continuity during this period. I suggest, then, that the answer to 2) is that 
chemists were part of the same practice. The changes were not, therefore, very 
revolutionary. I also argued that non-social factors were important drivers of change, and 
in answer to 1), that the change was wel motivated. But I agree with Chang that the social 
factors did not provide a wel-motivated force for change. I disagree with Chang in that I 
argued that phlogiston and oxygen could not long persist simultaneously. In answer to 3), 
I suggested the disagreement concerned how to distinguish elements from compounds 
and that Lavoisier suggested this be done by weight to the exclusion of other 
considerations. 
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter ilustrated a perspectival interpretation of scienti-.c disagreement that 
advances existing interpretations of this period. In 4.1 I indicated several particular areas 
where the contention in the literature is acute. These concerned how deep the 
disagreement was (was it revolutionary?), what the disagreement was about, and how we 
should evaluate the outcome. Section 4.2 examined several experiments during this period 
and 4.3 evaluated the evidence di0ferent chemists o0fered for the interpretation of their 
experiments and provided some analysis. In 4.4 I revisited the contemporary, 
philosophical disagreement. Perspectivism has provided a basis for thinking about 
disagreements that are serious, but not as insurmountable as other views suggest. My view 
acknowledges the historical context in which the disagreeing parties worked, but also 
accommodated evidential reasoning more naturaly than other views. 
 Through this discusion of the Chemical Revolution, I rejected pragmatic and 
relativist interpretations of this period. But where exactly do these views diverge and what 
motivates the divergence? The next chapter evaluates pragmatism, relativism, and 
perspectivism more abstractly and in relation to one another. Al three views are motivated
by, among other things, an atempt to beter understand disagreement. I wil argue against
the -.rst two and in favour of the third. 
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5
Three Views of Scienti-.c Practice
Abstract
In this chapter I argue in favour of perspectivism against scienti-.c Changian pragmatism 
and relativism. I -.rst motivate, and then criticize, Changian pragmatism and relativism 
before showing how perspectivism avoids criticisms faced by the other views. Al three 
views are brands of pluralism that purport to o0fer insight into disagreements. The two 
views I reject, however, fail to account adequately for the objectivity, continuity, and 
broad appeal scienti-.c explanations have. These problems emerge because each view takes 
a subjective atitude toward the evaluation of scienti-.c products. However, these 
problems are avoided, or at least beter understood, by framing some kinds of 
disagreements as taxonomic, and therefore identity, problems. Perspectivism as I defend it 
atempts this framing.
5.0 Introduction
How should we think about scienti-.c disagreements? Should they be resolved and if 
resolution is posible, is it rational? This chapter presents three di0ferent accounts of 
scienti-.c practice that purport to help us understand disagreements and controversies by 
answering these kinds of questions. The -.rst two accounts I wil suggest face similar and 
critical problems. These de-.ciencies are avoided by the -.nal view, perspectivism, which I 
defend. We saw some of these di0ferences emerge in the previous chapter about the 
Chemical Revolution, but here I wil examine more abstractly the di0ferent commitments 
these views have and why we might be tempted to accept, or reject, those commitments.
In section 5.1, I discus a brand of Changian pragmatism that uses action as the 
analytic tool for understanding disagreement. Section 5.2 addreses relativism with respect 
to situated judgements that are justi-.ed within an epistemic system. And in section 5.3, I 
defend a version of perspectivism that focuses on scienti-.c taxonomies and their 
applicability and relevance to scienti-.c practice. 
5.1 Changian Pragmatism
In this section, I present an argument for pluralism about scienti-.c disagreement. Chang 
chie?@y defends this view and cals it pragmatic. It is inspired by the American pragmatist 
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tradition and a particular feature of the view that makes the pragmatic label appropriate is 
the emphasis on the practical abilities that scientists have. Chang evaluates such activities 
in terms of human interests. Science is therefore interest- or aim-driven.40 
This view of pluralism provides an important foil because, like the perspectival 
view I shortly defend, it is motivated by disagreement and it emphasizes activity, but there 
is a critical di0ference. Changian pragmatism takes a strong subjective and internal atitude 
toward evaluating scienti-.c claims. This atitude shows itself in several premises and is 
deeply problematic. My examination of the pragmatist argument wil show the role of 
evaluation in the account and why it is a problem. I take it that a posible argument for 
Changian pragmatism (broadly understood along the lines indicated by Chang) goes as 
folows:41 
1. There are di0ferent epistemic systems of practice.
2. Judgements and beliefs are evaluated within speci-.c systems of practice 
according to internal standards. 
3. Systems of practice and their asociated aims cannot always be ranked or 
evaluated in terms of one another.
C: We should be epistemic pluralists 
In what folows, I look at the individual premises of these argument, highlights points 
where I think the pragmatist has a point, and ?@ag some wories one might have.
5.1.1. Premise 1: There are di1erent epistemic systems o+ practice
This premise does much of the work in making this view pluralist and distinctly 
pragmatic. It is the claim that scientists perform a number of activities, al oriented 
systematicaly toward achieving a set of aims. The pragmatist claims each scienti-.c 
community has a set of aims and must engage in various activities in order to achieve those
aims. These activities form a coherent structure because they al relate systematicaly. This 
structure is an epistemic system and, consequently, can also include concepts, beliefs, 
models, explanations, and other epistemic features of a scientist’s context. The view is 
40 Interests and aims can take di0ferent forms, but they are interchangeable because both 
concern the suitability of a method or explanation relative to a problem, task, or 
phenomenon that scientists endeavour to investigate. I take Chang (2015, 2012) to be 
broadly commited to this characterization of pragmatism.
41 Because this is the main version of pragmatism under discusion here, I wil hereafLer cal 
it “Changian pragmatism.” I indicate where there are exceptions. 
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pluralist because there are multiple independent and autonomoA systems (Chang 2012, 
chap. 5). He describes his approach here:
I propose to frame my analyses in terms of “systems of (scienti-.c) practice” that
are made up of “epistemic activities”…. An epistemic activity is a more-or-les coherent set 
of mental or physical operations…. and the coherence of an activity is de-.ned by how wel 
the activity succeeds in achieving its aim (2013, 15–16).
As an example, a scientist within such a structure must perform a number of activities in 
order to measure the mas of an electron. Thomson, one of the -.rst to accurately measure 
this mas, performed a number of activities asociated with his aim (Arabatzis 2006). He 
had to arange his laboratory equipment using a cathode ray tube. He had to select and 
arange the relevant metals to emit electrons and he had to connect an electrical source to 
the cathode ray tube. Once he managed to run the experiment, he had to calculate—based 
on how much cathode rays were de?@ected—what the mas-to-charge ratio was. This is just 
a brief characterization of the activities involved in a scienti-.c practice. Each activity 
Thomson performed systematicaly relates to one another and these relationships are 
established by the overal aim of the experiment, to measure the mas of an electron.
One appeal of this pragmatic account is its apparent sensitivity to scienti-.c 
practice and its aversion to abstraction. The pragmatist argues that by emphasizing the 
practice, we get a clearer picture of what scientists must know and do in order to answer 
questions, make calculations, predictions, and o0fer explanations. Knowledge of theory 
alone, for instance, is insu0-.cient for understanding what scientists are doing and what 
role things like theories play in science. It folows Hacking (1983) in pushing the analysis 
away from representation and toward experiment. 
Not only does this view avoid abstract reconstructions, it also gives credence to the
diversity we see in scienti-.c practice. Scientists just do seem to be engaged in di0ferent 
activities and these di0ferences structure inquiry in important ways. Chemists, physicists, 
and biologists are al engaged in activities that systematicaly relate to one another, but 
scientists of one type perform very di0ferent activities from those of another. They also use
very di0ferent sets of concepts, seek very di0ferent types of explanations, develop very 
di0ferent theories, and make evaluations under very di0ferent standards of succes. These 
di0ferences in practice are posible at least in part because there are di0ferent activities 
asociated with each practice. Thomson’s laboratory work was an activity scientists from 
other practices had no need to understand or perform, just as Thomson had no need to 
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perform activities asociated with cultivating bacteria in petri dishes, an esential skil for 
some of his contemporary scientists. 
Although this account seeks to capture the complexity of scienti-.c practice, we 
might struggle to endorse it. The main problem is the emphasis on autonomy. 
Disagreement is meant to be a strong motive for endorsing autonomy, but many of the 
historical cases that provide that motivation, such as the Chemical Revolution, are not 
best characterized as separate systems. This is because those who disagree actualy share a 
number of the same methods, activities, and explanatory aims, even though there are 
important points of disagreement. We saw this in the preceding chapter.
There are other ways of incorporating aims and pluralism into an account of 
science that does not fal afoul of these deep divisions. Mitchel’s integrative pluralism
(2003, 2002), for instance, shares pluralist roots and a pragmatic interest in aims, but with 
the posibility of integration. The key di0ference as I see it is that Mitchel’s pragmatism 
situates aims and models into a broader scienti-.c inquiry. This focus on methods avoids 
the kind of strong autonomy separate systems have under Chang’s treatment of 
pragmatism. This suggests one can take an interest in the fact that science has a plethora of
aims and activities, but without endorsing this commitment to autonomous systems of 
practice, further suggesting science can be insightfuly examined with an eye toward aims 
and activity, but without commitment to autonomy. So while this premise does o0fer 
some insight into how we can approach an analysis of science, it goes too far in 
commiting to autonomy.
5.1.2. Premise 2: Judgements and beliefs are evaluated within speci:c systems of
practice acording to internal standards 
This premise is about internal standards for evaluating claims. The pragmatist claims here 
that whether scientists have succeeded in achieving their aims is internal to the practice. 
Chang cals this the coherence of the activity (2017, 6–7): an activity is coherent if it alows 
the scientist to achieve the relevant aims. This requires a rather narow construal of aims 
such that they are not shared acros practices. Relativism shares a similar premise, but 
perspectivism does not. The di0-.culty here is that the pragmatist (and the relativist too) 
takes a subjective stance toward evaluation and subjectivity of this kind does not -.t wel 
with social, colaborative, and integrative features of science. Let’s -.rst examine why we 
might be motivated to accept this premise before looking at the grounds for rejection. 
Part of the motivation for this premise comes from the pragmatist atitude toward
succes. Succes is internal to a practice, so the pragmatist argues, because each practice has 
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its own set of aims and so any potential succes must be evaluated by that speci-.c set. 
Consider Chang’s Chemical Revolution case (2012, chap. 1), which I have also discused at 
length in the preceding chapter. Brie?@y, the two explanations, one appealing to 
phlogiston, the other to oxygen, were incompatible. However, phlogiston chemists were 
interested in qualitatively explaining a broad range of phenomena whereas oxygen 
chemists were interested in explaining quantitatively a narow range of phenomena. 
Because they had di0ferent explanatory aims, each explanation could equaly and 
independently be succesful. This equality of succes was posible because no explanation 
perfectly satis-.ed al aims (2012, 293:17–18).
The key claim here is that succes cannot be determined from another practice. 
Once someone in a practice has chosen what he or she wants to explain, a proces that is 
subjective, the evaluation of his or her explanation depends entirely on that explanatory 
aim and on no other aim. Although this analysis gives puzzling results when applied to 
cases of disagreement, it emerges from a very intuitive idea. That idea is that in everyday 
life, when we perform an activity, we evaluate that activity on the basis of what we set out 
to do. To use a very mundane example, I may have the aim of cleaning the kitchen. My 
actions of mopping ?@oors and washing dishes are succesful if they result in a clean kitchen
and they otherwise are unsuccesful. These actions are also unsuccesful if my aim was not 
to clean the kitchen, but to repair a desk. The pragmatist strategy here, we might say, is to 
take a very intuitive idea of action in the everyday context and more explicitly apply it to 
scienti-.c explanation generaly. 
Chang seeks to link succes with truth by appeal to coherence (2017, 1). A 
statement is true if belief in it is necesary for performing coherent activities that achieve 
speci-.ed aims. Succes provides the anchor or constraint that ataches systems of 
compatible beliefs to the world. Chang’s main motivation for this account of truth stems 
from his emphasis on action and rejection of propositional analyses of science. We might 
be motivated to accept Chang’s de-.nition of truth because it is epistemicaly accesible, i.e.
scientists are in a position to make judgements about what is true, based on what activities 
are succesful. (Chang 2017, 6).42 
So far I have atempted to reconstruct the motivation Chang has for evaluating 
science by internal standards of succes. I now turn to some tensions with this premise. 
42 Although I agree that truth should be epistemicaly available, the point is 
contentious. Psilos (1999 Introduction) explicitly rejects the idea that truth is epistemic at 
al. Within such accounts, truth might play a regulative, indirectly accesible role in science
that licenses inferences to the best explanation. 
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There are two I discus here: the -.rst concerns how widely shared the aims are; the second 
is about truth. Both of them put presure on the idea that evaluating science can be done 
internaly, i.e. that it is as subjective as Changian pragmatism suggests. 
The -.rst wory is that aims may not be best thought of as internal. If they are not 
internal, then aims could be widely shared or recognized as legitimate aims worthy of 
pursuit. One way to make this wory more direct is to suggest that there are general aims 
al scientists have. One example is truth—a metaphysicaly more robust form of truth than
coherence. But even if we found truth too commiting, there are les metaphysicaly 
commiting examples of widely shared aims. We might say, and I think it is reasonable to 
endorse the claim, that al scientists are interested in providing explanations that have as 
broad a scope and as much precision as posible. Sometimes these di0ferent aims are in 
con?@ict, but that does not preclude scientists atempting to achieve the best balance. If 
scientists do aim generaly for the best balance between con?@icting aims, then there is far 
les scope for thinking explanations are evaluated internaly.43 
There is stil room for disagreement over how to strike the best balance, but if al 
scientists are engaged in -.nding that balance, then precision and generality are candidates 
for cros-practice aims or standards, i.e. standards that are not fuly internal. This sits more
naturaly with how we might think scienti-.c explanations feature in science: an 
explanation must have general appeal. If explanations did not have this generality, the 
relevance and power of scienti-.c investigations would be mysterious and much smaler 
than we would expect. This wil feature prominently in the perspectival view I defend 
later. 
The second wory is that coherence sets the bar too low for truth, even with 
succes as a constraint, and therefore it makes truth too easy to achieve. Say I set myself 
certain aims and develop an explanation that achieves those aims to my satisfaction. My 
aims might even include some form of compatibility with empirical evidence, so it need 
not be completely divorced from worldly constraints. Provided this explanation does not 
con?@ict with my other beliefs, I am entitled to believe that this explanation is true. Truth, 
I gather, consists in no more than this and it has the advantage of being epistemicaly 
available and metaphysicaly e0-.cient. 
However, there is something mising from this line of thought. Suppose I am 
interested in explaining moving lights I see in the night sky. I can solve this explanatory 
aim by positing spacecrafL from other planets. I do not believe the only inteligent life is 
from Earth, so this explanation con?@icts with no other beliefs and it also achieves my 
43 See Masimi (2017) for a recent discusion of balancing between con?@icting explanatory 
virtues. 
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explanatory aim. This explanation could therefore be considered true by the pragmatist 
analysis and it even accords with some empirical evidence: there are moving lights in the 
sky that cal for explanation. However, an explanation invoking alien spacecrafL is 
implausible because there is no other evidence for aliens (note that one could not prove 
the non-existence of them) and there is extensive evidence for airplanes or satelites, which 
also have lights. Yet because positing aliens satis-.es an explanatory aim with coherence, the
explanation is true according to the pragmatist. We -.nd ourselves in this puzzling position
because to rule out implausible views, one might need to consider a broad range of 
evidence, but if aims are set internaly, and subjectively, then one can be as selective as one 
pleases. There is no obligation to consider the fact that there is poor evidence for aliens 
and extensive evidence that airplanes ?@y at night with lights on.
Although simplistic, su0-.cient detail could be added to this toy example to show 
that succes and coherence are weak constraints on scienti-.c theorizing. We need a 
constraint that is not so easily speci-.ed subjectively and internaly to a practice, otherwise 
extensive odd and unscienti-.c claims could be true according to this coherence view. 
To recap, the pragmatist of Chang’s persuasion is interested in analysing science in
terms of activities that are coherent. An activity is coherent if it is performed so as to 
achieve certain aims. One could use this to analyse activities— the things scientists do such
as explain, predict, and measure—in terms of their succes. Whether an activity is 
succesful is relative to the aims a scientist has and these aims vary by practice. I suggested 
there were two serious wories we might have about evaluating activities in this way. The 
-.rst was that aims are subjective and the other is that coherence is a weak constraint on 
truth when aims are subjective. Perspectivism wil avoid these isues by o0fering a more 
robust and inter-subjective evaluative tool.
5.1.3. Premise 3: Systems o+ practice and their asociated goals cannot always be 
ranked or evaluated in terms o+ one another 
Premise 3 folows from premise 2 with one additional asumption. If activities are 
evaluated only by internal standards, then there are no extra-practice standards with which 
we can compare activities. The pragmatists here claim that systems of practice cannot be 
ranked because judgements are evaluated within these particular systems. There are no 
extra-practice criteria for giving greater weight to some aims over others. As such, it is 
posible for con?@icting judgements to arise when two or more judgements are asociated 
with di0ferent systems. In such cases, the con?@ict is realy just apparent, because each 
judgement achieves equal succes through the evaluation by each separate epistemic 
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system. AfLer providing some motivation the pragmatist may have, I wil argue this 
premise is not waranted because historical evidence does not support it and because the 
basis on which we evaluate claims is more widely shared than the pragmatist requires, so 
there are historical and philosophical grounds for rejecting this claim. As for premise 2, the
philosophical problem concerns internalism about evaluation. 
One motivation for this premise is, strangely, that the alternative is harder to 
establish. The alternative is the claim that practices can be ranked and providing such a 
ranking demands some independent strategy that is not deeply sensitive to a particular 
practice. Changian pragmatism negates the need for such a strategy.
Another strength of this premise is that it provides an explanation for why past 
practices were abandoned, but without a “Whiggish” interpretation of the past, i.e. an 
interpretation that asumes the past is directed toward the future. The explanation is that 
past practices were abandoned because they failed by their own internal standards. For 
example, scientists have chosen not to pursue geocentric astronomy, but they have done so
not because geocentrism fails by heliocentric standards or an external standard, but 
because geocentrism, by its own internal standards, has not alowed scientists to achieve 
their aims. The practice stopped yielding succeses. This response gives us a way to reject 
systems without appealing to criteria external to the practice. 
Despite these motivations there are two serious wories that I think the pragmatist
does not have the resources to addres. One wory is that historical cases do not actualy 
provide the support Changian pragmatism suggests. Disagreements and controversies 
tend to be resolved, suggesting there is a way to evaluate con?@icting claims in a compeling 
way. Emerging from the chemical revolution was a commitment to studying oxygen. It is 
di0-.cult to imagine how we could characterize the debates during the Chemical 
Revolution as anything other than resolved. This cals for explanation, a cal that cannot 
be answered with satisfaction by the pragmatist, who argues that there is no need for 
resolution because phlogiston and oxygen were equaly succesful. But if each was equaly 
succesful by their own standards, why was there disagreement and then resolution?
In addition to the historical wory, there is a philosophical wory, motivated in 
part by the historical wory. It strikes me that although there may be a number of values 
and aims in science, these values and aims are not practice-speci-.c and are consequently 
more widely shared than Changian pragmatism requires. I also discused this in the 
previous section and chapter 3. The wory is that it is hard to imagine, regardles of their 
practice, scientists rejecting the values of scope and precision. It is also hard to imagine 
how they could reject the need to explain the phenomena that fal under their purview. 
There is a paralel in this argument to Davidson’s criticism of conceptual schemes (1984). 
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Davidson argues that merely considering another supposed scheme would require 
bringing that scheme within our own scheme, undermining the supposition that they 
could be di0ferent. Common to Davidson and the argument here is a scepticism about our 
ability to entertain candidates for other modes of thought, reasoning, or cognition. My 
point here is that without an ability to understand the appeal of a scienti-.c explanation, 
we could not accept that it as scienti-.c. And if that is corect, it is not so plausible that 
there could be rival systems with alternative modes of reasoning, i.e. that use very di0ferent
standards for evaluating explanations. 
There are stil resources for motivating disagreement, even if we reject the 
pragmatist analysis. Chang claims that phlogiston chemists wanted to explain the 
properties of metals and the oxygen chemists wanted to explain weight data with more 
precision. However, it is not the case that oxygen chemists thought the properties of 
metals were not worth explaining, they just gave greater emphasis to other problems. We 
should not conclude, as the pragmatist does, that disagreement is to be understood in 
terms of di0ferent aims, rather we should understand it as di0ferent emphasis on aims, 
which is a much more super-.cial form of disagreement, one which does not preclude 
more widely shared aims and values. 
There is some motivation for this premise that rival explanations cannot be ranked
when they satisfy di0ferent aims. However, there are two serious wories, historical and 
philosophical, about characterizing disagreement in this way. I argued we are not 
waranted in accepting this premise.  
5.1.4. Conclusions about Changian Pragmatism
I have provided motivation for several premises that support a form of pragmatic 
pluralism about scienti-.c practice as defended by Chang. The conclusion of these premises
is that we should be pluralist about science, speci-.caly about the epistemic systems to 
which scientists belong, which Chang describes in terms of activities oriented toward 
achieving aims. This conclusion folows because if scientists are performing di0ferent 
epistemic activities (1) and if those activities are evaluated internaly by di0ferent standards 
(2) that cannot be evaluated in terms of other standards (3), then we should be pluralist 
about those practices (conclusion). This argument gives an interesting, but ultimately 
unsatisfactory account of disagreement.
I suggested there were several serious wories about this account, mostly asociated
with internalism about succes and evaluating science. They apply to premises 2 and 3. If 
these wories are as serious as I claim, then we may need to rethink pragmatic pluralism 
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along di0ferent lines (perhaps lines more akin to those defended by Sandra Mitchel’s 
integrative pluralism) and in so doing, we may -.nd other perfectly good and valid reasons 
for endorsing pluralism. Until we do that, however, we should be very reluctant to accept 
pragmatic pluralism. Let us now consider another wel-known argument for pluralism 
that takes the path of relativism. Ultimately this view shares some of the same di0-.culties 
we saw with Changian pragmatism. 
5.2 Relativism
This section lays out and argues for another pluralist analysis of science: relativism. Unlike 
Changian pragmatism, relativism as discused here takes a propositional approach, which 
may give it an appeal that Changian pragmatism lacks. The view is also motivated by cases 
of disagreement and controversy and shares some similar general commitments with 
Changian pragmatism. I show the argument structure and then discus why the relativist is
motivated to accept the premises.44 However, the relativist, like the pragmatist, is too 
subjective and internal. The relativist argument that I shal analyse can be summarised as 
folows:45 
1. There are di0ferent epistemic systems de-.ned by di0ferent epistemic standards. 
2. Judgements are justi-.ed relative to the internal standards of each epistemic system.
3. Epistemic systems cannot always be ranked or evaluated independently.
C. We should endorse epistemic pluralism.
5.2.1. Premise 1 There are di1erent epistemic systems de:ned by di1erent 
epistemic standards
Premise one claims that any given scientist has a set of beliefs and that a subset of those 
beliefs are not necesarily shared by any two scientists. This may seem trivialy true and a 
premise that realists and monists about epistemic systems could accept. But the relativist is
interested in a particular set of beliefs that are les straightforwardly divided into separate 
systems: those asociated with the principles one holds true and exemplars—an approach 
or method that scientists accept as reliable, exemplary, the standard by which other 
methods or approaches are to be judged. These elements of an epistemic system—
44  I take my discusion of relativism to be compatible with Kusch’s defense 
of relativism (Kusch and Kinzel 2018; Kusch 2015, 201), though they may apply to Bloor as
wel (David Bloor 2004, 1999, 2005)
45  See for example Boghosian 2006 for a reconstruction of the relativist 
argument along these lines. Kusch and Kinzel make this argument as wel in (2018, 66).
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principles and exemplars—are elements that members do not by de-.nition chalenge. We 
can think of principles as general propositions that, together with evidence, entail beliefs 
we should endorse (Wright 2008, 384). Accepting a principle and accepting some evidence 
consequently determines what relevant beliefs one should have.
There are some important similarities and di0ferences between the relativist and 
the Changian pragmatism discused earlier. Both positions take as their -.rst premise the 
existence of separate epistemic systems. However, the relativist places les emphasis on the 
role of goals and the structure of activity and much more emphasis on beliefs. Both 
consider elements of the epistemic system beyond chalenge. But for the pragmatist it is 
the aims and succeses of particular scientists that are beyond question and for the 
relativist it is the justi-.catory principles asociated with that system.
This reliance on principles is problematic and for reasons akin to those that Chang
faces in his -.rst premise. I discus two problems for thinking that principles can give 
relativists justi-.cation for positing di0ferent epistemic systems. I -.rst argue principles are 
widely shared and then that principles do not have the kind of special status the relativist 
requires. Without the special status, di0ferences in beliefs do not amount to di0ferences in 
epistemic systems. Both arguments show that the relativist overplays epistemic di0ferences.
To get the relativist thesis motivated, it must be the case that di0ferent epistemic systems 
with di0ferent principles do or could exist and there is just insu0-.cient reason for thinking 
this could be true. 
5.2.1.1 First problem for relativism
Epistemic justi-.catory principles, the -.rst criticism goes, are actualy more widely shared 
than the relativist suggests. A number of philosophers have pushed this line. Boghosian 
develops this criticism in his (2007, 85–86). Masimi (2018) also argues that principles of 
this kind must be cros-perspectival, i.e. apply acros epistemic contexts. And Wright
(2008, 388–89) argues that the acceptance of epistemic standards cannot be understood 
using only relativist conceptions of truth. Kusch has extensively responded to Boghosian 
so I wil focus on this exchange in what folows. 
Boghosian (2007, 85) has argued that the di0ferences in principles we see are just 
derived instances of more general principles that are either universal or practicaly so. For 
example, the belief that a telescope gives reliable evidence about the moon is an instance of
a more general principle about the reliability of observation. This is a problem for the 
relativist because if principles do not vary acros epistemic contexts, then there may be 
only one epistemic system. Claiming justi-.cation is relative to that one system is then no 
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longer such a special claim for the relativist because al epistemic agents are part of the 
same system. 
Kusch rebu0fs this position in several ways (2017, 4699–4701). One response is 
particularly strong: when two people are part of di0ferent epistemic systems, it is di0-.cult 
to -.nd common principles that they would both endorse. This di0-.culty stems from the 
fact that any candidate for a shared principle is likely to be heavily abstracted from the 
particular case and, if it were heavily abstracted, the principle would not provide any 
bridge between the epistemic systems. General principles, in other words, do not preclude 
divisions between epistemic systems because they are too abstract to have a role in the 
disagreement. A necesary function of standards—as Boghosian envisions them—is to 
determine what beliefs to endorse. 
 Kusch (Ibid.) ilustrates this point by appealing to a disagreement between 
Cardinal Belarmine and Galileo. The former believed the bible was a source of evidence 
that could trump observation whereas Galileo believed the opposite, that observation 
trumped the bible. We might say that they disagreed over the principle (B1) “the bible is 
the best source of evidence.” Belarmine endorsed this principle while Galileo endorsed the
principle (G1) “observation is the best form of evidence.”46 Kusch suggests there is no 
more general principle that encompases these di0ferent propositions that Belarmine and 
Galileo would endorse, therefore Boghosian is wrong to suggest particular principles are 
derived from general principles.
We might -.nd Kusch’s response a bit quick because of a problem related that 
facing Changian pragmatism: how should we distinguish between di0ferent systems? I wil
argue that in the case of relativism, it is not clear that principles can provide a way to make 
this distinction. They cannot -.l this role because they cannot be unambiguously 
formulated in the right way. If they cannot be unambiguously articulated, how can they 
give us a de-.nitive way to distinguish epistemic systems? I think they cannot. 
I contend that how we formulate the principles that disagreeing people endorse 
could dramaticaly a0fect whether we conclude there are multiple epistemic systems. Say, 
for example, that we reformulated Belarmine’s (B1) principle as 
(B2) The bible is always the best source of evidence and when the bible provides 
no evidence, observation is acceptable. 
46 These formulations of historical principles, and the others that folow, are entirely 
hypothetical. Part of the purpose in characterizing beliefs in this way to show how 
esentialy speculative an analysis that appeals principles is (and hence unreliable). 
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Next let’s reformulate Galileo’s (G1) principle as: 
(G2) The bible is almost always the best source of evidence and observation is 
sometimes beter.
I have reformulated Galileo’s hypothetical principle in this way because it is just as 
compatible with empiricist science as the previous principle (G1). However, the crucial 
di0ference is that (G2) does not outright reject the value of the bible as a source of 
evidence. If Galileo did endorse (G2), then the divide between Galileo and Belarmine is 
not very profound because both accepted the value of the bible as evidence. The main 
di0ference would then be that Galileo put constraints on biblical evidence whereas 
Belarmine did not. If this is corect, their disagreement is not the result of di0ferent 
principles, but concerns the scope of a single principle, namely when the bible is the best 
source of evidence. They would, therefore, be part of the same epistemic system, which 
contradicts relativism. 
In suggesting Galileo and Belarmine endorsed the same principles, I am not 
necesarily agreeing with Boghosian’s criticism. I take Boghosian to endorse principles 
that determine in a strong sense what beliefs a rational agent must have. I reject this strong 
determining role: there is stil scope for disagreement even when principles are shared 
because the scope and application of them is not given. If there were not this scope, it 
would be di0-.cult to imagine how a rational disagreement could take place. This lack of 
clarity stems from the fact that, according to Boghosian’s view, the beliefs one should 
hold are determined by principles and evidence. This is an uncharitable view of 
disagreement and fails to tel us why disagreements take place and how they are resolved. 
However, there is another important di0ference between Boghosian’s and my 
criticism of relativism. I am not suggesting Belarmine and Galileo de:nitively shared the 
same principles, which Boghosian does.47 Although I think it is likely they shared a 
number of principles, I am merely trying to show that sharing principles is just as plausible
as not sharing principles. This is because the principles can be drasticaly reformulated so 
as to show more or les di0ference and it is plausible that those who disagree would accept 
the reformulations. 
There are two conclusions I draw from this discusion of reformulating principles.
First, it may be easy to re-examine cases where disagreement seems profound and to -.nd 
that the disagreement is actualy quite shalow, which undermines the strength of the 
47  General principles are shared propositions that state under what 
conditions a belief is justi-.ed (Boghosian 2007, 85). In being general, such principles are 
distinct from the particular beliefs particular people hold. 
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relativist conclusion. Whether this is posible wil depend heavily on the case and how 
plausible it is that we can characterize it as a shalow disagreement. I am not suggesting this
is always posible, but I do think it is plausible. 
Second, the very fact that minor changes in our principles have profound 
consequences for our philosophical view should strike us as odd. We may then have this 
concern: can principles be so precisely articulated that they form the basis for a relativist 
account? I think the answer is no. For example, which of the folowing would Galileo 
endorse?
(i) The bible is almost always the best source of evidence; when it is not the 
best source of evidence, observation is best. 
(i) The bible is always inferior to observation as a source of evidence
In order to justify some claims, the di0ference between these two principles is moot. 
However, many claims would be justi-.ed very di0ferently if we endorsed (i) and not (i) or 
vice versa. The problem becomes quite serious if there were insu0-.cient evidence to 
accurately reconstruct the principles di0ferent people have. For example, we may just have 
too litle evidence to know whether Galileo endorsed (i) or (i)—perhaps he never clearly 
and explicitly stated his principles. He might not even have known which he endorses; the 
question may never have arisen for him. If it is corect that principles are di0-.cult to 
discern, then they may not be the kind of thing relativists can rely on to justify the 
existence of independent epistemic systems. 
There is further reason for doubting the existence of fuly independent epistemic 
systems. It is not clear that someone could be guided by principles that are di0ferent from 
ours because any deviation from our principles would just be a case of irationality. 
Boghosian discuses this chalenge (2007, 108–10) and Kusch has not adequately 
responded to it.48 This is a serious wory that puts presure on the claim that there are or 
could be multiple epistemic systems. 
5.2.1.2 The second problem for relativism
I have argued for one problem that Kusch faces. I now turn to the other, which is that 
epistemic principles are not su0-.ciently di0ferent from any other beliefs. The main feature 
48  This problem is also related to Davidson’s (1984) argument against the 
posibility of alternative conceptual schemes. By merely considering a candidate 
conceptual scheme, we bring that supposed scheme under our own. See my discusion of 
Davidson in 5.1.2.
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of an epistemic principle, for the relativist, is that it provides a norm for evaluating claims, 
but is not itself in need of justi-.cation and so is not open to question or chalenge. 
However, I contend that even if there are some beliefs that are not chalenged by those 
who hold them, one could stil chalenge them if given reason to do so. If this is right, then
there is no profound distinction to be made between principles and other beliefs. 
Consider once again Galileo’s principle that (G1) observation is always the best source of 
evidence. What makes this belief special, i.e. a principle? Certainly it is the kind of belief 
that in most cases we would not expect to chalenge. AfLer al, observation typicaly gives 
us no di0-.culties. If observation leads me to believe there is a cup on the table, I can use 
that belief to inform future action; I can pick the cup up, avoid knocking it over, pour 
water into it, etc. Chalenging G1, in cases like this, would be a very puzzling chalenge. 
What would doubt about G1 amount to, if I can pick up the cup, knock it over, etc.? 
However, just because I am normaly not in a position to doubt G1 does not mean 
I am never in a position to doubt it. Distant objects or unfavourable conditions can lead 
me to rely on other sources of evidence. Doubting G1 in these contexts would be quite 
reasonable. Such contexts may be rare, suggesting for most purposes G1 is adequate and 
that generaly G1 is not subject to chalenge. But al this shows is the robustnes of G1, not 
that G1 occupies a special status as a principle on every occasion. One cannot doubt every 
belief al at once and one needs reason to doubt something, but presenting with the right 
context, but my argument suggests that principled beliefs do not di0fer in kind from other 
beliefs. 
What does this criticism amount to? It suggests that disagreements over principles,
which are fodder for relativists, need not be very deep disagreements because they are just 
disagreements over beliefs, which al disagreements are, in a sense. If we accept this, then 
disagreements that seem to involve principles could, in principle, be resolved and they 
might not be in principle sustainable.
Is this a fair criticism of Kusch’s relativism? It may not seem so because Kusch 
does acknowledge that relativism is not commited to the idea that disagreements cannot 
be resolved. However, he does admit relativism is commited to two serious claims: (i) 
disagreements are in principle sustainable and (i) the outcome of the disagreement is 
contingent. However, if principles are posible to criticise, even if in practice they 
sometimes are not, then (i) and (i) are problematic. (i) is problematic because if principles 
can be chalenged just as any other beliefs, then there is no reason to think disagreements 
stemming from di0ferent principles are any more sustainable than any other disagreement 
because, in e0fect, these disagreements over principle are not di0ferent in kind from any 
other disagreement. (i) is problematic because if principles can be chalenged, then any 
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disagreement over them is probably going to be temporary, unsustainable, and not very 
deep. 
I have given the relativist argument that scientists are part of epistemic systems 
that are constituted by beliefs and goals and that di0ferent scientists are sometimes 
members of di0ferent such systems. I gave some motivation for thinking we should accept 
this premise. I pointed out some di0ferences and similarities between relativism and 
Changian pragmatism. Both are commited to some contextual unit of scienti-.c practice, 
but the relativist is more interested in judgements and justi-.cation and, therefore, beliefs. I
ended by arguing that principles, which I believe Kusch relies on to justify the existence of 
independent epistemic systems, may not be able to provide this role for the relativist. If 
my wories are wel founded, then there is reason to doubt the power of a relativist 
analysis of science. 
5.2.2. Premise 2 Judgements are justi:ed relative to the internal standards o+ 
each epistemic system
The commitment here is that the justi-.cation for beliefs is always situated within an 
epistemic system. Kusch argues for this position in his recent defence of relativism (2017, 
4697). I discus what this premise might mean, how it di0fers from what pragmatists are 
commited to, and why it might be a problem. 
On its own, this premise can be given a mild reading: scientists in one epistemic 
context can only justify their judgements by appeal to what is epistemicaly available to 
them in that context. The only claims of interest here are those within rational space, those
that scientists can support with reasons.49 It bears close resemblance to the pragmatist 
premise 2, that evaluations are always within an epistemic system. An important di0ference
is that the relativist ties justi-.cation to beliefs whereas the pragmatist ties them to aims 
without emphasis on beliefs. The pragmatists, in other words, need not appeal to what a 
scientist believes when evaluating a claim. Consequently, the pragmatist is more interested 
in suces and the relativist in justi:cation. The former asks, “does this explanation achieve 
the aims I set out” whereas the epistemic relativists asks, “given my curent state of 
knowledge, is this belief justi-.ed”? Relativists can also be fuly propositional in their 
49 Relativism can, in principle, cover a broader domain than this. Maters of taste, 
for instance, may not qualify under this brand of relativism if we consider maters of taste 
mere sensation reports. This is because these reports would not be subject to rational 
support. If we considered such judgements subject to rational support, however, then 
taste may fal within the domain of relativism. Restricted to the scienti-.c domain, it is easy
to -.nd examples of justi-.cation that are tied to particular epistemic systems. This is the 
form of relativism I consider here. 
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characterization of scienti-.c disagreement, whereas pragmatists can include experiments, 
models, instruments, and other features of scienti-.c practice. 
As an example to ilustrate the relativist claim, consider again the history of 
physical sciences. Scientists in the early 19th century epistemic context could not provide 
any justi-.cation for claims about electrons because electrons were not part of the epistemic
context until much later in the century; they could, however, make claims about 
quantities of electricity50, just not in the sense of an electron as a wave or excitation in a 
-.eld. Natural philosophers during this earlier time consequently could have had no beliefs 
or explanatory aims asociated with electrons. The general leson to draw from this is that 
any particular justi-.cation, because it depends on having certain beliefs, concepts, and 
sources of evidence, is only posible in certain contexts.
Relative justi-.cation, given this mild reading, need not be controversial. 
However, if given a stronger internal reading, this premise is problematic, for reasons 
similar to those facing Changian pragmatism. The isue with Changian pragmatism 
premise 2 was that evaluation was too subjective. Similarly, if we give internal justi-.cation 
a highly subjective reading—such as al scientists can specify their own standards for 
evaluating judgements—then we may have a problem. Relativists like Kusch want to do 
this when analysing disagreement. Disagreeing scientists have enough in common to -.nd 
one another’s views unsatisfactory, but di0fer enough to -.nd resolution out of reach. The 
di0ference is that their justi-.catory practices are based on di0ferent principles, which are 
beyond question, so disagreement can continue inde-.nitely. 
The stronger reading of this premise depends upon accepting premise 1, that 
di0ferent scientists occupy di0ferent epistemic systems when their principles di0fer. I 
already argued premise 1 was di0-.cult to accept, so I wil not discus principles more here. 
Without that other premise, relative justi-.cation need not be ino0fensive because we can 
give it a mild reading. 
However, there is reason we might want to give this premise a strong reading. It 
comes from a discusion of what Fogelin, inspired by Witgenstein and Putnam, caled 
deep disagreement (1985). There has since been extensive literature on disagreements of 
this kind—see for example (Lugg 1986; Turner and Wright 2005; Godden and Brenner 
2010). The general idea is that some types of disagreement cannot be resolved rationaly 
because such resolution requires extensive shared background, such as shared beliefs about
evidence, that is necesary for resolving the disagreement. When there in insu0-.cient 
shared background, resolution is imposible. This background is what the relativist cals 
the epistemic context.
50 See Stoney (1883) for an early example of atempts to quantify units of electricity.
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Relativists apply deep disagreements to science by atempting to identify beliefs 
that are not shared between disagreeing scientists: such beliefs, they postulate, preclude 
resolving the scienti-.c disagreement. Kusch does this with case studies from the history of 
science (2015; 2018) These beliefs, principles or standards, provide guidance on how best to
go about acquiring knowledge of the facts. How plausible this analysis is wil depend 
upon how seriously one takes the posibility of fundamentaly di0ferent beliefs. If the 
di0ference is too fundamental, then Davidson’s criticism of conceptual schemes would 
apply. If the di0ference is not that fundamental, it may not be deep enough to motivate 
the relativist. These are, however, only applicable to the strong reading. 
There is one objection that may apply to even a mild reading: relativism is 
commited to internalism about justi-.cation and thus sets the bar too high for what can 
be known. Lewens (2005, 575) raises this very problem against relativism. The isue is that 
internalism supposedly requires that potential knowers, to have knowledge, must prove 
the reliability of their justi-.cation. Such a proof, Lewens argues, cannot be developed in a 
non-circular way. This suggests that one need not know the reliability of one’s justi-.cation
in order to have a true belief, which in turn suggests that the truth or falsity of one’s beliefs
is independent of the epistemic context in which they feature. Reliability provides a kind 
of universal tool for justifying beliefs and principles and the epistemic context are 
irelevant. 
There are two things a relativist could say in response to the externalist criticism. 
The -.rst is that it’s not clear why an internalist about justi-.cation would require proof. 
The externalist has asumed that internalism sets the bar very high for justi-.cation, but in 
fact relativists are interested in the appropriatenes of belief, which does require some 
epistemic relationship between a potential knower and justi-.cation, but this relationship 
can fal far short of proof. 
The second response the relativist might give to an externalist concerns how 
reliability is established and whether there is a genuine external alternative. Externalists 
tend to be reliabilist about justi-.cation: a belief is justi-.ed if it is produced by reliable 
mechanisms. And reliability we usualy understand in terms of succes (say empirical 
succes) (Lewens 2005, 570). But the reliabilist has smuggled in a crucial concept: succes. 
And they have done so without specifying what counts as succesful. For relativists, what 
counts as succesful is going to vary according to the epistemic context. If that is corect, 
then what counts as reliable and what counts as justi-.cation wil also vary. Whether a 
belief is justi-.ed is therefore tied to the epistemic context. This leaves us with the original 
claim of interest to the relativist: whether beliefs are appropriate or not in the relevant 
epistemic context. 
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This discusion suggests that the externalist criticism of relativism needs further 
development to be serious. As it now stands, externalists leave un-analysed key features of 
justi-.cation that are only grist to the relativist mil. 
I have given the argument for the second premise in the relativist’s argument, 
which is that justi-.cation is relative to an epistemic system. The relativists are interested in 
whether a justi-.cation is appropriate or not and this, they contend, depends upon the 
epistemic context of the scientist o0fering the justi-.cation. This becomes interesting when 
two con?@icting judgements arise, which are equaly justi-.ed relative to di0ferent epistemic 
systems. I argued that externalist wories about justi-.cation are not serious for the 
relativist. There are strong similarities between this premise and Chang’s premise 2. Both 
are commiting to an evaluation of scienti-.c claims within the epistemic context in which 
they are made. If we give this premise a mild reading, then endorsing it is not di0-.cult. 
However, stronger readings give us the same problems Changian pragmatism faces. 
 
5.2.3. Premise 3: Epistemic systems cannot always be ranked or evaluated 
independently
This premise, along with premise 1, does much of the work establishing the relativist 
thesis. It suggests that di0ferent epistemic systems cannot be ranked or evaluated neutraly. 
It might be that some systems can be clearly ranked, but this is imposible for certain 
forms of disagreement. Consequently, there are no system-independent reasons or neutral 
facts that would compel someone to switch from one system to another. In other words, 
one cannot be compeled on rational grounds to adopt one system over another or to 
switch from one system to another. I suggest that there are at least three reasons for 
accepting this premise. Even though these reasons can give some strong motivation for this
premise, I end by arguing that it cannot do the kind of work the relativist needs it to. 
The -.rst motivation for this premise stems from the di0-.culty of providing a 
neutral ranking. Ranking is not neutral because any ranking just emerges from the 
con-.dence we have in a particular system—our own epistemic system—which does not 
o0fer neutrality. Any ranking we make, in other words, we always make from within a 
particular system and that system is going to taint our ranking, making it non-neutral.
The second motivation for this premise is the fact that those who disagree do not 
accept the opposing view. Epistemic humility, if there is such a thing, suggests restraint 
when ranking. I might believe in a set of principles and think they are beter than the 
alternatives, but those who disagree obviously do not share my beliefs. There may, at 
times, be no rational way to arbitrate. If there is indeed no way to arbitrate, then it seems 
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no neutral ranking is posible. I take it that a neutral ranking is an evaluative tool that al 
parties can, or should, endorse. This is the whole point in having a neutral ranking. If not 
al parties do accept the ranking, we have reason to doubt the evaluative tool is neutral. If 
al the ranking does is convince us and vindicate our beliefs, then it only a0-.rms our 
existing beliefs and does litle else for those who disagree. In other words, the very fact that
there is disagreement suggests ranking epistemic systems is problematic. This criticism 
trades on two rival views of epistemic disagreement: the steadfast and conciliatory views. 
The steadfast view (Rosen 2001; van Inwagen 1999) believes it is reasonable to stick to 
one’s beliefs even in the face of disagreement. The conciliatory view (Christensen 2007; 
Feldman 2007) argues the opposite: that the very fact someone disagrees with us should 
prompt us to revise our beliefs. If one endorses the conciliatory view, then the very fact 
that someone disagrees with us should prompt us to revisit the beliefs we hold. This is 
because presumably those who disagree with us do so in part because they rank their own 
system higher than ours. But we in turn rank our own system higher. If we then thought 
our beliefs were not necesarily beter than those held by others (including our beliefs 
about which ranking is beter), then the posibility of a neutral ranking is tenuous. 
However, if one were a steadfast epistemologist, this argument would not be compeling. 
But steadfast epistemologists are unlikely to be sympathetic to relativism because such an 
epistemologist does not feel the beliefs of others need prompt change or evaluation of 
their own beliefs. 
I o0fered three motivations for the premise that epistemic systems cannot always 
be ranked neutraly. I -.rst argued that the con-.dence we might have in a particular system 
does not alow us to rank that system relative to others, at least on occasion. I then 
suggested there is no neutral, context-free means for evaluating epistemic systems when 
there is disagreement. Finaly, I argued that con?@ict arises at the level of particular 
judgements, but not at the level of epistemic systems on the whole, which prevents our 
ability to rank them in a straightforward way. 
Now I wil discus some reasons why this premise might fail, despite these 
motivations. The -.rst, which I raised during the discusion of premise 1, is that there is 
insu0-.cient basis for thinking there are di0ferent epistemic systems of the kind the relativist
needs to get their thesis o0f the ground. If there are no such systems, then ranking, 
neutraly or otherwise, is not posible because there is nothing to rank. This should be a 
serious wory for the relativist. But there are two further wories. The -.rst wory is that 
the relativist has confused the di0-.culty of evaluating some beliefs with the thesis that 
those beliefs cannot be evaluated at al. The second wory is that the imposibility of a 
neutral ranking does not support the relativist position.
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First let us consider the wory about evaluating beliefs. Much of scienti-.c evidence
is not proof. This means that there is logical room for alternative explanations or 
interpretations of the same body of evidence. Boghosian discuses this very brie?@y in the 
context of underdetermination (2007, 127). I would like to develop it in a more speci-.c 
direction. 
The relativists take the existence of rival scienti-.c beliefs as support for rival 
epistemic systems. The relativist asumes, and has some evidence that, those who disagree 
are peers in good epistemic positions. Belarmine had very good reasons for his beliefs and 
Galileo had very good reasons for his beliefs. In such cases, it seems ranking these beliefs 
neutraly is imposible because each has reasons for endorsing them. The relativist here is 
taking a view similar to the one that Ruth (2013) defends about disagreement. The view is 
that one can rationaly remain steadfast in their view when disagreeing with a peer: two 
disagreeing scientists are peers in epistemicaly good positions and it is therefore reasonable
for them to continue holding their beliefs, even though they realise the other disagrees. 
 However, we might wonder whether we should be commited to disagreeing 
peers having good epistemic positions. This may be the case sometimes, but is it ofLen 
enough to get the relativist thesis going? Rather than think the disagreement emerges 
because there is good evidence for rival views, peers may sometimes disagree because there 
is poor evidence for both views. In other words, both parties to the disagreement could be 
in poor epistemic conditions. In such cases, it seems more reasonable to me that when 
there are rival beliefs each with justi-.cation, no one has very good justi-.cation and so must
make do with weaker forms of evidence. 
In such cases, the existence of a disagreement that is not easily resolved is best 
explained by appealing to limited information, evidence, and justi-.cation, not by 
appealing to relativism. So even if the relativist is corect in claiming a neutral ranking is 
imposible, it is imposible because there is limited justi-.cation available and thus 
uncertainty, but not because there are wel-supported rival positions that could be in 
principle sustained. If we had more information, more evidence, beter justi-.cation, then 
we might overcome the di0-.culties we had in evaluating rival beliefs. 
This is wel supported historicaly. Consider that it was once very reasonable to 
believe that the planets move in circular orbits because there was limited information and 
circular orbits -.t wel with what evidence and knowledge there was. Planets move 
cyclicaly and circular orbits would be compatible with this rough observation. However, 
this fact about the evidence available to past scientists does not provide support for the 
claim that past astronomers were in a good epistemic position. They were in a relatively 
poor epistemic position compared to where we are now. Consequently, it may once have 
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been reasonable to believe planets move in circular orbits, but that is no longer the case. So
the relativist view of disagreements does not seem right. The relativist asumes those who 
disagree are in equal and good epistemic positions, but if we thought that disagreements 
took place because of insu0-.cient evidence and a poor epistemic position, then it is not so 
obvious disagreements can be sustainable in principle.51 
Even if we set aside the status of the epistemic position, there is another wory, 
which concerns whether epistemic systems can in fact be neutraly ranked. If beliefs can be
rationaly evaluated, then this suggests that epistemic systems can at least be evaluated. 
The question remains whether the evaluation, and the ranking, can be neutral. I wil 
suggest it does not mater whether we can. If neutral ranking is posible, relativism is 
unsuccesful. However, the imposibility of a neutral ranking does not provide support 
for relativism.
Why think a neutral ranking is desirable? It may not actualy be something to 
strive for, regardles of whether it is in principle something we could achieve. For instance,
we know a lot more about the natural world now than natural historians did 200 years 
ago. It is also certainly the case that contemporary scientists wil evaluate claims di0ferently 
from their intelectual predecesors. Both of these claims suggest that contemporary 
scientists are in a beter epistemic position and that in making this judgement we are 
providing a ranking. We then might ask: is our contemporary ranking neutral? It is not 
neutral in the sense that it is informed by our curent knowledge and those who are in a 
di0ferent epistemic position would make a di0ferent ranking. But this concesion is not 
very substantial because it is likely that the contemporary evaluations we make are beter 
than the ones we would have made 200 years ago because we now know more and so are 
in the beter epistemic position. The question about ranking epistemic systems then 
becomes not one of neutrality, but one of how to be in the best position to o0fer one. And
wouldn’t the one who knows more be in the beter position to provide a ranking? 
There is one further point about this premise worth considering. The relativist 
claims that the outcome of a disagreement is contingent. We should be sceptical of this. I 
think the relativist has mistaken contingency for the fact that it may not be obvious during
a disagreement which view is corect. In such cases, it may appear that any particular 
outcome is contingent. This appearance of contingency, however, is perfectly compatible 
with one party to a disagreement being corect and another being incorect. It is also 
compatible with both being wrong or both being partly corect. And, -.naly, it is 
51  Being in a poor epistemic position wil not explain al disagreements, but 
it suggests there may be fewer instances of relativized disagreements than we might 
initialy expect. 
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compatible with one party becoming accepted as corect, even though that party is in fact 
wrong. The point here is that what appears contingent at one time may not be a good 
guide to what we later accept as true. If we endorse this, then the relativist’s point about 
the outcome of disagreements being contingent is not a very profound point. In cases 
where it seems like an outcome is contingent, it may be a temporary conclusion (perhaps 
because both outcomes seem equaly reasonable or unreasonable). It might also be that 
such apparent contingency is not a good guide to what we later accept as true. Regardles 
of how we should choose to interpret an outcome that seems contingent, there is plenty of
room to do so in such a way that avoids relativism.
5.2.4. Conclusions about Relativism
I presented three premises for the relativist view and argued against endorsing them, 
especialy 1 and 3. Against premise 1, it is not clear that di0ferent epistemic systems exist in 
the way the relativist needs them to. The problem is that the relativist relies on a 
conception of epistemic principles and such principles are di0-.cult to characterize 
substantively. The second premise—that justi-.cation is relative to the epistemic context—
may only be controversial for externalists about justi-.cation; at least if we reject premise 1. 
Rejecting premise 1 means justi-.cation need not be tied so closely to subjective and 
idiosyncratic beliefs. For the -.nal premise, that neutral ranking is imposible, I argued 
neutrality o0fers no support for relativism because such a ranking is not something we 
should strive for; so its posibility is tangential. And -.naly, I suggested that the outcomes 
of disagreements are not so highly contingent. Although some disagreements may become
protracted, it is a di0-.cult to make sense of the further claim that they are always 
contingent. 
These remarks suggest we need an account of scienti-.c disagreement that does not
take as strong a stance toward the depth of di0ference between those who disagree, but stil
gives due consideration to the context in which those disagreements take place and why 
both parties are motivated to disagree. The next section considers, and defends, a view that
I contend comes closer to these ideals. 
5.3 Perspectivism
This section defends the last view this chapter considers. Perspectivism avoids the strong 
internal evaluations that pragmatists and relativists defend (particularly in their second 
premises). I wil folow Kuhn in centring the account on taxonomy, but with key 
119
di0ferences that result in a novel approach to thinking about disagreement and change. 
The structure of the view is as folows. 
1. To participate in a practice, scientists must broadly be using the same conceptual 
taxonomy. 
2. Disagreements can emerge from rival uses of a taxonomic system, where di0ferent 
uses o0fer di0ferent perspectives.
3. Those disagreements can be resolved within an epistemic context structured by 
shared epistemic standards.
C. We should be perspectivists about disagreements and conceptual change.  
5.3.1. Premise 1: To participate in a practice, scientists must broadly be using 
the same perspectival taxonomy. 
Changian pragmatism and relativism take as their -.rst premise the commitment to
plurality, which I criticised. The problems concerned how to de-.ne what the plurality was
about. I suggested the grounds for positing the existence of rival epistemic systems were 
insu0-.cient grounds. This suggests that we need a characterization of disagreements that 
does not put those who disagree in di0ferent epistemic contexts. Consequently, the 
perspectival premise defended here starts with what scientists have in common by taking 
as its starting point the unity of scienti-.c inquiry. 
That particular form of unity is the unity asociated with scienti-.c disciplines and 
when acquiring membership of that discipline, scientists learn the use of the asociated 
terms. Working within a discipline requires knowing a number of things that interelate 
and this knowledge forms an epistemic context. A large part of this epistemic context 
consists in the terms scientists use. It obviously includes other things and activities—hence
we could cal it a practice—but I claim the terms must be learned -.rst and are of most 
interest here. These terms form a taxonomy and when scientists learn a taxonomy, they 
learn how the di0ferent things they study are related to and distinguished from one 
another. 
There are three tasks in the remainder of this section. I wil -.rst examine the points
of common ground and points of di0ferences between perspectivism and the pragmatist 
and relativist commitments. Then I distinguish my project from Kuhn’s. Lastly, I wil 
provide motivation for endorsing this premise. 
This premise shares an important commitment with the pragmatist. Both take 
activity as a starting point for analysing science. The epistemic context with respect to 
120
science therefore does not consist only in sets of beliefs, but in abilities. There are, 
however, important di0ferences between not only perspectivism and Changian 
pragmatism, but perspectivism and relativism. However, we are concerned here 
speci-.caly with the linguistic abilities asociated with the use of taxonomic terms. As 
such, this epistemic context is more closely related to the Witgensteinian view of language
(or language-games) as a practical ability.
Perspectivism I defend here speci-.es preconditions for practice membership. 
Those preconditions are the use of a taxonomic system. This claim about preconditions is 
more commiting than a trivial reading: scientists know a bunch of technical terms. Such a 
general claim does not cary the force of the premise I am defending here, which is that 
scientists must know the same set of terms, not merely that they do so. And if they do not 
do so, then they must be occupying di0ferent perspectives. This force is what clari-.es what 
membership of a practice or discipline consists in. Chang’s pragmatism and Kusch’s 
relativism do not directly addres preconditions for membership. Instead, they conclude 
on the basis of controversies and disagreements that scientists must be members of 
di0ferent epistemic systems or practices, but without addresing directly why we should 
reach this conclusion solely because disagreements exist. 
Despite the important di0ferences I noted between this premise and Changian 
pragmatism, there is an important point of similarity and that is the emphasis on activity. 
But whereas Chang focuses on activities that achieve aims, the activity asociated with 
perspectivism is the use of the taxonomic system. Because the elements of the system 
should best be understood by the use to which they are put, we can think of this account, 
loosely, as a Witgensteinian approach to scienti-.c taxonomy. This inspiration comes 
from Witgenstein’s emphasis in his later work on the use of language as a practical ability 
and on his characterization of the meaning of a word as its use. 
Another inspiration for this view is Kuhn, in particular his (1990), but the 
similarities with his view are importantly limited. Most of these di0ferences I discus in 
chapter 3, but there is one that I have not yet discused. I mean something more speci-.c 
about membership than Kuhn does. Chemists, for example, learn how to do three things 
when learning the taxonomy of their epistemic context. They learn the concept (i), they 
learn how to apply the concept (i) and thus how to distinguish various objects of study, 
and they learn how the things that fal under the concept are signi-.cant for the discipline 
(ii). The -.rst of these things, the concept, might be, say, what an element is (i.e. that it has 
a nucleus and forms molecules). In learning how to apply the concept, they learn how to 
tel elements apart from other things like compounds or particles; this is the second thing 
learned. The signi-.cance might involve how it is studied and how it relates to the other 
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study subjects. For instance, a chemist recognizes the way elements are related to 
molecules. This general understanding, of the objects of study, how they are studied, and 
how they relate to one another, forms the epistemic context of the discipline. To be a 
scientist, one is always a member of such a context. And in being a member of such a 
context, scientists have mastery of a number of practical abilities. 
This is a very di0ferent picture of taxonomy than Kuhn o0fers. Learning a Kuhnian
lexicon52 is akin to learning a language, but a language than cannot be translated (1990, 5). 
Those who know two lexicons, therefore, are bilingual, but without the ability to translate
one language to another. This picture is very di0ferent from the one perspectivism o0fers. 
A necesary part of learning a new term or language is the acquiring the ability to 
paraphrase, either using other words from the same language, or words from another 
language, a point philosophers since Davidson (1984) have made. Kuhnian lexicons do not
sit wel with this feature of learning and translating terms or languages. Perspectivism 
makes no such claims, not only because it does not commit to such a strict holism, but also
because it takes a di0ferent stance toward the meaning of that taxonomy, i.e. the meaning 
is not to be primarily understood in terms of reference, but in terms of use. 
There are two motivations for this commitment to taxonomy as practical ability. 
The -.rst is that understanding an epistemic context more generaly -.rst requires 
understanding the taxonomic elements of that practice; this is one place where 
perspectivism departs from Changian pragmatism and relativism. The second motivation 
is that examining how scientists use a taxonomy tels us much more about their practice 
than looking at theory. Let’s examine each in more detail.
Firstly, understanding the epistemic context requires understanding the 
taxonomic system of any given discipline, which has changed over time, losing and 
acquiring key parts of that system. At the same time and in lock step with these changes, 
the problems scientists face and the way they addres those problems has also changed. For
example, phlogiston has uterly dropped out of use from chemistry. Chemists no longer 
use a eudiometer to study phlogiston and no longer pose questions about phlogiston. 
Oxygen, when it entered the chemist’s vocabulary, gave rise to new questions—say about 
acidity—and the development of new techniques to addres those questions, such as 
weight measuring techniques. The main point here is that understanding the dynamics of 
52 Kuhn de-.nes a lexicon in this way: “Terms [which form a lexicon] have two esential 
properties. First, as already indicated, they are marked or labeled as kind terms by virtue 
of lexical characteristics like taking the inde-.nite article. Being a kind term is thus part of 
what the word means, part of what one must have in the head to use the word properly. 
Second - a limitation I some- times refer to as the no-overlap principle - no two kind terms,
no two terms with the kind label, may overlap in their referents unles they are related as 
species to genus” (1990, 4). 
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an epistemic context requires understanding the nuances of the conceptual system. The 
order of explanation starts with an examination of taxonomy before proceeding to other 
elements of an epistemic context, such as methods, evidence, and explanation. Therefore, I
suggest that the pragmatist and relativist equaly fail to begin their analysis of science at the
corect point because they start with the claim that there is a plurality without explaining 
what commitments one must have for membership. Perspectivism -.rst explores what it is 
to be a scientist -.rst, or at least what minimal commitments a scientist must have. 
Secondly, an examination of how scientists are using a taxonomic system tels us 
more about metaphysical commitments scientists face than an examination of theory or 
beliefs. I take it part of what we want to glean from an analysis of science is the 
metaphysical commitments that science entertains. Examining taxonomic distinctions is 
an easier way to do this than examining theory. 
Consider the folowing question: how are compounds to be distinguished from 
elements? Asking this question tels us not only which things are elements, but also what 
activities a scientist must perform in order to -.nd out. Such an answer is much more 
informative than just analysing a theory, which on its own tels us litle about the activities
asociated with a discipline or epistemic context. And on its own it tels us very litle about
what atitude scientists take towards it and what kind of interpretation we can or should 
give the theory. We can, afLer al, give theories various interpretations that each yields quite
di0ferent metaphysical conclusions. 
This question of taxonomic distinctions also tels us more than an examination of 
beliefs. One might be tempted to examine beliefs as a means to investigate metaphysical 
commitments or disagreements, which the relativist does. This, however, is not 
straightforward because it’s not clear what beliefs every scientist in a practice has. And if 
it’s unclear how widespread a belief is, how can that belief be an indicator of 
commitment? It’s also unclear what method could reveal in a satisfactory way the beliefs 
of a discipline. Interviews are one option, but not for many studies of the history of 
science. An examination of texts might, but such texts in many cases may be unable to 
help us discern commiting beliefs from con-.dence in a hypothesis. Furthermore, as van 
Fraasen has argued (1980), there is no rational mandate to take a given atitude toward 
theory, i.e. one need not think theory is true simply because it is succesful. Such an 
argument suggests theory is not a good guide to understanding ontology, or at least even if
it were necesary, it is not su0-.cient. 
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5.3.2. Premise 2: Disagreements and controversi. can emerge from rival us. of
a taxonomic system, where di1erent us. o1er di1erent perspectiv.
This premise is partly what makes this account distinctively perspectival and related to 
pluralist views. It stipulates that scientists in the same discipline or epistemic context 
generaly use in the same way the taxonomic system, but not always and not completely. I 
discus the signi-.cance of what happens when this consensus breaks down or fails to form 
and then motivate this premise. 
Uncertainty or disagreement can emerge in the use of a taxonomic system. When a
discrepancy emerges, we can cal the di0ferent rival uses of the taxonomy di0ferent 
perspectives. It departs from previous views by making no internalist claims about the 
relativity of explanation or justi-.cation, nor about how situated they are within epistemic 
systems. Instead, this premise merely states that di0ferences can emerge within a 
perspective that had previously had unity, yielding rival perspectives. However, 
perspectivism is similar to the other views in that it takes interest in disagreements and 
controversies and part of what motivates this premise is a need to beter characterize 
disagreements and controversies. 
Why might it be valuable to describe these disagreements and controversies as 
perspectival? There are three reasons. The -.rst reason stem from thinking about historical 
science. Historical cases provide support in a natural way for thinking that taxonomic 
problems are ofLen, though not always, central features of dispute. The second reason for 
describing disagreement as perspectival is that emphasis on taxonomy alows us to 
realocate some realist concerns by characterising realist questions as identity questions. 
Third, this recognizes the extent to which disagreements are situated in a wider, and 
shared, epistemic context. I discus each reason in turn. 
Historical cases provide support for this premise. As the preceding chapter argued,
a reading of the Chemical Revolution suggests chemists during the 18th century did not 
form a consensus on how to discern the simple substances from the complex and it was 
consequently unclear which things were simple and which were complex. 
This analysis di0fers substantively from other interpretations because it stipulates 
that scientists disputed only part of the system, much of which was una0fected. No one 
questioned that there were simple and complex substances, metals, acids, and airs. These 
were al widely accepted categories. And chemists were particularly interested in studying 
the properties of substances such as water, metals, and rusts, but not just properties. Some 
of their interest lay in identity questions, questions concerning what kinds of things these 
substances were. Are metals simple? Is water simple? What happens when a metal 
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becomes a calx? What is a calx? Much of the disagreement emerged from di0ferent answers 
to these questions. But regardles of the speci-.c answers one might give to these questions,
the very fact that disagreeing chemists could ask the same questions is an indication that 
chemists held most of the taxonomic system in common. Di0ferences only emerged when 
it became unclear which substances were elements. There were certainly other problems 
too, and not every disagreement takes this form, but taxonomic isues were, and ofLen are, 
some of the most presing. 
There is an important departure here from relativism and Changian pragmatism, 
which both use their second premise to establish a kind of internal justi-.cation or criterion
for succes. This second premise of the perspectival argument, however, seeks to establish 
that disagreements are inherently limited, or constrained, which leaves extensive parts of 
an epistemic system or perspective una0fected. In other words, I am rejecting the kind of 
holism that seems to underpin Kuhn’s lexicons.
I now discus how this might avoid some of the problems that realist approaches 
face when examining cases from the history of science. One way of reading the realist 
question is to question what atitude we should take toward the entities posited by 
scienti-.c theories. Although intuitive, this approach faces a number of problems, one of 
which I wil discus. It is di0-.cult, by framing historical sciences in terms of the realist 
question about existence, to form an insightful interpretation. This is because there is a 
sense in which none of the entities postulated by 18th century chemistry exist because we 
now ful or mostly reject theories from that period. But if al those theories are false, what 
insight could we gain from examining them? There might be kernels of truth that are 
preserved in later theories, but such an analysis is not sensitive to the historical context and
requires extensive reconstruction. 
These problems are avoided by shifLing the question away from existence 
considered in the abstract and toward clasi-.cation primarily. Existence claims are of 
course not without interest, but the existence or non-existence of entities cannot be 
investigated without in the proces investigating the clasi-.catory practices of the 
asociated discipline that studies them in its own historical context. This strategy sits more 
naturaly with what scientists are actualy doing and gives us resources for appreciating and
understanding what scientists in the distant past were doing and why. Rather than 
wondering whether phlogiston exists as certain realists might, the perspectivist suggests we
instead ask how scientists used phlogiston to identify certain substances and study them. 
This permits a more natural investigation of scienti-.c practice because scientists ofLen 
consider what something is rather than whether it exists. 
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Chemists were curious about what combustion consisted in, a question that does 
not involve existence but rather the nature of a natural phenomenon and how it was 
related to other phenomena such as calcination. Once this question is posed, scientists can 
then investigate whether combustion is a proces of composition or decomposition, which
is what was realy at stake. Whether phlogiston exists subsequently fals out of the answer. 
If combustion is a decomposition proces, then phlogiston is what is released (and it must 
therefore exist). If combustion is a composition reaction, then phlogiston as a substance 
does not play an explanatory role (and so we might say it does not exist). 
There are several advantages to this view over the two others. First, it makes no 
appeal to epistemic principles, which I suggested the relativist has trouble characterizing in
such a way as to motivate relativism. Perspectivism also does not in principle need a 
characterization of truth as coherence, nor does it require the tricky proces of 
disentangling very speci-.c epistemic aims that scientists have. These two merits give 
perspectivism an advantage over Changian pragmatism, whose isues I discused above. 
More generaly, I think the perspectival treatment of disagreement is intuitive in at least 
one important respect: it characterizes disagreements and controversies in such a way that 
there is reason for scientists to have disputes. The reason is that disagreeing parties are 
both invested in the disagreement because they are part of the same practice, discipline, or 
epistemic context. Everyone who is a member of such a context wil be a0fected by the 
result of the disagreement. In contrast, it is very mysterious to me why scientists would 
have cause to disagree if they are members of di0ferent epistemic contexts. 
I suggested this premise concerns di0ferences in how scientists di0ferently use a 
taxonomic system. I argued this was a reasonable premise to hold because historical cases 
seem to suggest taxonomic questions were at least sometimes important parts of disputes 
and commiting to this premise alows a change in emphasis away from a primary interest 
in existence and toward taxonomy problems primarily. These kinds of problems sit 
naturaly with important parts of scienti-.c practice. 
5.3.3. Premise 3: Those disagreements can be resolved within an epistemic 
context structured by shared epistemic standards
Changian pragmatism and relativism take as their third premise a general commitment to 
neutrality and an inability to rank systems. A wory about that general approach is that it 
suggests there is no common ground we can appeal to when trying to resolve 
disagreements and controversies. I argued this was a serious wory, which suggests we 
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should instead look for a way to characterize disagreements such that they can be resolved 
in principle. This is the motivation for positing this premise. 
This premise suggests that, even though discrepancies or disputes over parts of the 
taxonomic system emerge, they can be rationaly addresed by appeal to standards that 
transcend the boundaries of particular perspectives. So even if it becomes unclear how to 
tel apart the elements from the compounds, it is in principle posible to achieve 
resolution. I -.rst describe what these principles are and then ilustrate their application. I 
defend this characterization of principles against objections. 
A distinction may be helpful in understanding the role principles have in the 
context of disagreement. Wright (2008, 381) distinguishes between what I wil cal 
normative principl. that we consult when forming judgements and descriptive principl. 
that merely reveal paterns in our past judgements. Normative principles are the subject of 
Boghosian’s and Kusch’s views (and probably the views of other epistemic relativists). I 
think this distinction is not quite accurate. 
Let’s consider in more detail what this picture of normative principles is and why 
it is inaccurate. Wright (2008, 384) characterizes these principles as general propositions 
that state under what conditions a judgement is justi-.ed or what beliefs one should adopt 
(say when one has relevant evidence). Boghosian, Wright, and Kusch, take this to 
determine in a strong sense what judgements one must adopt—or beliefs one must adopt
—to be rational (when presented with such-and-such evidence, I must adopt such-and-
such belieS). This is certainly an unpromising approach to understanding disagreement. If 
there were such epistemic principles, it is hard to imagine, as Kusch has argued, how they 
could have any signi-.cance in actual disagreements. Once a principle is accepted, one has 
only to determine whether the right conditions obtain in order to ascertain what 
judgements one should make or what beliefs one should adopt. But if this is corect, then 
there are a vast number of people who are deeply irational because it is ofLen very unclear 
what judgements one should make or beliefs one should have. 
A beter characterization of principles is to equate them with criteria. As such, 
principles determine what considerations obtain when it becomes unclear what judgement 
is appropriate or when scientists disagree over which judgement is appropriate. By this 
view, principles tel us something about the context in which disagreements occur and the 
form those disagreements must take, but they do not stipulate what beliefs one must 
adopt in order to be rational, nor which judgements one must make. But these principles 
do have some force in that they alow for corection. They tel us what those who disagree 
must consider and, if they fail to entertain those considerations, then there is a problem 
with their reasoning. I contend that principles of this kind play a role in resolving 
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taxonomic uncertainty or disagreement and that they are consequently, in general form, 
perspective independent. Let’s examine what this looks like in context. 
As an example of the support principles might play in justifying a particular 
taxonomic use over an alternative, consider Lavoisier’s work (Lavoisier in Best 2016). He 
used weight as a new means for distinguishing elements (discused in preceding chapter). 
It was an open question at one point whether this was a reasonable choice, which gave rise 
to disputes about which things are elements. Lavoisier argued metals were elements on the
basis of weight measurements, phlogiston chemists argued the opposite (see (Kirwan 1789;
Priestley 1800). Part of this dispute involved resolving which things are elements, but the 
resolution required addresing whether weight can be used as a criterion of identity. Both 
sides of the debate gave reasons supporting their position, but the use of weight ultimately
proved the beter option, at least for a time. As discused in the preceding chapter, there 
were several distinct advantages to Lavoisier’s view and even though there was no “prooS” 
he was right, Lavoisier’s oxygen system was more precise and was more consistent with 
empirical evidence, even though it lacked scope. These are some examples of cros-
perspectival standards.
The structure of the exchange during this historical episode ilustrates the point 
that taxonomic problems can be addresed rationaly. It would furthermore be very odd if 
these general standards—such as scope, precision, and empirical consistency—were not 
standards to which one could appeal regardles of their perspective. Would any chemist, 
regardles of their prefered theory, believe that consistency with empirical data is 
undesirable or irelevant? Or that simple theories, al else being equal, are preferable to 
more complex ones? Although these di0ferent standards may come into con?@ict and so 
need judgement to balance, it seems implausible that any scientist would reject their 
appeal, regardles of the perspective they occupy. But the di0-.culties asociated with these 
standards are di0-.culties that must be overcome in the usual scienti-.c way: by careful 
experiment, analysis, and theorizing. 
The relativist at this point may claim that the historical scientists I discus were 
part of a di0ferent epistemic system from me and of course I have my own preference for 
oxygen over phlogiston, but that claim is not neutral because it is made from my epistemic
context. Consequently, the oxygen explanation is only beter to me, not beter absolutely. 
I would make two responses to this charge. The -.rst is that I don’t see how one 
could reject the broad standards discused above, regardles of when or where one lived 
and what theories one endorsed. If someone did reject them, there are grounds for 
questioning their competence as a scientist or rational agent. The standards are of course 
general and subject to di0ferent interpretations and applications, but I nevertheles do not 
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see how generality gives license for rejection. The second response I would o0fer is to 
appeal to the purpose of historical inquiry. I think an examination of historical cases is a 
worthy enterprise because it helps A understand how and why historical scientists acted as
they did and it helps A understand the general project of science and how the sciences of 
today emerged. An important feature of these motivations is that it begins with interests 
that we have today, in the present. 
Consequently, any analysis of past science, to be a satisfactory analysis, must 
provide us with an understanding of past events, which includes why they occured. If 
chemists were in fact persuaded that oxygen provided beter explanations and if we accept 
that scientists were sensitive to evidence and reasoning, then an analysis of the Chemical 
Revolution should account for this. If we give an analysis that treats historical scientists as 
irational or not subject to some of the general standards discused earlier, it becomes 
di0-.cult to see how we could cal those historical -.gures scientists at al. Such an analysis is 
not very satisfactory. 
But here is a clari-.cation about the role of standards, which I do not take to be 
equivalent to the epistemic principles of, say, Boghosian’s view: standards are not 
epistemic principles that determine in a strong sense which beliefs we must have. Rather, I 
take these standards to be necesary features of the context in which disagreements take 
place. Returning to Wright’s characterization, standards are not fuly normative (in that 
they do not dictate beliefs), nor are they fuly descriptive (by being abstractions from past 
judgements), but they cary partial features of both. They must be recognizable in cases of 
disagreement, and so have some normativity, and they do describe in general terms some 
past and present scientists have in common. Disagreements, to be such, require that those 
who disagree recognize the signi-.cance and relevance of the arguments and evidence of 
others, even if those arguments and evidence are rejected. Standards give us a way to think 
about why this appreciation is posible and what distinguishes disagreement from failed 
atempts to communicate. Two scientists who did not share standards could not recognize
that they were making an argument. 
We can motivate this premise more generaly without appeal to historical cases. 
Puestions of identity are general questions and the general form of resolution is to 
examine the existing means by which those identity questions are resolved and, when 
inadequate, to develop new methods that extend as naturaly as posible from what came 
before. The general form of this problem concerns uncertainty about what something is, 
but not, as discused under the previous premise, what exists. When faced with such 
uncertainty about identity, scientists and members of epistemic contexts generaly can and
do appeal to methods that have worked in the past for resolving that uncertainty. 
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It is important to qualify the character of rational support here. Any arguments 
for a particular way of applying a taxonomy are situated, i.e. relative to the epistemic 
context at the time and, therefore, temporal. This quali-.cation should be uncontroversial.
The arguments chemists in the 18th century gave are not necesarily the same kinds of 
arguments a contemporary chemist would give and arguments that were compeling 
historicaly may cease to be so. The notion of element is a prime example. In the 18th 
century, an element was simply that which could not be decomposed. Today every 
element on the Periodic Table of the Elements can be broken down into electrons and 
protons at the very least. And yet we stil cal it a table of elements. 
Not only are these taxonomic problems temporal, they may also not have an 
obvious solution and it may not be obvious that one could, or how one would, reach a 
solution. And so an important criticism could be leveled at this point. The relativists like 
Kusch do not deny the posibility of rational resolution, just that a particular outcome is 
necesary. If particular outcomes are not necesary, then disagreements can be contingent 
as wel as rational. Disagreements, therefore, can continue inde-.nitely in principle. Kusch 
likens this to a religious conversion, which involves a fundamental shifL in beliefs and that 
such a shifL is not compeled.
My response is twofold. First, scientists and anyone else can disagree, but the fact 
that two people have a protracted disagreement is not an argument for being in principle 
unable to -.nd resolution. Another explanation we might o0fer of such disagreements 
could appeal to either insu0-.cient information or misunderstandings. In other words, 
science is di0-.cult and it is not always obvious or easy what kind of explanation we should 
o0fer. This does not require thinking that disagreements can in principle continue 
inde-.nitely. 
Second, I’m not sure religious conversion provides an adequate standard for 
thinking about scienti-.c change. For one thing, conversion suggests the complete 
adoption of a system of [religious] beliefs in exchange for an old system of beliefs. I do not
see evidence, in this episode from the Chemical Revolution, for changes that take this 
form. Much of the change involved select beliefs. Science, although it may be hard to 
formaly specify how, builds upon its history and it does so because changes, even large 
changes, do not negate al previous belief. Scienti-.c change is much more incremental than
religious conversion. I consequently do not -.nd the conversion metaphor persuasive. 
5.3.4. Conclusions about Perspectivism
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The conclusion these premises support is that perspectivism o0fers a way for thinking 
about disagreements and conceptual change that, on the one hand, does justice to the 
historical setings in which these disagreements take place, and that on the other does not 
give way to relativism or other strong anti-realist views about science. It provides a 
characterization of certain kinds of disagreement and o0fers a mechanism in the form of 
standards whereby disagreements and controversies are resolved. 
5.4 General Conclusion
This chapter has presented three views of scienti-.c practice and the arguments for those 
views: pragmatic pluralism, relativism, and perspectivism. Al three are commited to a 
premise suggesting that elements of scienti-.c activity are restricted to a context. Although 
super-.cialy similar and motivated to addres disagreement in science, each view 
characterizes the epistemic context very di0ferently, giving rise to di0ferent conclusions. 
The pragmatist prioritizes aims and activities and is most interested in succes. The 
relativist is interested in situated and justi-.ed judgements and how those judgements are 
tied to beliefs. The perspectivist focuses on the application of a taxonomy. 
The pragmatist and relativist are commited to the idea that di0ferences cannot be 
ranked or evaluated independently. This premise does much of the work in motivating 
the non-realist aspect of these views. Perspectivism, in contrast, is commited to the idea 
that di0ferences must be resolved and can be resolved. In forming a resolution, one side of 
a debate is beter defended than another. Scientists are able to evaluate, in other words, the
positions and systems of others, regardles of whether we would asign the same relative 
evaluations to the di0ferent views in our present epistemic context. This is posible because
we, and past scientists and students of science, can and do appeal to standards that are not 
restricted absolutely to their historical context.
Changian pragmatism and relativism share much more in common than the 
perspectivist view defended here. The former two both asign disagreeing scientists to 
di0ferent epistemic contexts and both reject the ability to rank con?@icting views. 
Perspectivism has neither commitment and asigns disagreeing scientists to the same 
general context and permits contextual ranking. The -.rst two views consider the ranking 
of deep-seated features of the epistemic context, whereas the perspectivist considers only 





This thesis is an atempt to use perspectivism as a lens for furthering our understanding of
great conceptual change and disagreements in science. Because disagreements and change 
are topics that stimulate realism debates, perspectivism is a promising place to investigate. I
showed in chapter 1 some of the tensions between realists and anti-realists. Perspectivism, 
as Giere articulates it, promises to mediate between these extremes, but because he over-
generalizes the importance of models and because he leaves data unaccounted for, his view 
fals too close to anti-realism. There is, however, scope for thinking perspectivism could be
developed more productively. Mitchel has done so in the context of models and 
integration in the life sciences and I proposed to do so in the context of conceptual change 
and disagreement more generaly.
My main argument has been that disagreements and conceptual change are ofLen 
best understood as identity problems—and hence taxonomic—not problems about 
existence. Consequently understanding these topics requires an understanding of the 
distinctions that scientists make—thought of loosely as a conceptual taxonomy—and it 
requires an investigation into how taxonomic isues are addresed. The advantages of this 
approach are several. It alows for some measure of continuity acros conceptual change. It
avoids whiggish interpretations of the past by showing sensitivity to change and 
disagreement in the historical context and without importing contemporary science. 
Finaly, it provides some clari-.cation on why some disagreements are di0-.cult to resolve 
and result in great change.
The -.rst step in my analysis was to addres scienti-.c evidence. Within science, one 
typicaly expects empirical evidence, especialy in the form of data, to resolve 
disagreements, test theory, or justify theoretical change. This is the intuitive path to 
understanding conceptual change and disagreement. However, chapter 2 argued that there
is a distinction we should make between data and evidence. I make this distinction by 
arguing against relational accounts that de-.ne data in terms of evidence. Rather, data are 
representational, but are stil not mind-independent evidence because they depend upon 
the conceptual taxonomy used by the scientists. If the taxonomy changes, or features of 
the taxonomy change, then there is the posibility the data wil change as wel. 
Chapter 3 provides clari-.cation on what the conceptual taxonomy is and its 
connection to the distinctions that scientists make. I situate my view in the literature on 
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epistemic pluralism. Many existing accounts approach pluralism from a pragmatic 
position. The diversity we see in scienti-.c practice is a re?@ection of the complexity of the 
world and the diversity of aims, interests, and questions that drive scientists to investigate. 
I suggest there are some limits on this line of thought and argue we should understand 
pluralism primarily as conceptual and therefore taxonomic. I draw on resources from the 
philosophy of language, particularly Witgenstein, in making this claim. Two features of 
this account are that it takes language to be a kind of practical ability and sharing a 
conceptual taxonomy is a precondition for belonging to the same practice. If scientists do 
not share a taxonomy, this amounts to an inability to epistemicaly engage with one 
another (because the use of a taxonomy is to be understood as a practical ability). 
In chapter 4 I ilustrate the perspectival view by examining the Chemical 
Revolution. Recent historiography has given us three questions about this period that 
perspectivism can addres. The questions are: (1) was there a revolution; (2) what was 
disagreement about; and (3) was change wel motivated? I revisited experimental work on 
acids that Cavendish, Lavoisier, and Kirwan conducted as the -.rst step toward addresing 
these questions. 
I showed how di0ferences between these chemists are best understood as 
di0ferences in how they individuated substances. Lavoisier made individuations using 
weight, whereas Cavendish and Kirwan did not, even though they were al adept at the use
of the balance and weighed substances frequently. The answer to (2) is that the 
disagreement, because it concerned individuating substances, was a taxonomic problem. 
These di0ferences did not extend acros their entire experimental work, i.e. they had 
extensive shared methods, concepts, and explanatory interests. The new use to which 
Lavoisier put weight was not a revolutionary development, though it was important and 
resulted in substantive changes in chemistry. My answer to (1) is that the Chemical 
Revolution was not very revolutionary. Although there were big changes during this 
period, there was great continuity in concepts, methods, and explanatory aims. This is 
su0-.cient ground for denying there was a revolution. 
In answer to (3), I suggested there were reasonable grounds for adopting oxygen 
chemistry. The adoption was not a straightforward choice because data could not be used 
unambiguously to refute phlogiston theory. Instead, chemists had to navigate the 
disagreement using what we can describe as epistemic standards. In order for an 
explanation or method to be comprehensible and persuasive, it must be subject to an 
epistemic standard. Such standards during the Chemical Revolution included precision, 
consistency, and continuity with past methods. The use of weight -.t these standards, or 
criteria, beter than alternatives. Importantly, these standards do not determine the 
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outcome of a disagreement, but provide structure and context. So there are resources for 
resolving disagreements and these resources can have wide appeal for scientists, but data 
are not always the resources available, for reasons discused in chapter 2. 
In defending a perspectival interpretation of the Chemical Revolution, I argued 
against relativism and Changian pragmatism. In chapter 5 I contrasted those two views 
with perspectivism more abstractly by criticaly examining their commitments. Changian 
ragmatism and pluralism both struggle with accounting for the objectivity, or at least 
inter-subjectivity, of science. They place too much importance on subjective, even 
idiosyncratic, choices that scientists make over how to evaluate explanations, theories, 
models, and other products of science. As a consequence, it is mysterious how or why 
scientists would come to disagree. Another isue they face is that they suppose it is posible
to make sweeping claims about the variety of epistemic positions, while denying that there
is such a position one can occupy. Giere faced this same di0-.culty (discused in chapter 1). 
Perspectivism avoids both of these isues. It suggests disagreements arise between 
those with shared background. The evaluation of scienti-.c products is consequently 
restricted to what the individual chooses or desires, but must have broader appeal, even 
though such evaluations are always contextual. The relevant shared background that 
makes these evaluations posible is the conceptual taxonomy. I avoid the “view from 
nowhere”—which has been a clasic foil for Changian pragmatism and relativism—
because I do not take disagreements to arise between systems, but in very speci-.c contexts, 
i.e. perspectivism does not posit that there are scientists who make radicaly di0ferent 
evaluations while at the same time denying that we can make judgements about those 
evaluations (for example by ranking them). 
Perspectivism, over these 5 chapters, provides a way of thinking about 
disagreements and change in science. It shows why these isues are so di0-.cult by 
addresing the role of data and evidence in science and their dependence upon conceptual 
taxonomies. It provides clari-.cation on what disagreements are about and how they can 
be resolved, but also why resolution is ofLen di0-.cult. 
Does it, however, strike any kind of balance between realism and anti-realism, as 
promised in chapter 1? Perspectivism is compatible with two senses of realism. It satis-.es 
the minimal realist position van Fraasen describes, i.e. a commitment to truth or 
approximate truth of scienti-.c theories. That is, commitment to an explanation is not just 
a commitment to its succes: a good scienti-.c theory is a theory about the world, not just 
one that provides succesful predictions. This was not part of my argument, but 
perspectivism as I defend it is not in tension with it. 
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More importantly, Perspectivism is also compatible with Hacking’s de-.nition of 
realism. He suggests that there comes a point when the doubting existence of something 
in particular becomes pointles of even meaningles, at which point we are, in a sense, 
realists. However, if there is no cause for doubting existence, then aserting existence does 
not carve a useful distinction (1983, 53), i.e. it does not add any certainty or metaphysical 
robustnes if there is already no cause for doubt. Existence, this suggests, is not the kind of 
general or deep wory we might expect. 
My exposition of perspectivism as a taxonomic view has been in the spirit of this 
view of realism. By reframing existence isues as identity and taxonomic isues, 
perspectivism suggests there is much les scope for doubt. Where there is no doubt, there 
is no ground for scepticism about existence. Hence there is a mild realism to which we can 
be commited, even in the face of disagreement, controversy, and substantive conceptual 
change. 
Perspectivism is not, however, compatible with al forms of realism. My 
characterization of taxonomies as practical abilities may be in con?@ict with the realist 
semantic commitment, which requires terms to have extension. The metaphysical 
commitment may also sit uncomfortably with perspectivism because the realist wants to 
claim that entities exist ful stop, whereas the perspectivist suggests the realist question 
ofLen cannot be posed. This is because it is not existence that is at stake, but identity (also 
understood as how scientists clasify the parts of the world they study). Perspectivism is 
not, however, in con?@ict with the epistemic commitment (that our theories are in some 
sense true or approximately true and thus involve stronger commitment than some anti-
realists suggest). 
A number of important questions remain; and there are many further areas for 
development, both about realism generaly and about perspectivism. Some are particularly
presing. Doubt plays an important role not only in motivating realism, but also in 
motivating conceptual change. Further developing this concept would improve our 
understanding of when realist questions do sensibly arise. I have, afLer al, been suggesting 
that identity (or taxonomic) questions arise -.rst, but not that realist questions do not arise
at al. Another topic that needs further clari-.cation is the depth of the distinction between
more abstract theory and scienti-.c practice. I have devoted litle space to abstract theory in
preference to examining practice, but the two are obviously related in important ways and 
the distinction is ofLen, but not always, robust. Finaly, it is likely there are a great diversity 
of types of disagreement that are not easily captured by my view, or that are at least 
interesting and in need of di0ferent philosophical analysis. And many other disagreements,
136





Arabatzis, Theodore. (2006). Representing Electrons: A Biographical Approach to 
Theoretical Entiti.. University of Chicago Pres.
Bensaude-Vincent, Bernadete. (1992). “The Balance: Between Chemistry and Politics.” 
The Eighteenth Century 33 (3): 217–37. htp://www.jstor.org/stable/41447871.
Bergman, Torbern. (1785). A Disertation on Elective Atractions. Translated by Thomas 
Beddoes. J. Muray and Charles Eliot.
Best, Nicholas W. (2015). “Lavoisier’s ‘Re?@ections on Phlogiston’ I: Against Phlogiston 
Theory.” Foundations o+ Chemistry 17 (2). Springer Netherlands: 137–51. 
htps://doi.org/10.1007/s10698-015-9220-5.
Best, Nicholas W. (2016). “Lavoisier’s ‘Re?@ections on Phlogiston’ II: On the Nature of 
Heat.” Foundations o+ Chemistry 18 (1). Springer: 3–13.
Black, Max. (1979). “Witgenstein’s Language-Games.” Dialéctica 33 (3/4): 337–53.
Bloor, D. (2016). “Relativism versus Absolutism: In Defense of a Dichotomy.” Common 
Knowledge 22 (3). Duke University Pres: 488–99.
Bloor, David. (1999). “Anti-Latour.” Studi. in History and Philosophy o+ Science Part A 
30 (1). Citeseer: 81–12.
———. (2004). “Sociology of Scienti-.c Knowledge.” In Handbook o+ Epistemolo9, 919–
62. Springer.
———. (2005). “Witgenstein and the Priority of Practice.” In The Practice Turn in 
Contemporary Theory, 103–14. Routledge.
Blumenthal, Geo0frey, and James Ladyman. (2017). “The Development of Problems 
within the Phlogiston Theories, 1766-1791.” Foundations o+ Chemistry 19 (3). 
Springer: 241–80.
Bogen, James, and James Woodward. (1988). “Saving the Phenomena.” The Philosophical 
Review 97 (3): 303–52.
Bogen, James, and James Woodword. (2003). “Evading the IRS.” PoznaI Studi. in the 
Philosophy o+ the Scienc. and the Humaniti. 20: 223–56.
Boghosian, Paul. (2007). Fear o+ Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism. 
Clarendon Pres.
Boyd, Richard. (1991). “Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural 
Kinds.” Philosophical Studi. 61 (1–2). Springer: 127–48.
Brewer, Wiliam F, and Bruce L Lambert. (2001). “The Theory-Ladennes of Observation 
139
and the Theory-Ladennes of the Rest of the Scienti-.c Proces.” Philosophy o+ 
Science 68 (S3). University of Chicago Pres: S176-S186.
Cartwright, Nancy. (1994). “Fundamentalism vs. the Patchwork of Laws.” In Proceedings 
o+ the Aristotelian Society, 94:279–92.
———. (1999). “The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science.” Cambridge:
Cambridge University Pres.
Cavel, Stanley. (1962). “The Availability of Witgenstein’s Later Philosophy.” The 
Philosophical Review 71 (1): 67–93.
Cavendish, Henry. (1766). “Three Papers, Containing Experiments on Factitious Airs.” 
Philosophical Transactions o+ the Royal Society 56: 141–84.
———. (1921). The Scienti:c Papers o+ the Honourable Henry Cavendish: Volume II. 
Edited by James Clerk Maxwel and Joseph Larmor. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Pres.
Cetina, Karin Knor. (1993). “Strong Constructivism—from a Sociologist’s Point of View: 
A Personal Addendum to Sismondo’s Paper.” Social Studi. o+ Science 23 (3). Sage 
Publications: 555–63.
———. (2009). Epistemic Cultur.: How the Scienc. Make Knowledge. Harvard 
University Pres.
Chakravarty, Anjan. (201). “Scienti-.c Realism and Ontological Relativity.” The Monist 
94 (2): 157–80.
Chalmers, Alan. (2012). “Klein on the Origin of the Concept of Chemical Compound.” 
Foundations o+ Chemistry 14 (1): 37–53.
———. (2013). “Review of H. Chang, Is Water H2O?” Science and Education 22 (4): 913–
20.
Chang, Hasok. (2012). Is Water H2O?: Evidence, Realism and Pluralism. Springer Science
& Busines Media.
———. (2015). “The Chemical Revolution Revisited.” Studi. in History and Philosophy 
o+ Science Part A 49. Elsevier Ltd: 91–98. htps://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.1.002.
———. (2017). “Pragmatist Coherence as the Source of Truth and Reality.” Proceedings 
o+ the Aristotelian Society 17 (2): 103–22. htps://doi.org/10.1093/arisoc/aox004.
Christensen, D. (2007). “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.” Philosophical 
Review 16: 187–217.
Clark, David H., and F. Richard Stephenson. (1977). The Historical Supernovae. Oxford: 
Pergamon Pres.
Conant, James. (2005). “The Dialectic of Perspectivism, I.” Nordic Journal o+ Philosophy 6
(2): 5–50.
140
———. (2006). “The Dialectic of Perspectivism, I.” Nordic Journal o+ Philosophy 7 (1): 
6–56.
Danks, David. (2005). “Scienti-.c Coherence and the Fusion of Experimental Results.” 
The British Journal for the Philosophy o+ Science 56 (4). Oxford University Pres: 
791–807.
———. (2007). “Theory Uni-.cation and Graphical Models in Human Categorization.” 
Causal Learning: Psycholo9, Philosophy, and Computation. Oxford University Pres,
173–89.
———. (2015). “Goal-Dependence in (Scienti-.c) Ontology.” Synthese 192 (1): 3601–16.
Davidson, Donald. (1984). “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.” Inquiri. into 
Truth and Interpretation 183. Clarendon Pres Oxford: 189.
Dummet, Michael. (1993). The Se/ o+ Language. Oxford, New York: Oxford University 
Pres.
Dupré, John. (1981). “Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa.” The Philosophical Review 90 
(1): 66–90.
———. (1995). The Disorder o+ Things: Metaphysical Foundations o+ the Disunity o+ 
Science. Harvard University Pres.
———. (1996). “Metaphysical Disorder and Scienti-.c Disunity.” The Disunity o+ Science:
Boundari., Contexts, and Power, 101–17.
Feigl, Herbert, and Michael Scriven. (1957). “Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science, Volume I. The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Psychology and 
Psychoanalysis.”
Feldman, R. (2007). “Reasonable Religious Disagreements.” In Philosophers without 
Gods, edited by L. Anthony, 194–214. Oxford: Oxford University Pres.
Fogelin, Robert. (1985). “The Logic of Deep Disagreements.” Informal Logic 7 (1).
Fraasen, Bas C. van. (2008). Scienti:c Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Pres.
Fraasen, Bas C Van. (1980). The Scienti:c Image. Clarendon Library of Logic and 
Philosophy. Oxford: Clarendon.
Franklin, Alan D. (1981). “Milikan’s Published and Unpublished Data on Oil Drops.” 
Historical Studi. in the Physical Scienc. 1 (2). JSTOR: 185–201.
French, Steven. (2003). “A Model-Theoretic Account of Representation (or, I Don’t 
Know Much about Art… but I Know It Involves Isomorphism).” Philosophy o+ 
Science 70 (5). The University of Chicago Pres: 1472–83.
———. (2014). The Structure o+ the World: Metaphysics and Representation. Oxford 
University Pres.
Geo0frey, Etienne. (1718). “Table Des Di0ferents Rapports Observés En Chimie Entre 
141
Di0ferentes Substances.” Histoire de l’ Académie Royale D. Scienc.: Avec L. 
Mémoir. de Mathématique et de Physique Pour La Même Année, 202–12.
Georg Ernst Stahl. (1730). Philosophical Principl. o+ Universal Chemistry. Edited by 
Translated by Peter Shaw. London: Osborn and Longman.
Giere, Ronald N. (2006). Scienti:c Perspectivism. University of Chicago Pres.
Giere, Ronald N. (2010). “An Agent-Based Conception of Models and Scienti-.c 
Representation.” Synthese 172 (2). Springer: 269.
Godden, David M, and Wiliam H Brenner. (2010). “Witgenstein and the Logic of Deep 
Disagreement.” Cogency: Journal o+ Reasoning and Argumentation 2 (2). Centro de 
Estudios de la Argumentación y el Razonamiento: 41.
Goodman, Nelson. (1955). Fact, Fiction and Forecast. Harvard University Pres.
Goodstein, Judith R, Albert F Gunns, and Ann Underleak. (1977). The Robert Andrews 
Milikan Colection at the California Institute o+ Technolo9: Guide to a Micro:lm 
Edition. California Institute of Technology.
Green, David A, and F. Richard Stephenson. (2003). “The Historical Supernovae.” 
October 4 (1): 12. htps://doi.org/10.1016/0160-9327(77)90175-2.
Guerlac, Henry. (1966). Lavoisier—The Crucial Year. Ithaca: Cornel University Pres.
Hacking, Ian. (1983). Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy 
o+ Natural Science. Cambridge University Pres.
Hansen, Arlen. (1976). “The Dice of God: Einstein, Heisenberg, and Robert Coover.” 
NOVEL: A Forum on Fiction 10 (1): 49–58.
Hempel, Carl G, and Paul Oppenheim. (1948). “Studies in the Logic of Explanation.” 
Philosophy o+ Science 15 (2). Wiliams and Wilkins Co.: 135–75.
Holmes, Frederic L. (1995). “The Boundaries of Lavoisier’s Chemical Revolution.” Revue 
d’histoire D. Scienc. 48 (1): 9–48.
Holmes, Frederic L. (1962). “From Elective A0-.nities to Chemical Equilibria: Bertholet’s 
Law of Mas Action.” Source: Chymia 8 (1962): 105–45. htp://www.jstor.org/stable/
27757221%0Ahtp://about.jstor.org/terms.
———. (1988). “Lavoisier’s Conceptual Pasage.” Osir0 4. Department of History and 
Sociology of Science, University of Pennsylvania: 82–92.
Inwagen, P. van. (1999). “Is It Wrong Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone to Believe 
Anything on Insu0-.cient Evidence?” In Philosophy o+ Religion: The Big Nuestions, 
edited by E. Stump and M. J. Muray, 273–84. Malden: Blackwel.
Kelert, Stephen H., Helen E. Longino, and Kenneth C. Waters. (2006). Scienti:c 
Pluralism. Edited by Stephen H. Kelert, Helen E. Longino, and Kenneth C. Waters. 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Pres.
142
Kirwan, Richard. (1789). “An Esay on Phlogiston, and the Constitution of Acids: To 
Which Are Added, Notes, Exhibiting and Defending the Anti-Phlogistic Theory; 
and Annexed to the French Ed. of This Work by Mesrs. de Morveau, Lavoisier, de 
La Place, Monge, Bertholet, and de Four.” London: J. Johnson.
Kirwan, Richard. (1782). “Continuation of the Experiments and Observations on the 
Speci-.c Gravities and Atractive Powers of Various Saline Substances.” Philosophical
Transactions o+ the Royal Society o+ London 72. Royal Society: 179–237. 
htps://doi.org/10.2307/106458.
———. (1787). An Esay on Phlogiston, and the Constitution o+ Acids. London: J. Davis, 
for P. Elmsly. htps://archive.org/details/b22386816.





ge&q=elements of minerology vol. 2%2C kirwan&f=false.
Klein, Ursula. (1994). “Origin of the Concept of Chemical Compound.” Science in 
Context 7 (2): 163–204.
———. (2015). “A Revolution That Never Happened.” Studi. in History and Philosophy
o+ Science Part A 49. Elsevier Ltd: 80–90. 
htps://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.1.003.
Knor-Cetina, Karin D. (1983). The Ethnographic Study o+ Scienti:c Work: Towards a 
Constructivist Interpretation o+ Science.
———. (2013). The Manufacture o+ Knowledge: An Esay on the Constructivist and 
Contextual Nature o+ Science. Elsevier.
Kordig, Carl R. (1971). “The Theory—Ladennes of Observation.” In The Justi:cation o+ 
Scienti:c Change, 1–33. Springer.
Kuhn, Thomas S. (1976). The Structure o+ Scienti:c Revolutions. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Pres.
———. (1990). “THe Road Since Structure.” Biennial Meeting o+ the PHilosophy o+ 
Science Asociation 1990: 3–13.
Kuhn, Thomas S, and Joseph Epstein. (1979). “The Esential Tension.” AAPT.
Kusch, Martin. (2004). “Rule-Scepticism and the Sociology of Scienti-.c Knowledge: The 
Bloor-Lynch Debate Revisited.” Social Studi. o+ Science 34 (4). Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage Publications: 571–91.
———. (201). “Re?@exibity, Relativism, Microhistory: Three Desiderata for Historical 
143
Epistemologies.” Erkenntn0 75: 483–94.
———. (2015). “Scienti-.c Pluralism and the Chemical Revolution.” Studi. in History 
and Philosophy o+ Science Part A 49: 69–79. 
htps://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2014.10.001.
———. (2017). “Epistemic Relativism, Scepticism, Pluralism.” Synthese 194 (12). Springer 
Netherlands: 4687–4703. htps://doi.org/10.1007/s1229-016-1041-0.
Kusch, Martin, and Katherina Kinzel. (2018). “De-Idealizing Disagreement, Rethinking 
Relativism.” International Journal o+ Philosophical Studi. 26 (1): 40–71.
Ladyman, James. (1998). “What Is Structural Realism?” Studi. in History and Philosophy
o+ Science 29: 409–24.
Latour, Bruno. (1999). Pandora’s Hope: Esays on the Reality o+ Science Studi.. Harvard 
university pres.
Latour, Bruno, and Steve Woolgar. (2013). Laboratory Life: The Construction o+ Scienti:c 
Facts. Princeton University Pres.
Lavoisier, Antoine Laurent. (1776). Esays Physical and Chemical. Translated by Thomas 
Henry. London: Printed for Joseph Johnson.
———. (1777). “"Memoir on Combustion in General in A Source Book in Chemistry 
1400-1900 (New York: McGraw Hil, 1952).” Memoir. de l’Academie Royale D. 
Science, 592–600. htps://doi.org/10.1001/jama.241.25.2730.
Leoneli, Sabina. (2009). “On the Locality of Data and Claims about Phenomena.” 
Philosophy o+ Science 76 (5): 737–49. 
htp://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/605804%5Cnhtp://www.jstor.org/stable/
pdfplus/10.1086/605804.pdS?acceptTC=true.
———. (2012). “Introduction: Making Sense of Data-Driven Research in the Biological 
and Biomedical Sciences.” Studi. in the History and the Philosophy o+ the Biological 
and Biomedical Scienc.: Part C 43 (1): 1–3. 
htps://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.201.10.001.
———. (2013). “Integrating Data to Acquire New Knowledge: Three Modes of 
Integration in Plant Science.” Studi. in History and Philosophy o+ Science Part 
C :Studi. in History and Philosophy o+ Biological and Biomedical Scienc. 44 (4). 
Elsevier Ltd: 503–14. htps://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsc.2013.03.020.
———. (2015). “What Counts as Scienti-.c Data? A Relational Framework.” Philosophy of
Science 82 (5): 1–1.
———. (2016). Data-Centric Biolo9: A Philosophical Study. University of Chicago Pres.
Lewens, Tim. (2005). “Realism and the Strong Program.” The British Journal for the 
Philosophy o+ Science 56 (3). Oxford University Pres: 559–77.
144
Lugg, Andrew. (1986). “Deep Disagreement and Informal Logic: No Cause for Alarm.” 
Informal Logic 8 (1).
Masimi, Michela. (2012). “Scienti-.c Perspectivism and Its Foes.” Philosophica 84: 25–52.
———. (2014). “Natural Kinds and Naturalised Kantianism.” NoA 48 (3): 416–49.
———. (2015). “Walking the Line: Kuhn between Realism and Relativism.” In Kuhn’s 
Structure o+ Scienti:c Revolutions-50 Years On, edited by Wiliam J. Devlin and Alisa 
Bokulich, 135–52. Springer.
———. (2017). “Laws of Nature, Natural Properties, and the Robustly Best System.” The
Monist 100 (3): 406–21.
———. (2018). “Four Kinds of Perspectival Truth.” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 96 (2). Wiley Online Library: 342–59.
Masimi, Michela, and Casey McCoy. (2019). Understanding Perspectivism: Scienti:c 
Chaleng. and Methodological Prospects. Edited by Michela Masimi and C D 
McCoy. New York: Taylor & Francis.
Mauskop, Seymour. (2002). “Richard Kirwan’s Phlogiston Theory : Its Succes and Fate” 
49 (3): 185–205. htps://doi.org/10.179/amb.2002.49.3.185.
Mccormmach, Rusel, and Christa Jungnickel. (2016). Cavendish: The Experimental Life.
Edition Open Acces.
Mitchel, Sandra D. (1992). “On Pluralism and Competition in Evolutionary 
Explanations.” American Zoologist 32 (1). Oxford University Pres UK: 135–44.
———. (2002). “Integrative Pluralism.” Biolo9 and Philosophy 17 (1). Springer: 55–70.
———. (2003). Biological Complexity and Integrative Pluralism. Cambridge University 
Pres.
———. (2009). Unsimple Truths: Science, Complexity, and Policy. University of Chicago 
Pres.
Morison, Margaret, and M Morgan. (1999). Models / Mediators : Perspectiv. on 
Natural and Social Scienc.. Edited by Margaret Morison and Mary Morgan. Ideas 
in Context ;52. Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres.
Multhauf, Robert P. (1962). “On the Use of the Balance in Chemistry.” Source: 
Proceedings o+ the American Philosophical Society 106 (3): 210–18. 
htp://www.jstor.org/stable/985176.
Parker, Wendy. (2015). “Computer Simulation, Measurement, and Data Asimilation.” 
The British Journal for the Philosophy o+ Science 68 (1): 273–304.
Parker, Wendy S. (2010). “Scienti-.c Models and Adequacy-for-Purpose.” The Modern 
Schoolman 87 (3/4): 285–93.
Pickering, Andrew. (1992). Science / Practice and Culture. University of Chicago Pres.
145
Priestley, Joseph. (1775). “An Account of Further Discoveries in Air.” Philosophical 
Transactions 65: 384–94. htp://www.jstor.org/stable/106209.
———. (1800). “The Doctrine of Phlogiston Established, and That of the Composition 
of Water Refuted.” A. Kennedy.
Psilos, Stathis. (1999). Scienti:c Realism: How Science Tracks Truth. London and New 
York: Routledge.
Reichenbach, H. (1938). Experience and Prediction: An Analys0 o+ the Foundations and 
the Structure o+ Knowledge. Chicago: Chicago University Pres.
Rheinberger, Hans-Jörg. (201). “Infra-Experimentality: From Traces to Data, from Data 
to Paterning Facts.” History o+ Science 49 (3). SAGE Publications Sage UK: London,
England: 337–48.
Rosen, G. (2001). “Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism.” Philosophical 
Perspectiv. 15: 69–91.
Ruth, Weintraub. (2013). “Can Steadfast Peer Disagreement Be Rational?” The 
Philosophical Nuarterly 63 (253). Blackwel Publishers Ltd: 740–59.
Schindler, Samuel. (201). “Bogen and Woodward’s Data-Phenomena Distinction, Forms 
of Theory-Ladennes, and the Reliability of Data.” Synthese 182 (1). Springer: 39–55.
Shannon, Claude Elwood. (1948). “A Mathematical Theory of Communication.” Bel 
System Technical Journal 27 (3). Wiley Online Library: 379–423.
Siegfried, Robert. (1968). “Composition, a Neglected Aspect of the Chemical 
Revolution.” Annals o+ Science 24 (4): 275–93. 
htps://doi.org/10.1080/00033796800200201.
———. (2002). “From Elements to Atoms: A History of Chemical Composition .” 
Transactions o+ the American Philosophical Society 92 (4): i–278. 
htp://www.jstor.org/stable/4144909.
Siegfried, Robert, and Bety Jo Dobbs. (1968). “Composition, a Neglected Aspect of the 
Chemical Revolution.” Annals o+ Science 24 (4): 275–93. 
htp://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00033796800200201.
Stoney, G. (1883). “On the Physical Units of Nature, Sci.” In Proc. Roy. Dublin Soc, 3:51.
Straser, Bruno J. (2012). “Data-Driven Sciences: From Wonder Cabinets to Electronic 
Databases.” Studi. in History and Philosophy o+ Science Part C: Studi. in History 
and Philosophy o+ Biological and Biomedical Scienc. 43 (1). Pergamon: 85–87.
Suarez, Mauricio. (2010). “Scienti-.c Representation.” Philosophy Compas 1 (5): 91–101.
Suárez, Mauricio. (2004). “An Inferential Conception of Scienti-.c Representation.” 
Philosophy o+ Science 71 (5). The University of Chicago Pres: 767–79.
Suppes, Patrick. (1966). “Models of Data.” In Studi. in Logic and the Foundations o+ 
146
Mathematics, 44:252–61. Elsevier.
———. (1978). “The Plurality of Science.” In PSA: Proceedings o+ the Biennial Meeting 
o+ the Philosophy o+ Science Asociation, 1978:3–16.
Tal, Eran. (2014). “Making Time: A Study in the Epistemology of Measurement.” The 
British Journal for the Philosophy o+ Science 67 (1). Oxford University Pres: 297–335.
Thorset, Stephen Erik. (1992). “Identi-.cation of the Pulsar PSR1509—58 with the ‘guest 
Star’ of AD 185.” Nature 355: 717–19.
Turner, Dale, and Lary Wright. (2005). “Revisiting Deep Disagreement.” Informal Logic 
25 (1).
Witgenstein, Ludwig. (2008). Philosophical Investigations. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe 
and R. Rhees. Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. 3rd ed. Oxford: Blackwel 
Publishing Ltd.
Woodward, James. (2010). “Data, Phenomena, Signal, and Noise.” Philosophy o+ Science 
77: 792–803.
Wright, Crispin. (2008). “Fear of Relativism?” Philosophical Studi. 141 (3). Dordrecht: 
Springer Science & Busines Media: 379–90. 
htp://search.proquest.com/docview/196618180/.
Wylie, Alison. (2015). “A Plurality of Pluralisms: Colaborative Practice in Archaeology.” 
In Objectivity in Science, 189–210. Springer.
147
